Who gets to decide what the law means—Congress, agencies, or courts?
For forty years, that question was largely answered by a single Supreme Court case: Chevron. Under what became known as “Chevron deference,” courts were required to defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute the agency administers.
In this episode, Gwen and Marc explain what Chevron deference actually was, why it mattered so much to the administrative state, and how it quietly shaped everyday government decision-making—from environmental rules to labor protections to healthcare policy.
This isn’t an episode about technical doctrine for its own sake. It’s about institutional power.
Together, we explore:
- Why Congress often writes ambiguous statutes—and why that’s not a bug, but a feature
- How Chevron shifted interpretive authority from courts to agencies
- What courts were supposed to do under Chevron, and what they often did instead
- Why Chevron made agencies more powerful—but also more vulnerable
- How Chevron fits into the broader story of delegation, expertise, and democratic accountability
By the end of the episode, you’ll understand why Chevron became one of the most important—and controversial—doctrines in administrative law, and why battles over “who decides” were inevitable.
This episode sets the stage for later conversations about Skidmore, the major questions doctrine, and what happens when Chevron disappears.
00:00:14 --> 00:00:17 Hello, and welcome to Administrative Remedies,
00:00:17 --> 00:00:19 because you can't fix what you don't understand.
00:00:19 --> 00:00:21 Brought to you in part by the University of Tulsa
00:00:21 --> 00:00:24 College of Law. I'm Gwendolyn Savitz, an associate
00:00:24 --> 00:00:26 professor here at TU and the associate dean of
00:00:26 --> 00:00:28 research and intellectual life. And I'm Mark
00:00:28 --> 00:00:31 Rourke. I'm the dean of the College of Law. We'll
00:00:31 --> 00:00:33 be breaking down complex doctrines with real
00:00:33 --> 00:00:35 -life analogies and examples to demystify the
00:00:35 --> 00:00:37 world of administrative law for everyone trying
00:00:37 --> 00:00:39 to understand how government actually works.
00:00:40 --> 00:00:41 Agencies are the main way the federal government
00:00:41 --> 00:00:44 gets things done. It's not through Congress for
00:00:44 --> 00:00:46 reasons we'll be addressing over the course of
00:00:46 --> 00:00:51 this series. We've spent the last two episodes
00:00:51 --> 00:00:53 exploring the major questions doctrine, when
00:00:53 --> 00:00:56 Congress has to speak super, super clearly to
00:00:56 --> 00:00:58 issues of vast economic and political significance.
00:00:59 --> 00:01:03 Today, we're turning to another doctrine that
00:01:03 --> 00:01:06 controlled how administrative law functioned
00:01:06 --> 00:01:10 for decades, and that is Chevron. So, Mark, we're
00:01:10 --> 00:01:13 going to go back to the babysitter. Except now
00:01:13 --> 00:01:16 we're going to make her a nanny. We'll call her
00:01:16 --> 00:01:18 Crystal. She's been with this family for two
00:01:18 --> 00:01:21 years. She does the school pickup, homework,
00:01:21 --> 00:01:24 dinner, the whole routine. Okay. So she knows
00:01:24 --> 00:01:27 how our wife works and she knows how the kids
00:01:27 --> 00:01:31 work. Yes. She also knows that homework needs
00:01:31 --> 00:01:33 to happen before screens or everything goes downhill.
00:01:33 --> 00:01:35 The kids have sloppy handwriting. They're rushing
00:01:35 --> 00:01:39 through it. They don't retain anything. So it's
00:01:39 --> 00:01:42 645. The kids' favorite show is on at 7. And
00:01:42 --> 00:01:44 Crystal's told the kid that homework needs to
00:01:44 --> 00:01:47 get done first or the kid can't watch. The kid
00:01:47 --> 00:01:50 does not like this, calls up Grandma at 6 .55
00:01:50 --> 00:01:52 and says, Crystal's making up rules. Mom and
00:01:52 --> 00:01:55 Dad didn't say when I had to do homework. They
00:01:55 --> 00:01:57 just said my homework has to get done. What does
00:01:57 --> 00:02:01 Grandma do then? This we could think of as a
00:02:01 --> 00:02:03 Chevron situation. So the instructions are vague
00:02:03 --> 00:02:04 if the parents just want to make sure the homework
00:02:04 --> 00:02:07 is done. Crystal has expertise. She knows the
00:02:07 --> 00:02:10 kid. She knows the family. Under Chevron, grandma
00:02:10 --> 00:02:12 would defer to Crystal's reasonable interpretation,
00:02:12 --> 00:02:15 meaning the kid has to do the homework before
00:02:15 --> 00:02:18 they can watch TV, even if the grandma might
00:02:18 --> 00:02:21 have let the kid do it afterwards. And that's
00:02:21 --> 00:02:25 what courts did with agencies. Yes. For 40 years,
00:02:25 --> 00:02:29 if Congress left something unclear, and as we've
00:02:29 --> 00:02:32 talked about, Congress can leave a lot of things
00:02:32 --> 00:02:34 unclear, courts deferred to the agency's reasonable
00:02:34 --> 00:02:39 expert judges. In this example, Crystal obviously
00:02:39 --> 00:02:41 is the agency, but we needed to bring in the
00:02:41 --> 00:02:43 grandparents. We couldn't just have the parents
00:02:43 --> 00:02:46 coming back because the whole point is that the
00:02:46 --> 00:02:50 person making this decision about what the delegator
00:02:50 --> 00:02:53 meant, what Congress meant, isn't Congress. So
00:02:53 --> 00:02:56 we need to have a third party in there. So this
00:02:56 --> 00:02:58 is about who gets to fill in the blanks when
00:02:58 --> 00:03:02 Congress is being vague. Yes. And Congress is
00:03:02 --> 00:03:05 vague all the time, sometimes because they can't
00:03:05 --> 00:03:09 agree on stuff. But also because they can't predict
00:03:09 --> 00:03:12 every situation that a particular agency would
00:03:12 --> 00:03:15 face. Right. Like we talked about the Clean Air
00:03:15 --> 00:03:19 Act before, how Congress wants the EPA to regulate
00:03:19 --> 00:03:21 air pollutants, but doesn't necessarily know
00:03:21 --> 00:03:23 what a pollutant should be. Like carbon dioxide,
00:03:23 --> 00:03:26 does that count? Yeah. I mean, we breathe it
00:03:26 --> 00:03:30 out, but is that pollution? But what level of
00:03:30 --> 00:03:32 danger and what kinds of danger should the agency
00:03:32 --> 00:03:34 have to act on? One death per million, per billion?
00:03:35 --> 00:03:38 And they didn't specify. They can't for so many
00:03:38 --> 00:03:41 of these areas. Environmental statutes, workplace
00:03:41 --> 00:03:44 regulations, food safety. These statutes are
00:03:44 --> 00:03:47 full of terms like reasonable, feasible, appropriate,
00:03:48 --> 00:03:51 harmful, fair. And someone has to put numbers
00:03:51 --> 00:03:54 to give meaning to those words. Yes. So the question
00:03:54 --> 00:03:56 is, who should be the one doing that? The agency
00:03:56 --> 00:03:59 that works with that kind of issue every day
00:03:59 --> 00:04:01 or judges who only see that issue occasionally?
00:04:02 --> 00:04:05 And agencies that have more expertise with this
00:04:05 --> 00:04:08 area do more practice with it, probably are in
00:04:08 --> 00:04:10 a better position to decide what those numbers
00:04:10 --> 00:04:12 should be. That's what the Supreme Court said
00:04:12 --> 00:04:15 for decades. But to understand why this is such
00:04:15 --> 00:04:17 a big deal, let's talk about the actual case
00:04:17 --> 00:04:22 itself. If we're thinking about Chevron, this
00:04:22 --> 00:04:26 is 1984, Reagan's president. His EPA is trying
00:04:26 --> 00:04:27 to help the industry while still complying with
00:04:27 --> 00:04:31 the Clean Air Act. Reagan's EPA is helping the
00:04:31 --> 00:04:35 industry? That's shocking. I know. So everything
00:04:35 --> 00:04:37 comes down to one word in the Clean Air Act,
00:04:37 --> 00:04:40 and that is source. Source of what? Source of
00:04:40 --> 00:04:42 pollution. So the Clean Air Act said that areas
00:04:42 --> 00:04:45 with dirty air, which are called non -attainment
00:04:45 --> 00:04:48 areas, in those types of areas, any new or modified
00:04:48 --> 00:04:50 stationary source of pollution needs a permit.
00:04:50 --> 00:04:53 And getting that permit meant you had to install
00:04:53 --> 00:04:55 the best available technology. Let me guess,
00:04:56 --> 00:04:59 that's going to cost a lot of money. Millions
00:04:59 --> 00:05:01 of dollars per smokestack. But here was the important
00:05:01 --> 00:05:04 question. What counts as a source? Is it every
00:05:04 --> 00:05:07 individual smokestack? Well, that would make
00:05:07 --> 00:05:09 sense because each one would then emit pollution.
00:05:10 --> 00:05:14 Or is the entire factory one source? Oh, OK.
00:05:14 --> 00:05:17 I can see that. So Reagan's EPA came up with
00:05:17 --> 00:05:20 the bubble concept. We can picture a giant imaginary
00:05:20 --> 00:05:23 bubble over the entire industrial plant. Like
00:05:23 --> 00:05:27 a dome. Yes. And everything inside that bubble
00:05:27 --> 00:05:30 or under the dome. All the smokestacks, the vents,
00:05:30 --> 00:05:32 every emission point there, that is one single
00:05:32 --> 00:05:35 source. So if you have a factory with 10 smokestacks
00:05:35 --> 00:05:38 and you want to modify smokestack number three
00:05:38 --> 00:05:41 to increase production. Which would increase
00:05:41 --> 00:05:44 the emissions from that stack. Yes. So under
00:05:44 --> 00:05:47 this individual approach, you need a permit and
00:05:47 --> 00:05:50 expensive controls on smokestack three. But under
00:05:50 --> 00:05:52 the bubble concept, you would look at all of
00:05:52 --> 00:05:54 the different smokestacks combined and there
00:05:54 --> 00:05:56 might be something you could do to reduce emission
00:05:56 --> 00:05:58 at another smokestack. Maybe you're shutting
00:05:58 --> 00:06:00 it down or maybe it's doing something where you
00:06:00 --> 00:06:03 can put cheaper control technology on that one.
00:06:03 --> 00:06:06 So you have a total cap of what you can do. And
00:06:06 --> 00:06:08 sometimes that means you can modify the different
00:06:08 --> 00:06:12 things you have at your control. Right. So you
00:06:12 --> 00:06:14 can't be emitting more pollution total from that
00:06:14 --> 00:06:17 factory, but you could adjust what you're doing
00:06:17 --> 00:06:20 to try and even that emission out. Okay. And
00:06:20 --> 00:06:22 then you wouldn't have to have a permit. Right.
00:06:23 --> 00:06:24 You wouldn't need to go through the expensive
00:06:24 --> 00:06:26 permit process and you wouldn't need to go through
00:06:26 --> 00:06:28 the expensive technology to improve the emissions
00:06:28 --> 00:06:32 for that one particular smokestack. It does seem
00:06:32 --> 00:06:35 a little bit like playing fast and loose with
00:06:35 --> 00:06:38 what the rules are governing industrial complexes.
00:06:38 --> 00:06:41 That is what the Natural Resources Defense Council
00:06:41 --> 00:06:44 said, too. They sued saying that the whole point
00:06:44 --> 00:06:46 in these non -attainment areas was to reduce
00:06:46 --> 00:06:49 the pollution whenever possible. And if you let
00:06:49 --> 00:06:51 companies just shuffle pollution around under
00:06:51 --> 00:06:53 an imaginary bubble, that would defeat the purpose.
00:06:54 --> 00:06:56 What did the statue actually say, though, about
00:06:56 --> 00:06:59 the source? It just defined stationary source
00:06:59 --> 00:07:02 as any building, structure, facility, or installation
00:07:02 --> 00:07:05 which emits or may emit any air pollutant. Those
00:07:05 --> 00:07:08 are all different scales of emission, right?
00:07:08 --> 00:07:11 So a building is smaller than a facility. Yeah.
00:07:11 --> 00:07:13 So a building could mean one structure. A facility
00:07:13 --> 00:07:15 could mean the whole complex. An installation
00:07:15 --> 00:07:18 could mean a single piece of equipment or potentially
00:07:18 --> 00:07:21 the entire industrial installation. So essentially
00:07:21 --> 00:07:23 both sides could claim they were right in how
00:07:23 --> 00:07:25 they were interpreting the statute. Yes. Both
00:07:25 --> 00:07:27 sides were absolutely convinced that the plain
00:07:27 --> 00:07:30 language of the statute supported them. The case
00:07:30 --> 00:07:32 goes to the Supreme Court and Stevens writes
00:07:32 --> 00:07:35 an opinion that creates what becomes the Chevron
00:07:35 --> 00:07:39 two -step. Sounds like a dance. It does. A little
00:07:39 --> 00:07:41 easier than the Macarena. So this one just has
00:07:41 --> 00:07:45 two moves. Step one, has Congress directly spoken
00:07:45 --> 00:07:47 to the precise question at issue? Meaning, is
00:07:47 --> 00:07:51 it crystal clear on what source means within
00:07:51 --> 00:07:53 the statute? Yes, that would be what they're
00:07:53 --> 00:07:57 looking at here. At this stage, courts are really
00:07:57 --> 00:07:59 supposed to try. They're using all traditional
00:07:59 --> 00:08:02 tools of statutory interpretation. They're looking
00:08:02 --> 00:08:04 at the text. What do the words mean? They're
00:08:04 --> 00:08:05 looking at the structure. How does this provision
00:08:05 --> 00:08:07 fit in with other provisions? They're looking
00:08:07 --> 00:08:09 at the purpose. What was Congress trying to achieve
00:08:09 --> 00:08:12 with this? So judges can't just glance at it,
00:08:12 --> 00:08:14 throw their hands up and say, it looks confusing
00:08:14 --> 00:08:17 to me. Exactly. They need to genuinely exhaust
00:08:17 --> 00:08:20 every traditional tool of statutory interpretation.
00:08:21 --> 00:08:24 But sometimes after all that work. The statute
00:08:24 --> 00:08:27 is still genuinely ambiguous. Like stationary
00:08:27 --> 00:08:30 source, like we have here. Yes, exactly. This
00:08:30 --> 00:08:33 is definitely an ambiguous statute under that
00:08:33 --> 00:08:35 standard. So when that happens, we go to step
00:08:35 --> 00:08:39 two. If the statute is ambiguous, did the agency
00:08:39 --> 00:08:41 adopt a reasonable interpretation? Reasonable
00:08:41 --> 00:08:43 according to who? So that was the key with the
00:08:43 --> 00:08:46 test. Reasonable didn't mean the best interpretation.
00:08:47 --> 00:08:50 It didn't mean the interpretation the judge would
00:08:50 --> 00:08:53 choose if they were choosing fresh. or the one
00:08:53 --> 00:08:55 that the judge thought best served the statutory
00:08:55 --> 00:08:57 purpose. It just had to be reasonable. That's
00:08:57 --> 00:09:01 a pretty low bar. Yes. The agency didn't need
00:09:01 --> 00:09:03 to be right in the judge's mind, just reasonable.
00:09:03 --> 00:09:06 And that could be within a fairly broad area.
00:09:07 --> 00:09:09 If it was reasonable, the agency wins. Even if
00:09:09 --> 00:09:11 the judge hates the outcome. Even if the judge
00:09:11 --> 00:09:14 thinks it's terrible policy. Even if the judge
00:09:14 --> 00:09:16 thinks there's potentially a better interpretation.
00:09:16 --> 00:09:19 The reasonable agency interpretation beats whatever
00:09:19 --> 00:09:22 the judicial preference is. So in Chevron itself,
00:09:22 --> 00:09:26 then? We say step one, is statutory source clear?
00:09:26 --> 00:09:30 No. As we've established, it could mean an individual
00:09:30 --> 00:09:32 smokestack or it could mean the entire plant.
00:09:33 --> 00:09:36 So step two, is the EPA's bubble concept reasonable?
00:09:36 --> 00:09:40 And the court says yes. Focusing on total plant
00:09:40 --> 00:09:43 emissions is a reasonable approach. Again, the
00:09:43 --> 00:09:47 EPA can be choosing. to allow businesses to control
00:09:47 --> 00:09:50 whatever is cheapest for them to control while
00:09:50 --> 00:09:52 still making sure that we're not increasing the
00:09:52 --> 00:09:55 total emissions from the facility. Wait a minute.
00:09:55 --> 00:09:58 In this case, then the environmental groups lost
00:09:58 --> 00:10:02 under Chevron. Yes, they did. EPA won. EPA's
00:10:02 --> 00:10:04 approach was against what the environmental groups
00:10:04 --> 00:10:07 wanted there, so they lost. I thought Chevron,
00:10:07 --> 00:10:09 though, was about agencies doing more regulation.
00:10:10 --> 00:10:13 In this case, deference meant less environmental
00:10:13 --> 00:10:16 protection. Reagan's business -friendly EPA won.
00:10:17 --> 00:10:20 But it's what happened next that mattered. Let
00:10:20 --> 00:10:23 me guess. The tables turned with a new administration.
00:10:23 --> 00:10:26 Shockingly, they did. So when Clinton came in,
00:10:27 --> 00:10:29 his EPA issued much stricter environmental rules.
00:10:29 --> 00:10:32 Industry challenged them. When that happened,
00:10:32 --> 00:10:35 the EPA would cite Chevron and say our reasonable
00:10:35 --> 00:10:37 interpretation should win. It became a double
00:10:37 --> 00:10:39 -edged sword. Yes, every administration found
00:10:39 --> 00:10:41 Chevron useful when they were defending their
00:10:41 --> 00:10:45 policies because, as we've established, there's
00:10:45 --> 00:10:49 a lot of ambiguity in most statutes. Okay, but
00:10:49 --> 00:10:51 how does this actually affect regular people?
00:10:51 --> 00:10:55 This seems pretty abstract. Let's look at a concrete
00:10:55 --> 00:10:58 example. Organic food. Congress tells the USDA
00:10:58 --> 00:11:01 to create standards for organic labeling, but
00:11:01 --> 00:11:03 the statute just says products should be produced
00:11:03 --> 00:11:05 without synthetic chemicals and using methods
00:11:05 --> 00:11:09 that foster cycling of resources. Sposter cycling
00:11:09 --> 00:11:12 of resources. What does that even mean? Exactly.
00:11:13 --> 00:11:16 So the USDA has to get specific. What percentage
00:11:16 --> 00:11:18 of organic ingredients will make a product organic?
00:11:19 --> 00:11:24 I don't know. 51 %? USDA said 95%. Okay. That's
00:11:24 --> 00:11:27 a very specific number. It is. Someone had to
00:11:27 --> 00:11:30 pick it. So they said at 95%, you can say you're
00:11:30 --> 00:11:33 organic. At 70%, you can say made with organic
00:11:33 --> 00:11:36 ingredients. They also decided things like organic
00:11:36 --> 00:11:39 cows will need access to pasture 120 days a year.
00:11:39 --> 00:11:43 Why 120, not 100, not 150? They're trying to
00:11:43 --> 00:11:47 interpret fostering cycling of resources. It's
00:11:47 --> 00:11:48 going to be a lot easier in some parts of the
00:11:48 --> 00:11:50 country to keep cows out for a lot longer than
00:11:50 --> 00:11:53 other parts of the country. Okay. This is really
00:11:53 --> 00:11:55 deferring to the people who have expertise on
00:11:55 --> 00:11:58 the ground to say what these vague words might
00:11:58 --> 00:12:00 mean within their industry. Is there another
00:12:00 --> 00:12:04 example? Net neutrality. Whether Internet providers
00:12:04 --> 00:12:06 are going to be considered information services
00:12:06 --> 00:12:09 or telecommunication services. OK, I know this
00:12:09 --> 00:12:12 fight and it keeps changing. Yeah. Under Obama,
00:12:12 --> 00:12:14 they're regulated as telecommunication services
00:12:14 --> 00:12:17 and that means heavy regulation. Trump comes
00:12:17 --> 00:12:19 in. They're now an information service. Hands
00:12:19 --> 00:12:22 off. Biden comes back in back to telecommunications.
00:12:22 --> 00:12:25 It seems very chaotic. The rules change every
00:12:25 --> 00:12:28 four years. This. Constant flip -flopping. This
00:12:28 --> 00:12:31 was one of the major criticisms people had about
00:12:31 --> 00:12:34 Chevron, that we would defer to whatever the
00:12:34 --> 00:12:36 agency interpretation was and the agency interpretation
00:12:36 --> 00:12:39 could change. Was it really that big of a change
00:12:39 --> 00:12:42 in 1984? This is what is so important and what
00:12:42 --> 00:12:44 most people don't really understand. Courts were
00:12:44 --> 00:12:47 doing this long before Chevron. Let's talk about
00:12:47 --> 00:12:49 United States v. Hammers. This is from 1911.
00:12:50 --> 00:12:52 It's a perjury case, and the entire prosecution
00:12:52 --> 00:12:55 hinges on whether the Desert Land Act allows
00:12:55 --> 00:12:58 someone to assign a land entry. Here's the part
00:12:58 --> 00:13:00 where the court discusses what the district court
00:13:00 --> 00:13:04 said about agency deference. It was also conceded
00:13:04 --> 00:13:07 that the rule often authoritatively announced
00:13:07 --> 00:13:09 is that where a court is doubtful about the meaning
00:13:09 --> 00:13:12 of an act of Congress, the construction placed
00:13:12 --> 00:13:15 upon the act by the department Charged with its
00:13:15 --> 00:13:18 enforcement is in the highest degree persuasive,
00:13:18 --> 00:13:21 if not controlling. And then the court said,
00:13:21 --> 00:13:25 such decision, however it was said, only determined
00:13:25 --> 00:13:28 in cases of doubt. And as the court found no
00:13:28 --> 00:13:31 ambiguity in the act, decided against the ruling
00:13:31 --> 00:13:34 of the department and the contention of the government.
00:13:34 --> 00:13:37 Here, the district court said, if I had doubt,
00:13:37 --> 00:13:40 I'd defer. But I don't, so I'm not going to.
00:13:40 --> 00:13:44 And the Supreme Court didn't buy that. No. Look
00:13:44 --> 00:13:46 at how the Supreme Court responds. We do not
00:13:46 --> 00:13:50 find the Act of 1891 as clear as the Learned
00:13:50 --> 00:13:53 District Court did and must give to decisions
00:13:53 --> 00:13:55 of the Land Department the weight to which such
00:13:55 --> 00:13:58 case the court acknowledged they are entitled.
00:13:58 --> 00:14:01 There it is. Once we determine there's some ambiguity,
00:14:02 --> 00:14:04 the agency's longstanding interpretation carries
00:14:04 --> 00:14:07 weight, so they deferred to the agency. Here's
00:14:07 --> 00:14:10 another one from 1980. This is just four years
00:14:10 --> 00:14:13 before Chevron. It's... Board Motor Credit v.
00:14:13 --> 00:14:16 Milholland. Here the court deferred to the Federal
00:14:16 --> 00:14:18 Reserve Board's longstanding interpretation that
00:14:18 --> 00:14:21 lenders didn't need to disclose acceleration
00:14:21 --> 00:14:23 clauses on the face of consumer credit contracts.
00:14:24 --> 00:14:26 Deference to the Federal Reserve is compelled
00:14:26 --> 00:14:30 by necessity. Compelled by necessity. A court
00:14:30 --> 00:14:33 that tries to chart a true course to the act's
00:14:33 --> 00:14:36 purpose embarks upon a voyage without a compass
00:14:36 --> 00:14:39 when it disregards the agency's views. That's
00:14:39 --> 00:14:42 rather poetic. It is. Keep going. Striking the
00:14:42 --> 00:14:45 appropriate balance is an empirical process that
00:14:45 --> 00:14:48 entails investigation into consumer psychology
00:14:48 --> 00:14:51 and presupposes a broad experience with credit
00:14:51 --> 00:14:53 practices. Administrative agencies are simply
00:14:53 --> 00:14:56 better suited than courts to engage in such a
00:14:56 --> 00:14:59 process. Simply better suited? They're just saying
00:14:59 --> 00:15:04 agencies are better than us. Yes, this was decades
00:15:04 --> 00:15:07 of deferring to agencies. Okay, so if this was
00:15:07 --> 00:15:10 so established, why was Chevron special? Part
00:15:10 --> 00:15:12 of it is that at the time Chevron was issued,
00:15:13 --> 00:15:16 it wasn't special. This was not a big case. It
00:15:16 --> 00:15:18 wasn't viewed as such when it came out. And one
00:15:18 --> 00:15:22 way we can tell that is that the very day Chevron
00:15:22 --> 00:15:26 was decided, June 25th, 1984, they decided another
00:15:26 --> 00:15:28 case using traditional agency deference and didn't
00:15:28 --> 00:15:31 even mention Chevron. The same day? Yes, the
00:15:31 --> 00:15:35 exact same day. This was Shurtan v. NLRB. And
00:15:35 --> 00:15:37 here the question is whether undocumented immigrants
00:15:37 --> 00:15:40 count as employees under labor law. Oh, that's
00:15:40 --> 00:15:44 quite controversial. Yeah, it has huge implications.
00:15:44 --> 00:15:48 All the statute says is employee means any employee.
00:15:49 --> 00:15:53 And that's not really all that helpful. It's
00:15:53 --> 00:15:56 not. Circular definitions generally aren't. The
00:15:56 --> 00:15:59 NLRB said undocumented workers are covered. The
00:15:59 --> 00:16:01 employer said they're not really employees, and
00:16:01 --> 00:16:04 the court deferred to the NLRB. But here's their
00:16:04 --> 00:16:06 reasoning. Can you read this part? Since the
00:16:06 --> 00:16:09 task of defining the term employee is one that
00:16:09 --> 00:16:11 has been assigned primarily to the agency created
00:16:11 --> 00:16:14 by Congress to administer the act. So assigned
00:16:14 --> 00:16:16 to the agency here. The board's construction
00:16:16 --> 00:16:19 of that term is entitled to considerable deference,
00:16:19 --> 00:16:22 and we will uphold any interpretation that is
00:16:22 --> 00:16:25 reasonably defensible. Reasonably defensible.
00:16:25 --> 00:16:27 That's basically Chevron. It is, but they're
00:16:27 --> 00:16:31 citing a 1944 case, not Chevron, which they decided
00:16:31 --> 00:16:34 the very same day. Did the justices not talk
00:16:34 --> 00:16:36 to each other? These were written by different
00:16:36 --> 00:16:39 people. It's the same principle, we're going
00:16:39 --> 00:16:41 to defer to the agency, comes out on the exact
00:16:41 --> 00:16:45 same day. It's safe to assume that if the court
00:16:45 --> 00:16:48 viewed Chevron as a new test and a change in
00:16:48 --> 00:16:50 the way they were interpreting agency law, they
00:16:50 --> 00:16:52 would have used the opportunity to apply it to
00:16:52 --> 00:16:54 another case that they were issuing the exact
00:16:54 --> 00:16:56 same day on agency deference. That's actually
00:16:56 --> 00:17:00 pretty funny. It shows Chevron wasn't revolutionary.
00:17:00 --> 00:17:02 It was just one way of expressing what courts
00:17:02 --> 00:17:05 had always done. Why did then Chevron become
00:17:05 --> 00:17:08 the standard? Mostly because this two -step test
00:17:08 --> 00:17:11 was crystal clear. This was a longstanding thing
00:17:11 --> 00:17:13 that the court had been doing for a long time,
00:17:13 --> 00:17:15 but it was also being expressed in a lot of different
00:17:15 --> 00:17:19 ways. Plus, this was ideologically neutral. Reagan's
00:17:19 --> 00:17:22 EPA used it for deregulation. Clinton's EPA used
00:17:22 --> 00:17:24 it for stricter rules. Everyone found it useful
00:17:24 --> 00:17:27 sometimes. A truly actual bipartisan doctrine.
00:17:27 --> 00:17:31 Yes. And it was at the court, too. This was a
00:17:31 --> 00:17:34 unanimous decision, which sure tan was not, although
00:17:34 --> 00:17:36 there were kind of different groups that were
00:17:36 --> 00:17:38 voting in them. This was seen as just straightforward,
00:17:38 --> 00:17:41 neutral administrative law, not politics. So
00:17:41 --> 00:17:43 deference is the court accepting an agency's
00:17:43 --> 00:17:45 interpretation, even if they might have chosen
00:17:45 --> 00:17:48 differently. It's not blind acceptance. It's
00:17:48 --> 00:17:50 just respect for the expertise and institutional
00:17:50 --> 00:17:53 role of the agency. The court really does have
00:17:53 --> 00:17:56 to work at step one before moving on to step
00:17:56 --> 00:17:58 two. It's traditional tools of statutory interpretation.
00:17:58 --> 00:18:01 These are the methods courts use for every other
00:18:01 --> 00:18:03 case to try and determine statutory meaning.
00:18:04 --> 00:18:06 They look at the text, the structure, the legislative
00:18:06 --> 00:18:08 history, the purpose, interpretive canons. This
00:18:08 --> 00:18:12 is functionally what courts do in every case.
00:18:12 --> 00:18:15 This is why Chevron wasn't some sort of complete
00:18:15 --> 00:18:17 judicial abdication. We didn't go straight to,
00:18:17 --> 00:18:20 is this agency interpretation within the realm
00:18:20 --> 00:18:22 of reasonable? It was only when the statute was
00:18:22 --> 00:18:25 actually ambiguous. Okay, before we wrap up today,
00:18:25 --> 00:18:28 help me understand the theory here. Why should
00:18:28 --> 00:18:31 agencies get any deference at all? There are
00:18:31 --> 00:18:34 several justifications, and they can lead to
00:18:34 --> 00:18:38 different results. The first is expertise. Agencies
00:18:38 --> 00:18:41 know their subject matter. Makes sense. EPA understands
00:18:41 --> 00:18:44 pollution better than judges. Next one is democratic
00:18:44 --> 00:18:46 accountability. The agency heads are appointed
00:18:46 --> 00:18:50 by elected presidents. If you do not like what
00:18:50 --> 00:18:53 an agency is doing, theoretically, you can elect
00:18:53 --> 00:18:56 a new president. Judges, in contrast, have lifetime
00:18:56 --> 00:18:59 tenure and are accountable to nobody. But then
00:18:59 --> 00:19:02 that makes interpretation seem political. Yeah,
00:19:02 --> 00:19:04 we can think about whether this is law or politics.
00:19:04 --> 00:19:07 Critics say Chevron enabled lawlessness. Defenders
00:19:07 --> 00:19:10 say it enables democratic choice within statutory
00:19:10 --> 00:19:13 bounds. Could say all law is politics at a certain
00:19:13 --> 00:19:16 level. You definitely could. So what's the third
00:19:16 --> 00:19:18 theory? So the last one is congressional intent.
00:19:19 --> 00:19:22 When Congress is using vague terms, that might
00:19:22 --> 00:19:24 be because they're deliberately delegating that
00:19:24 --> 00:19:27 choice to the agency. Or it could be that they
00:19:27 --> 00:19:31 couldn't agree on specifics. Yeah. So sometimes
00:19:31 --> 00:19:33 this vagueness is going to be because they want
00:19:33 --> 00:19:36 the agency making the choice. Sometimes it's
00:19:36 --> 00:19:38 because they couldn't reach an agreement and
00:19:38 --> 00:19:40 they had to compromise. Sometimes it's going
00:19:40 --> 00:19:42 to be because it just never occurred to anybody
00:19:42 --> 00:19:45 that what they were doing wasn't clear. And there
00:19:45 --> 00:19:47 could be like a fourth theory here, which is
00:19:47 --> 00:19:51 if Congress wanted to be more specific, this
00:19:51 --> 00:19:55 agency rule incentivizes Congress to be more
00:19:55 --> 00:19:59 specific rather than leaving their words to be
00:19:59 --> 00:20:02 interpreted by agencies. Yes, exactly. If they
00:20:02 --> 00:20:03 knew exactly what they wanted and they could
00:20:03 --> 00:20:05 agree on that, there wouldn't be any reason in
00:20:05 --> 00:20:07 letting an agency take a chance potentially interpreting
00:20:07 --> 00:20:10 something differently. Chevron assumed that if
00:20:10 --> 00:20:12 there was ambiguity in the statute, that meant
00:20:12 --> 00:20:15 Congress had delegated it. Critics say that's
00:20:15 --> 00:20:17 backwards. Ambiguity just means Congress didn't
00:20:17 --> 00:20:20 decide, so courts should decide. Any other theories?
00:20:21 --> 00:20:23 There's one that's just practical necessity.
00:20:23 --> 00:20:26 Here's what Stevens said about it in Chevron.
00:20:26 --> 00:20:29 Judges are not experts in the field and are not
00:20:29 --> 00:20:31 part of either political branch of the government.
00:20:32 --> 00:20:35 All right, keep going. Courts must in some cases
00:20:35 --> 00:20:38 reconcile competing political interests, but
00:20:38 --> 00:20:40 not on the basis of the judge's personal policy
00:20:40 --> 00:20:44 preferences. So judges lack both expertise and
00:20:44 --> 00:20:46 political authority. This is really an argument
00:20:46 --> 00:20:50 about judicial modesty. But critics say interpreting
00:20:50 --> 00:20:53 law is exactly what judges do. Even when it requires
00:20:53 --> 00:20:56 technical knowledge. That's the tension. Is interpreting
00:20:56 --> 00:20:59 stationary source a legal question or a policy
00:20:59 --> 00:21:02 question? It kind of seems like both. Chevron
00:21:02 --> 00:21:05 said when the legal question is unclear, it becomes
00:21:05 --> 00:21:08 a policy question and that we're leaving to agencies.
00:21:08 --> 00:21:11 Critics, in contrast, would say that. It is always
00:21:11 --> 00:21:14 a legal question, and that is always for a judge
00:21:14 --> 00:21:18 to decide. Even the hard ones? Every case. Let
00:21:18 --> 00:21:21 me make sure I've got this. Chevron created two
00:21:21 --> 00:21:23 -step tests that formalized what courts have
00:21:23 --> 00:21:25 been doing for almost a century, deferring to
00:21:25 --> 00:21:29 reasonable agency interpretations. Yes, and for
00:21:29 --> 00:21:31 40 years, this shaped the entire administrative
00:21:31 --> 00:21:34 state. How agencies wrote rules, how businesses
00:21:34 --> 00:21:36 planned compliance, how Congress wrote statutes.
00:21:37 --> 00:21:39 And every agency regulation we have talked about,
00:21:39 --> 00:21:43 organic food, net neutrality, they all depended
00:21:43 --> 00:21:46 on Chevron. Virtually everything agencies did
00:21:46 --> 00:21:48 depended at least to some extent on Chevron.
00:21:48 --> 00:21:50 Drug approvals, we're looking at whether something
00:21:50 --> 00:21:53 is safe and effective. For workplace safety,
00:21:53 --> 00:21:54 we're looking at whether something is feasible.
00:21:55 --> 00:21:57 In environmental areas, we're looking at what
00:21:57 --> 00:21:59 is the best available technology. In financial
00:21:59 --> 00:22:01 regulation, what is systematically important.
00:22:01 --> 00:22:04 All agency interpretations of vague terms. Yeah,
00:22:04 --> 00:22:07 those are all really vague. Under Chevron, courts
00:22:07 --> 00:22:09 would defer to any of these interpretations that
00:22:09 --> 00:22:11 seemed reasonable. Thousands of agency interpretations
00:22:11 --> 00:22:14 have been upheld under Chevron over the last
00:22:14 --> 00:22:18 four decades. But now it's gone. Yes. We won't
00:22:18 --> 00:22:20 really take apart the death of Chevron for another
00:22:20 --> 00:22:22 couple episodes. Before that, we'll have to talk
00:22:22 --> 00:22:24 about Skidmore. the other kind of theoretical
00:22:24 --> 00:22:28 deference that courts can give to agencies. So
00:22:28 --> 00:22:30 that does it for today's episode on administrative
00:22:30 --> 00:22:33 remedies. Thank you for joining us today. Please,
00:22:33 --> 00:22:35 if you enjoy this podcast and enjoy this episode,
00:22:35 --> 00:22:39 give us a like on Spotify, iTunes, or whatever
00:22:39 --> 00:22:42 platform you're listening on. And be sure to
00:22:42 --> 00:22:44 tune in next time where we'll continue to dive
00:22:44 --> 00:22:46 into the contours of administrative law, because
00:22:46 --> 00:22:48 remember, you can't fix what you don't understand.

