In the season finale, Gwen and Marc turn to Corner Post v. Board of Governors, a decision that reshapes when federal regulations can be challenged—and potentially destabilizes decades of settled law. They open with a property-law analogy, explaining the doctrine of “coming to the nuisance” and why legal systems protect settled expectations and reliance.
They then explain how statutes of limitations have traditionally functioned in administrative law: challenges to regulations had to be brought within six years of issuance. Corner Post upends that understanding by tying accrual to standing, allowing newly formed entities to challenge long-standing regulations as if they were brand new.
Walking through the facts of the case—a challenge to Federal Reserve interchange-fee rules by a company formed years after the regulation—the episode explains why the Court’s reasoning feels intuitive in individual litigation but becomes dangerous when applied to nationwide regulatory schemes. Gwen and Marc show how this eliminates finality, enables strategic plaintiff creation, and supercharges forum shopping.
The episode then examines how Corner Post interacts with Loper Bright and the Major Questions Doctrine, creating a multiplier effect: less deference, stricter substantive limits, and perpetual vulnerability to challenge. The result, they argue, is a regulatory system where no rule is ever truly settled.
The season closes by reflecting on what these cases mean collectively for the administrative state—and why understanding them is essential for anyone trying to make sense of modern governance.
What They Cover in This Episode
- How statutes of limitations normally work
- Accrual, standing, and regulatory finality
- The facts and holding of Corner Post
- “Coming to the regulatory nuisance”
- Reliance interests and settled expectations
- Strategic plaintiff creation and forum shopping
- Circuit fragmentation and regulatory chaos
- How Corner Post compounds Loper Bright
00:00:14 --> 00:00:17 Hello, and welcome to Administrative Remedies,
00:00:17 --> 00:00:19 because you can't fix what you don't understand.
00:00:19 --> 00:00:21 Brought to you in part by the University of Tulsa
00:00:21 --> 00:00:24 College of Law. I'm Gwendolyn Savitz, an associate
00:00:24 --> 00:00:26 professor here at TU and the associate dean of
00:00:26 --> 00:00:28 research and intellectual life. And I'm Mark
00:00:28 --> 00:00:31 Rourke. I'm the dean of the College of Law. We'll
00:00:31 --> 00:00:33 be breaking down complex doctrines with real
00:00:33 --> 00:00:35 -life analogies and examples to demystify the
00:00:35 --> 00:00:37 world of administrative law for everyone trying
00:00:37 --> 00:00:39 to understand how government actually works.
00:00:40 --> 00:00:41 Agencies are the main way the federal government
00:00:41 --> 00:00:44 gets things done. It's not through Congress for
00:00:44 --> 00:00:46 reasons we'll be addressing over the course of
00:00:46 --> 00:00:53 this series. Last time we talked about how Loper
00:00:53 --> 00:00:55 Bright killed Chevron deference, that courts
00:00:55 --> 00:00:58 no longer defer to agency interpretations of
00:00:58 --> 00:01:00 ambiguous statutes. But today we need to talk
00:01:00 --> 00:01:02 about a decision from the same term that might
00:01:02 --> 00:01:05 be even more destabilizing. And to explain it,
00:01:05 --> 00:01:08 we're going to pull in some property law. Property
00:01:08 --> 00:01:12 law? On an administrative wall podcast, now we
00:01:12 --> 00:01:15 are cooking with gas. All right. Tell me about
00:01:15 --> 00:01:19 coming to the nuisance. Imagine that you're buying
00:01:19 --> 00:01:22 a house. You find this perfect house in this
00:01:22 --> 00:01:26 lovely neighborhood that sits right outside of
00:01:26 --> 00:01:31 the busiest airport in the city. And after living
00:01:31 --> 00:01:33 in this house for a couple of months, you realize
00:01:33 --> 00:01:36 that the 5 a .m. flights make a ton of noise.
00:01:36 --> 00:01:39 They shake the house. They cause all kinds of
00:01:39 --> 00:01:41 pollutants in the air. And this really becomes
00:01:41 --> 00:01:45 very annoying to you. Do you get to claim that
00:01:45 --> 00:01:47 as a nuisance against the airport? The answer
00:01:47 --> 00:01:52 is no, because you literally came to the nuisance.
00:01:52 --> 00:01:55 The airport was there first, and you decided
00:01:55 --> 00:01:58 to move in next to the airport. Why does that
00:01:58 --> 00:02:02 rule exist? The law exists primarily because
00:02:02 --> 00:02:06 we try to give people some level of finality
00:02:06 --> 00:02:10 and reliance on the interests that they hold.
00:02:10 --> 00:02:13 So the airport has an economic investment in
00:02:13 --> 00:02:16 the land that it's operating. It schedules flights.
00:02:16 --> 00:02:19 It employs people. It has this massive economic
00:02:19 --> 00:02:22 impact on the community relating to its use of
00:02:22 --> 00:02:25 the land. So it wouldn't really be fair to say
00:02:25 --> 00:02:29 that a landowner can interfere with that economic
00:02:29 --> 00:02:33 use of the land when they're the ones that disrupted
00:02:33 --> 00:02:36 the use in the first place. It's talking about
00:02:36 --> 00:02:39 ensuring that people can rely on settled expectations.
00:02:39 --> 00:02:43 Yeah, exactly. People have an expectation for
00:02:43 --> 00:02:45 how their land will be used. What if the rule
00:02:45 --> 00:02:48 worked the other way? That would be chaos, right?
00:02:48 --> 00:02:52 We would not want landowners to be able to come
00:02:52 --> 00:02:55 in and to say, you have to stop this thing you've
00:02:55 --> 00:02:59 been doing for 25, 50 years in this place that's
00:02:59 --> 00:03:01 created employment, that's created opportunities,
00:03:01 --> 00:03:05 just because this one person has moved into the
00:03:05 --> 00:03:08 neighborhood and has found it a little disruptive.
00:03:09 --> 00:03:14 Welcome to Corner Post, the Board of Governors
00:03:14 --> 00:03:16 of the Federal Reserve System. They came to the
00:03:16 --> 00:03:19 nuisance. Yes, we are indeed talking about coming
00:03:19 --> 00:03:21 to the nuisance. This is about when the statute
00:03:21 --> 00:03:23 of limitation ends to challenge regulations.
00:03:24 --> 00:03:27 It turns what had been a six -year deadline into
00:03:27 --> 00:03:30 a rolling, forever resetting clock. Time is meaningless.
00:03:31 --> 00:03:34 Yes, this is really an existential crisis. Time
00:03:34 --> 00:03:37 has no meaning. What we're talking about is coming
00:03:37 --> 00:03:40 to the regulatory nuisance, except this time
00:03:40 --> 00:03:43 the newcomer wins. Let's talk about what the
00:03:43 --> 00:03:45 statute of limitations is to begin with, because
00:03:45 --> 00:03:48 that matters a lot here. Statute of limitations
00:03:48 --> 00:03:51 are standard limits on when legal actions can
00:03:51 --> 00:03:54 be brought, either challenging legislative acts
00:03:54 --> 00:03:58 or raising private claims within a court system.
00:03:58 --> 00:04:01 Sometimes we call them prescriptive limits. They
00:04:01 --> 00:04:03 prescribe when an action can be brought. Why
00:04:03 --> 00:04:06 would we want to have these limits? There's several
00:04:06 --> 00:04:09 reasons. One is evidence. People's memories get
00:04:09 --> 00:04:12 short. Documents get lost, witnesses become unavailable.
00:04:12 --> 00:04:15 The longer you wait to sue, the harder it is
00:04:15 --> 00:04:18 to figure out what actually happened. But also,
00:04:18 --> 00:04:22 people begin to rely on pre -existing arrangements.
00:04:22 --> 00:04:25 So people make decisions based on the assumption
00:04:25 --> 00:04:27 that if no one's challenged something for years,
00:04:27 --> 00:04:30 this is probably settled out, and therefore they
00:04:30 --> 00:04:33 make some economic choices. And third, it is
00:04:33 --> 00:04:37 a range of finality. We have this idea in the
00:04:37 --> 00:04:41 law. that the capacity to solve problems legally
00:04:41 --> 00:04:47 has a certain finite limit to it. And at some
00:04:47 --> 00:04:50 point, people, institutions need to know that
00:04:50 --> 00:04:53 disputes are just simply resolved and that we
00:04:53 --> 00:04:56 should move on. This makes sense. For challenges
00:04:56 --> 00:04:58 to federal agency action, the relevant statute
00:04:58 --> 00:05:04 for most cases is 28 U .S .C. 2401A, which says
00:05:04 --> 00:05:06 that you have six years to sue the United States.
00:05:07 --> 00:05:10 six years from when the claim accrues. When does
00:05:10 --> 00:05:13 a claim accrue? Well, that's the billion -dollar
00:05:13 --> 00:05:16 question. Literally billion? Many billions. Many
00:05:16 --> 00:05:18 billions. Billions and billions. For decades,
00:05:19 --> 00:05:21 courts said that the clock starts running when
00:05:21 --> 00:05:24 the agency issues a regulation. It's published
00:05:24 --> 00:05:26 in the Federal Register six years from then.
00:05:26 --> 00:05:28 Even if you don't know about the regulation?
00:05:29 --> 00:05:31 Even if you're not in business yet? Yes, even
00:05:31 --> 00:05:34 then, because regulations are generally applicable.
00:05:34 --> 00:05:36 They apply to everybody in a certain category,
00:05:36 --> 00:05:39 all banks or all power plants or all airlines.
00:05:39 --> 00:05:41 If the clock didn't start until each individual
00:05:41 --> 00:05:44 entity was injured, the regulation would never
00:05:44 --> 00:05:46 become final. There would always be someone new
00:05:46 --> 00:05:48 who could challenge it. That makes sense, because
00:05:48 --> 00:05:51 if I'm starting a new business, then I'm starting
00:05:51 --> 00:05:54 a business in the framework and in the environment
00:05:54 --> 00:05:58 in which the industry is being regulated. This
00:05:58 --> 00:06:00 really is like coming to the nuisance doctrine,
00:06:00 --> 00:06:02 right, where there's some level of finality.
00:06:02 --> 00:06:05 Yes. For decades, courts had said that once six
00:06:05 --> 00:06:08 years passes, the regulation is settled, industries
00:06:08 --> 00:06:11 have adjusted, the agency has moved on, everybody's
00:06:11 --> 00:06:13 built compliance systems around it. Like the
00:06:13 --> 00:06:16 airport. At some point, the neighborhood has
00:06:16 --> 00:06:19 to accept that it's there and just recognize
00:06:19 --> 00:06:21 that there will be noises, there will be pollution,
00:06:22 --> 00:06:24 and there will be shaking of buildings that go
00:06:24 --> 00:06:26 on. Right. Unless we're talking about Corner
00:06:26 --> 00:06:30 Post. Okay. Tell me about Corner Post. What actually
00:06:30 --> 00:06:33 happened here? In 2011, the Federal Reserve issued
00:06:33 --> 00:06:36 a regulation about interchange fees. Those are
00:06:36 --> 00:06:37 the fees that merchants pay whenever you swipe
00:06:37 --> 00:06:40 a credit card. I know merchants hate those, right?
00:06:40 --> 00:06:44 Yeah, they do. And so Congress told the Fed to
00:06:44 --> 00:06:46 make sure the fees were reasonable and proportional.
00:06:46 --> 00:06:49 The Fed issued a rule, and then merchants immediately
00:06:49 --> 00:06:51 challenged it, saying that the Fed had set the
00:06:51 --> 00:06:54 fees too high. But then what happened? The merchants
00:06:54 --> 00:06:57 lost. The D .C. Circuit said that the Fed's interpretation
00:06:57 --> 00:07:02 was reasonable. That was in... 2013. So under
00:07:02 --> 00:07:04 the old understanding, the rule was originally
00:07:04 --> 00:07:06 issued in 2011, but the six -year window would
00:07:06 --> 00:07:10 have closed in 2017. We're done. Okay, done and
00:07:10 --> 00:07:11 dusted. That should have been the end of it.
00:07:11 --> 00:07:14 It should have. Under the old understanding,
00:07:14 --> 00:07:16 it was. Anyone who wanted to challenge it had
00:07:16 --> 00:07:20 until 2017. After that, the rule was final. But
00:07:20 --> 00:07:24 then what happened? In this case, in 2018, seven
00:07:24 --> 00:07:26 years after the rule is issued, a truck stop
00:07:26 --> 00:07:28 in North Dakota called Corner Post was founded.
00:07:29 --> 00:07:32 And in 2021, they sued the Federal Reserve over
00:07:32 --> 00:07:35 the same rule. Ten years after the rule was initially
00:07:35 --> 00:07:37 issued. Ten years, yes. But the government said,
00:07:37 --> 00:07:40 you're too late. The statute of limitations expired
00:07:40 --> 00:07:43 in 2017. Corner Post said, no, we weren't even
00:07:43 --> 00:07:46 in existence in 2017. We weren't injured by the
00:07:46 --> 00:07:48 rule until we started to accept credit cards.
00:07:48 --> 00:07:51 So the clock should start when we were harmed,
00:07:51 --> 00:07:53 not when the rule was issued. And the Supreme
00:07:53 --> 00:07:57 Court bought this. Six to three. Justice Barrett.
00:07:58 --> 00:08:01 wrote for the majority. And here, read this part.
00:08:01 --> 00:08:03 A plaintiff's claim does not accrue until he
00:08:03 --> 00:08:06 has the right to assert it. That is, until he
00:08:06 --> 00:08:08 has standing. And because the regulation doesn't
00:08:08 --> 00:08:10 injure a plaintiff until it's applied to him,
00:08:11 --> 00:08:13 he does not obtain standing to challenge it until
00:08:13 --> 00:08:16 then. The court here has tied accrual to standing.
00:08:16 --> 00:08:19 You can't sue until you have standing, and you
00:08:19 --> 00:08:21 don't have standing until you're injured, and
00:08:21 --> 00:08:23 you're not injured until the regulation actually
00:08:23 --> 00:08:26 affects you. Therefore, the clock doesn't start
00:08:26 --> 00:08:29 until you're personally affected. Here's the
00:08:29 --> 00:08:31 next line. This is the part that makes the majority's
00:08:31 --> 00:08:34 rule sound intuitive. A plaintiff cannot sue
00:08:34 --> 00:08:36 before he is injured, so the limitations clock
00:08:36 --> 00:08:40 cannot begin before that injury exists. On its
00:08:40 --> 00:08:42 face, this seems straightforward. Of course,
00:08:42 --> 00:08:45 you can't sue until you're injured. But applying
00:08:45 --> 00:08:48 that tidy principle to regulations that govern
00:08:48 --> 00:08:51 entire national markets is a very different thing.
00:08:51 --> 00:08:54 That's where the trouble starts. Here, read this.
00:08:54 --> 00:08:57 Starting the clock at issuance conflicts with
00:08:57 --> 00:08:59 basic accrual principles. The court's saying
00:08:59 --> 00:09:02 we can't do it the way we have been doing because
00:09:02 --> 00:09:04 that would conflict with these principles. But
00:09:04 --> 00:09:07 what the court is calling these basic accrual
00:09:07 --> 00:09:09 principles were designed for individual lawsuits
00:09:09 --> 00:09:12 between private parties, not for nationwide regulatory
00:09:12 --> 00:09:14 programs that millions of people are relying
00:09:14 --> 00:09:17 on. That's the category error at the heart of
00:09:17 --> 00:09:20 this case. The logic is clean, but. The consequence
00:09:20 --> 00:09:23 is here that no regulation is ever truly final.
00:09:23 --> 00:09:25 There will always be new entities coming into
00:09:25 --> 00:09:28 existence. This is a major problem. Then a regulation
00:09:28 --> 00:09:32 from 1995 can be challenged right now. We can
00:09:32 --> 00:09:35 form a company today and sue five years from
00:09:35 --> 00:09:38 now to try and strike down the regulation. I
00:09:38 --> 00:09:40 mean, that seems like a really massive problem
00:09:40 --> 00:09:42 for a government that depends so much on regulatory
00:09:42 --> 00:09:46 agencies to do its business. It really is. That
00:09:46 --> 00:09:49 brings us back to the airport. Okay. Let's imagine
00:09:49 --> 00:09:51 that the airport has been there for 50 years.
00:09:52 --> 00:09:56 My new neighbor moves in. He sues. Property law
00:09:56 --> 00:09:58 would say, tough luck. You came to the nuisance.
00:09:59 --> 00:10:01 Here, property law would protect settled expectations.
00:10:01 --> 00:10:04 The airport invested a ton of money in the operation.
00:10:05 --> 00:10:07 The other neighbors have adjusted to it. Presumably,
00:10:07 --> 00:10:09 these houses are cheaper because they are near
00:10:09 --> 00:10:12 the airport. The community developed based on
00:10:12 --> 00:10:14 this assumption. You don't get to show up late.
00:10:15 --> 00:10:17 buy something really cheaply and then destroy
00:10:17 --> 00:10:19 what made it cheap in the first place. But Corner
00:10:19 --> 00:10:22 Post says that the regulatory version works the
00:10:22 --> 00:10:25 opposite way. Yes, the exact opposite. Here,
00:10:26 --> 00:10:28 if the EPA issues an air quality rule in 2010,
00:10:28 --> 00:10:32 everyone affected challenges it in 2011 by...
00:10:32 --> 00:10:35 2017, the challenges are done. The window has
00:10:35 --> 00:10:38 closed. And at this point, industries are investing
00:10:38 --> 00:10:41 billions building compliance programs. States
00:10:41 --> 00:10:43 are incorporating the rule into their implementation
00:10:43 --> 00:10:45 plans. People are hopefully breathing cleaner
00:10:45 --> 00:10:47 air and making life decisions based on that.
00:10:47 --> 00:10:50 The entire regulatory neighborhood is settled
00:10:50 --> 00:10:53 around this rule. Then we form a new LLC. It's
00:10:53 --> 00:10:55 subject to the rule, and Corner Post says that
00:10:55 --> 00:10:58 LLC gets to sue just as if the rule came out
00:10:58 --> 00:11:00 yesterday. They get six years from the date they're
00:11:00 --> 00:11:03 formed. That is exactly like the new neighbor
00:11:03 --> 00:11:05 suing the airport. Yes, it's exactly like that.
00:11:05 --> 00:11:08 The new entity is coming to the regulatory nuisance
00:11:08 --> 00:11:10 and demanding it be shut down. All the reliance
00:11:10 --> 00:11:12 interests, all the investments made, all the
00:11:12 --> 00:11:15 planning done, all the settled expectations can
00:11:15 --> 00:11:17 be upended by a single plaintiff who didn't even
00:11:17 --> 00:11:20 exist when the rule was issued. What did the
00:11:20 --> 00:11:22 dissent say in Corner Post? Jackson wrote the
00:11:22 --> 00:11:24 dissent. She was joined by the two other liberal
00:11:24 --> 00:11:27 justices. And she doesn't mince words. Here's
00:11:27 --> 00:11:29 what she has to say. The court's decision today
00:11:29 --> 00:11:32 will unleash chaos. From this day forward, federal
00:11:32 --> 00:11:34 regulations, no matter how longstanding, are
00:11:34 --> 00:11:37 destined to be continuously subject to legal
00:11:37 --> 00:11:40 attack. Indeed, the majority's ruling all but
00:11:40 --> 00:11:42 guarantees that for every rule in the books,
00:11:42 --> 00:11:45 some new formed entity will challenge it within
00:11:45 --> 00:11:48 six years of its creation. The result is a regulatory
00:11:48 --> 00:11:51 wild west. Nothing in the statute compels the
00:11:51 --> 00:11:54 majority's reading and everything in the administrative
00:11:54 --> 00:11:57 state counsels against it. Regulatory Wild West.
00:11:57 --> 00:12:01 I mean, that is a pretty stark description. It
00:12:01 --> 00:12:03 is. The point is simple. The majority's rule
00:12:03 --> 00:12:07 isn't required by the text. And it will destabilize
00:12:07 --> 00:12:09 everything that all of these regulations have
00:12:09 --> 00:12:12 created in long settled expectations. No regulation
00:12:12 --> 00:12:15 will ever be settled. No rule is ever safe. And
00:12:15 --> 00:12:17 agencies have to be prepared to defend everything
00:12:17 --> 00:12:20 forever. I really like the last part of the quote
00:12:20 --> 00:12:22 because it shows that she's thinking about the
00:12:22 --> 00:12:25 real world effects of these opinions. I would
00:12:25 --> 00:12:27 say that. A lot of these recent opinions, like
00:12:27 --> 00:12:29 the ones we've been talking about, read a little
00:12:29 --> 00:12:32 like Originalism 101. They would probably say,
00:12:32 --> 00:12:34 yeah, that sounds right. They're applying these
00:12:34 --> 00:12:38 basic, solid originalism principles. But when
00:12:38 --> 00:12:40 we say 101 after something, we don't really mean
00:12:40 --> 00:12:44 that's the truth. We mean it's the clean, elegant
00:12:44 --> 00:12:45 theory you teach in the first week of class.
00:12:46 --> 00:12:48 Statute of limitations protect plaintiff's right
00:12:48 --> 00:12:50 to sue. Regulations that violate the law are
00:12:50 --> 00:12:52 void from the beginning. If something's illegal,
00:12:52 --> 00:12:55 it doesn't matter how long ago it happened. And
00:12:55 --> 00:12:57 like so much that we've talked about in this
00:12:57 --> 00:13:00 podcast, the administrative state was not inflexible.
00:13:00 --> 00:13:05 But it seems that the court is operating from
00:13:05 --> 00:13:08 the premise that the administrative state has
00:13:08 --> 00:13:11 this rigidity about it that is always going to
00:13:11 --> 00:13:15 be harmful to potential potential owners or business
00:13:15 --> 00:13:18 owners. Yes. So viewing it in this simplistic
00:13:18 --> 00:13:22 way is. Potentially correct in the same way that
00:13:22 --> 00:13:24 saying supply and demand determined prices is
00:13:24 --> 00:13:30 correct in Econ 101. Yes, that's true, but it
00:13:30 --> 00:13:33 is really wildly insufficient once we start adding
00:13:33 --> 00:13:35 in market failures, information asymmetries,
00:13:35 --> 00:13:38 externalities, regulatory capture, monopoly power.
00:13:38 --> 00:13:40 Basically all the things that actually matter
00:13:40 --> 00:13:43 in the real world. So Originalism 101 says that
00:13:43 --> 00:13:46 these illegal rules are void ab initio, void
00:13:46 --> 00:13:49 from the beginning. But that ignores decades
00:13:49 --> 00:13:51 of settled expectations, billions of dollars
00:13:51 --> 00:13:53 in reliance, and entire industries structured
00:13:53 --> 00:13:56 around the existence of the rule. Essentially,
00:13:56 --> 00:13:58 the court is applying a first -year law school
00:13:58 --> 00:14:02 principal to a regulatory regime. And acting
00:14:02 --> 00:14:03 like that's really rigorous legal reasoning.
00:14:04 --> 00:14:06 The majority opinion reads like a clean hypothetical.
00:14:06 --> 00:14:09 But Corner Post isn't a hypothetical. It's a
00:14:09 --> 00:14:10 debt collection rule that had been in place for
00:14:10 --> 00:14:13 a decade. And now some restaurant in North Dakota
00:14:13 --> 00:14:16 gets to blow it all up because they didn't like
00:14:16 --> 00:14:21 the 4 % surcharge on the visa. Yes, which they
00:14:21 --> 00:14:23 would have been aware of when they were thinking
00:14:23 --> 00:14:26 about, is this an economic business to go into?
00:14:26 --> 00:14:28 But that's exactly what the court said, because
00:14:28 --> 00:14:31 in Originalism 101, all that matters is whether
00:14:31 --> 00:14:34 the rule is legal now. Reliance? Stability? the
00:14:34 --> 00:14:37 practical reality that our economy can't function
00:14:37 --> 00:14:40 if every rule is perpetually vulnerable to challenge,
00:14:40 --> 00:14:42 those aren't in the textbook. The rule challenge
00:14:42 --> 00:14:46 in Corner Post was recent, but many others have
00:14:46 --> 00:14:48 been part of the societal fabric for decades.
00:14:49 --> 00:14:51 It's like teaching someone to do laundry by showing
00:14:51 --> 00:14:54 them how to add the soap and then being shocked
00:14:54 --> 00:14:57 when you end up with a bunch of tiny pink sweaters.
00:14:57 --> 00:15:00 Yes. So you taught them one simple and critical
00:15:00 --> 00:15:02 step. You do need to add soap to do laundry,
00:15:02 --> 00:15:05 but you left out a lot of other stuff. You might
00:15:05 --> 00:15:07 want to sort by color, check the temperature,
00:15:07 --> 00:15:09 read the care labels, don't put wool in the dryer.
00:15:09 --> 00:15:12 All the things you would actually need to know
00:15:12 --> 00:15:15 to do laundry successful. Yes. The court really
00:15:15 --> 00:15:16 loves originalism here. They're saying they're
00:15:16 --> 00:15:18 going back to what the founders intended, back
00:15:18 --> 00:15:20 to these first principles. And there's something
00:15:20 --> 00:15:23 intellectually satisfying about it. It feels
00:15:23 --> 00:15:26 pure. It feels uncomplicated. That's what makes
00:15:26 --> 00:15:28 this particularly frustrating. The court acts
00:15:28 --> 00:15:30 like it's being rigorous and principled by sticking
00:15:30 --> 00:15:32 to the basics. We're just following the text.
00:15:33 --> 00:15:35 We're not making policy. But ignoring context
00:15:35 --> 00:15:38 is a choice. Ignoring consequences is a choice.
00:15:38 --> 00:15:40 So what they're calling neutral interpretation
00:15:40 --> 00:15:43 is actually... A specific interpretive philosophy
00:15:43 --> 00:15:47 that prioritizes textual simplicity over functional
00:15:47 --> 00:15:50 reality. Yes, and now it means that 40 -year
00:15:50 --> 00:15:51 -old regulations can be challenged as if they
00:15:51 --> 00:15:54 were issued yesterday. Okay, here's what I'm
00:15:54 --> 00:15:57 wondering. Corner Post by itself seems bad for
00:15:57 --> 00:15:59 regulatory stability. But we just spent the last
00:15:59 --> 00:16:01 episode talking about how Loper Bright killed
00:16:01 --> 00:16:04 Chevron deference. What happens when you put
00:16:04 --> 00:16:07 these two together? That is a really important
00:16:07 --> 00:16:09 question because the answer is that the effects
00:16:09 --> 00:16:14 multiply. How? Under the old system, the EPA
00:16:14 --> 00:16:17 could have issued a regulation in 2005. Industry
00:16:17 --> 00:16:20 challenges it. A lot of the time, if there were
00:16:20 --> 00:16:21 multiple lawsuits, they would have been consolidated.
00:16:22 --> 00:16:23 The court would have ruled. The court probably
00:16:23 --> 00:16:26 applied Chevron at the time. If the statute was
00:16:26 --> 00:16:29 ambiguous, it deferred. The agency won. The rule
00:16:29 --> 00:16:33 was upheld in 2006, and the six -year clock ran
00:16:33 --> 00:16:36 out in 2011. This was done, final, and settled.
00:16:36 --> 00:16:39 Chevron then protected the interpretation, and
00:16:39 --> 00:16:42 the statute of limitations protected the finality.
00:16:42 --> 00:16:45 Yes, and now both protections are gone. A new
00:16:45 --> 00:16:47 company formed today can challenge that 2005
00:16:47 --> 00:16:50 rule. And when they do, the court doesn't ask,
00:16:50 --> 00:16:52 is EPA's interpretation reasonable? It asks,
00:16:52 --> 00:16:55 what do I personally think the best reading of
00:16:55 --> 00:16:57 the statute is? The court's deciding for itself.
00:16:57 --> 00:17:01 Again, this is the court, unelected officials
00:17:01 --> 00:17:05 in the third branch of government choosing to
00:17:05 --> 00:17:07 read or potentially read it differently than
00:17:07 --> 00:17:11 what the regulatory experts, in theory, backed
00:17:11 --> 00:17:14 up by the election process of the president.
00:17:14 --> 00:17:17 would read it. Yes, they're doing it separated
00:17:17 --> 00:17:21 in time, separated in judicial philosophy. This
00:17:21 --> 00:17:23 is completely different. A regulation that almost
00:17:23 --> 00:17:25 certainly would have been upheld as reasonable
00:17:25 --> 00:17:27 under Chevron could easily be struck down today
00:17:27 --> 00:17:30 as not the best reading under Loeb or Bright.
00:17:30 --> 00:17:33 The same regulation literally can be litigated
00:17:33 --> 00:17:36 twice and lose the second time. Not just can
00:17:36 --> 00:17:38 be, will be. And the majority's view of this
00:17:38 --> 00:17:40 is really straightforward. The government's concerns
00:17:40 --> 00:17:43 about finality and reliance cannot alter the
00:17:43 --> 00:17:46 statute Congress enacted. They're saying here
00:17:46 --> 00:17:48 that finality isn't the point. Stability isn't
00:17:48 --> 00:17:50 the point. Reliance isn't the point. The only
00:17:50 --> 00:17:52 thing that matters is the words that Congress
00:17:52 --> 00:17:55 wrote, even if that means that decades -old regulations
00:17:55 --> 00:17:58 are never truly settled. This is not a normal
00:17:58 --> 00:18:01 way to run a regulatory system. If an industry
00:18:01 --> 00:18:03 lost under Chevron and the regulations still
00:18:03 --> 00:18:05 cost them money, they have every incentive to
00:18:05 --> 00:18:08 try again. And to do that, they just need to
00:18:08 --> 00:18:10 form a new entity and bring the challenge in
00:18:10 --> 00:18:12 a new circuit and let the court evaluate it de
00:18:12 --> 00:18:15 novo. Let's try a different analogy. This is
00:18:15 --> 00:18:17 sort of like if you're playing golf and you have
00:18:17 --> 00:18:20 unlimited mulligans. You can always drop the
00:18:20 --> 00:18:23 ball wherever you want to drop the ball. You
00:18:23 --> 00:18:25 can hit the ball from whatever point you want
00:18:25 --> 00:18:27 to hit it until you get the ball in the hole
00:18:27 --> 00:18:30 that you're aiming for. Yeah. That's really what
00:18:30 --> 00:18:32 the court has set up for industry here. We've
00:18:32 --> 00:18:34 talked about what this means for the people reliant
00:18:34 --> 00:18:37 on the regulations, but this also has a major
00:18:37 --> 00:18:40 impact on the agency. Under the old system, once
00:18:40 --> 00:18:43 a rule had been litigated and settled, the agency
00:18:43 --> 00:18:46 could go on and work on other issues. They could
00:18:46 --> 00:18:48 focus on new problems. They could allocate resources
00:18:48 --> 00:18:52 to new priorities. Now, every rule they've ever
00:18:52 --> 00:18:54 issued is potentially back on the table. They
00:18:54 --> 00:18:56 might be defending regulations from the Clinton
00:18:56 --> 00:18:59 administration brought using today's judicial
00:18:59 --> 00:19:01 standards. We might be relitigating drug approval
00:19:01 --> 00:19:04 frameworks from the 1990s. This sounds like it
00:19:04 --> 00:19:07 would completely overwhelm agency legal offices.
00:19:07 --> 00:19:11 And let me just say, sounds extremely expensive
00:19:11 --> 00:19:15 for the government. Yes, it absolutely does.
00:19:15 --> 00:19:17 Agencies have limited resources. So if they're
00:19:17 --> 00:19:19 constantly defending these old regulations, they
00:19:19 --> 00:19:21 can't write new ones. They can't respond to emerging
00:19:21 --> 00:19:24 problems. They're just playing defense forever.
00:19:25 --> 00:19:27 And here's how the court addressed this issue.
00:19:27 --> 00:19:30 If Congress wishes to provide a different limitations
00:19:30 --> 00:19:33 rule for regulatory actions, it must say so.
00:19:33 --> 00:19:36 Courts often do this. If you don't like what
00:19:36 --> 00:19:38 we're saying, you, Congress, can just make a
00:19:38 --> 00:19:41 new rule. And this honestly would actually be
00:19:41 --> 00:19:44 a very easy rule for Congress to change. Here
00:19:44 --> 00:19:46 they're just interpreting the statute. There's
00:19:46 --> 00:19:48 no concern about a separation of powers here.
00:19:48 --> 00:19:52 They could fix this issue. But there is no need
00:19:52 --> 00:19:54 for the court to even set the issue up to begin
00:19:54 --> 00:19:57 with. You mentioned industries trying again.
00:19:57 --> 00:19:59 Can they actually create plaintiffs on purpose?
00:20:00 --> 00:20:03 Oh, absolutely. If you're a trade association,
00:20:03 --> 00:20:06 you challenged a regulation in 2011 and lost.
00:20:06 --> 00:20:09 The six -year window closed in 2017. Under the
00:20:09 --> 00:20:12 old rules, that was the end. But now... Now you
00:20:12 --> 00:20:15 form a new LLC or subsidiary or holding company.
00:20:15 --> 00:20:19 That entity is formed after 2017. It gets a fresh
00:20:19 --> 00:20:22 clock. That seems like a pretty obvious loophole.
00:20:22 --> 00:20:25 It is. The court could see this was... potentially
00:20:25 --> 00:20:27 going to happen. So it said that courts should
00:20:27 --> 00:20:30 be skeptical of shell plaintiffs. But how do
00:20:30 --> 00:20:32 you prove that? You can create a real business
00:20:32 --> 00:20:34 that is doing real things, but that was still
00:20:34 --> 00:20:36 strategically formed to challenge a rule. If
00:20:36 --> 00:20:39 you have enough money. You can fund new plaintiffs
00:20:39 --> 00:20:42 forever. Individuals and small businesses can't
00:20:42 --> 00:20:44 do this, but major industries with billions at
00:20:44 --> 00:20:47 stake, why would they not? Okay, I just realized
00:20:47 --> 00:20:50 something. If you're creating a new entity to
00:20:50 --> 00:20:52 challenge regulation, you then get to decide
00:20:52 --> 00:20:55 where that entity is located. Yeah. Now we're
00:20:55 --> 00:20:59 adding to the problems here. And so now you're
00:20:59 --> 00:21:01 not just creating a new plaintiff, you're forum
00:21:01 --> 00:21:03 shopping the court you want to litigate your
00:21:03 --> 00:21:05 issue in. Yes. Coroner Post supercharged this
00:21:05 --> 00:21:09 issue. So if the D .C. Circuit upheld an APA
00:21:09 --> 00:21:12 regulation 20 years ago and... Generally, 20
00:21:12 --> 00:21:14 years ago, virtually all of this litigation would
00:21:14 --> 00:21:16 have been going through the D .C. Circuit. That
00:21:16 --> 00:21:18 was the end of the story. The D .C. Circuit is
00:21:18 --> 00:21:20 the expert circuit on administrative law and
00:21:20 --> 00:21:23 their decision settled it. But now. Yeah. Now,
00:21:23 --> 00:21:26 who cares what the D .C. Circuit said? You create
00:21:26 --> 00:21:28 a new entity in Texas. You file in the Fifth
00:21:28 --> 00:21:30 Circuit. You get a completely different set of
00:21:30 --> 00:21:32 judges who are likely to see things very differently
00:21:32 --> 00:21:35 than the judges did 20 years ago. And the Fifth
00:21:35 --> 00:21:36 Circuit isn't bound by what the D .C. Circuit
00:21:36 --> 00:21:39 decided. No, not at all. Circuit courts only
00:21:39 --> 00:21:42 bind themselves. The circuit can look at the
00:21:42 --> 00:21:44 exact same regulation, the exact same statute,
00:21:44 --> 00:21:46 and reach the completely opposite conclusion.
00:21:46 --> 00:21:49 And now, thanks to CornerPost, you can have almost
00:21:49 --> 00:21:51 a dozen more bites of the apple wherever you
00:21:51 --> 00:21:53 want. Just form a new entity in the right jurisdiction.
00:21:53 --> 00:21:55 We could end up with different circuits reaching
00:21:55 --> 00:21:57 different conclusions about the same federal
00:21:57 --> 00:21:59 regulation. Yes, and we already do sometimes.
00:21:59 --> 00:22:01 But CornerPost will make this so much worse.
00:22:02 --> 00:22:04 Before, there was at least the six -year window,
00:22:04 --> 00:22:06 and when that closed, we had some sense of finality.
00:22:07 --> 00:22:09 Challenges often got consolidated. The D .C.
00:22:09 --> 00:22:12 Circuit handled most regulatory cases. There's
00:22:12 --> 00:22:14 predictability. Now you can just shop for your
00:22:14 --> 00:22:17 favorite circuit indefinitely. And what does
00:22:17 --> 00:22:19 that mean practically? It means that regulations
00:22:19 --> 00:22:22 will be valid in some parts of the country and
00:22:22 --> 00:22:24 invalid in others. It means companies in different
00:22:24 --> 00:22:26 states will be playing by different rules. It
00:22:26 --> 00:22:29 means regulatory chaos. And I assume certain
00:22:29 --> 00:22:32 circuits are known for being more skeptical of
00:22:32 --> 00:22:34 agency power. Yes. If you're challenging most
00:22:34 --> 00:22:37 regulations right now, you're probably not filing
00:22:37 --> 00:22:39 in the D .C. Circuit or the Ninth Circuit. You're
00:22:39 --> 00:22:42 thinking maybe Fifth Circuit, maybe 11th. Courts
00:22:42 --> 00:22:44 that have been a lot more aggressive about trying
00:22:44 --> 00:22:47 to limit agency authority. But there are issues
00:22:47 --> 00:22:50 where it's predominantly more liberal attorneys
00:22:50 --> 00:22:52 challenging the agency action, particularly immigration
00:22:52 --> 00:22:55 is the first one that comes to mind. So for those,
00:22:55 --> 00:22:57 we'd probably be looking at more like the ninth
00:22:57 --> 00:23:00 or the fourth. Okay. The combination is create
00:23:00 --> 00:23:02 a new entity to reset the clock, locate that
00:23:02 --> 00:23:05 entity strategically to pick your court. And
00:23:05 --> 00:23:07 then argue under Loper Bright that the court
00:23:07 --> 00:23:09 should decide the best reading of the statute
00:23:09 --> 00:23:12 for itself without deferring to the agency. You
00:23:12 --> 00:23:14 have stacked every advantage in favor of yourself.
00:23:15 --> 00:23:18 I mean, kudos to them. That's a pretty sophisticated
00:23:18 --> 00:23:21 playbook. Yes, it is. And it's going to fragment
00:23:21 --> 00:23:24 regulatory law in ways that no one has ever seen
00:23:24 --> 00:23:27 before. The whole point of this federal regulatory
00:23:27 --> 00:23:29 scheme was supposed to be uniformity. We had
00:23:29 --> 00:23:32 one set of rules for the entire country. Corner
00:23:32 --> 00:23:34 post plus forum shopping threatens that in a
00:23:34 --> 00:23:37 fundamental way. We might end up with a patchwork
00:23:37 --> 00:23:39 of different regulations effectively applying
00:23:39 --> 00:23:42 in different parts of the country. We will. Unless
00:23:42 --> 00:23:46 and until. The Supreme Court theoretically could
00:23:46 --> 00:23:48 resolve that at some point, but most things never
00:23:48 --> 00:23:51 make it there. In the meantime, nobody will know
00:23:51 --> 00:23:54 what the actual rules should be. And the airport
00:23:54 --> 00:23:57 analogy again, except now the newcomer gets to
00:23:57 --> 00:24:00 pick which judge decides whether the airport
00:24:00 --> 00:24:02 can operate or not. And they're going to pick
00:24:02 --> 00:24:05 a judge who hates airports. All right, let's
00:24:05 --> 00:24:08 make this. A little more concrete. We've tried
00:24:08 --> 00:24:11 to do some examples, but this means that any
00:24:11 --> 00:24:13 new power plant can challenge air quality rules.
00:24:13 --> 00:24:15 Any new factory can challenge water pollution
00:24:15 --> 00:24:17 limits. Basically, anything that's regulated
00:24:17 --> 00:24:20 could be stabilized. Yes. Health and safety regulations
00:24:20 --> 00:24:23 for cars, labor rules about overtime, immigration
00:24:23 --> 00:24:26 regulations, energy efficiency standards, school
00:24:26 --> 00:24:29 and nutrition. This is everywhere. I mean, everything
00:24:29 --> 00:24:33 that... really basically governs our basic lives
00:24:33 --> 00:24:36 is up for grabs depending on where you live and
00:24:36 --> 00:24:38 depending on who's challenging it. So then my
00:24:38 --> 00:24:42 morning coffee is covered by administrative law.
00:24:42 --> 00:24:45 Same thing with the nutrition label on your yogurt,
00:24:45 --> 00:24:47 the safety standards on your car's brakes, the
00:24:47 --> 00:24:50 accessibility requirements at your gym, the rules
00:24:50 --> 00:24:52 about what your health insurance has to cover.
00:24:52 --> 00:24:55 And all of that now is perpetually up for grabs.
00:24:55 --> 00:24:57 Yes. All we need to do is form a new entity that's
00:24:57 --> 00:25:00 injured by the rules and they can sue. It doesn't
00:25:00 --> 00:25:02 matter if the rule is three years old or 30.
00:25:02 --> 00:25:04 OK, so let me see if I can summarize how all
00:25:04 --> 00:25:06 these pieces fit together. So we have corner
00:25:06 --> 00:25:08 posts, Loper Bright and the major questions doctrine
00:25:08 --> 00:25:12 we talked about a few episodes. Yes. So major
00:25:12 --> 00:25:14 questions doctrine says agencies can't cite issues
00:25:14 --> 00:25:17 of vast economic and political significance unless
00:25:17 --> 00:25:20 Congress clearly authorized it. That's a substantive
00:25:20 --> 00:25:24 limit on what agencies can do. Right. The Loper
00:25:24 --> 00:25:27 Bright says courts don't defer to agency interpretations
00:25:27 --> 00:25:29 anymore. They decide the best reading of the
00:25:29 --> 00:25:33 statute themselves. That changes how courts evaluate
00:25:33 --> 00:25:36 agency action. Correct. And now Corner Post says
00:25:36 --> 00:25:39 new entities can challenge the old regulations
00:25:39 --> 00:25:42 as if they were just issued. That changes when
00:25:42 --> 00:25:45 agency action can be challenged. Yes, you've
00:25:45 --> 00:25:48 got it. Okay, so you've got stricter substantive
00:25:48 --> 00:25:50 limits on what agencies can do, less favorable
00:25:50 --> 00:25:53 judicial review when they're challenged, and
00:25:53 --> 00:25:56 perpetual vulnerability to new challenges all
00:25:56 --> 00:25:59 at the same time. Yes, these effects multiply.
00:25:59 --> 00:26:02 Under the old system, even if an agency made
00:26:02 --> 00:26:04 an interpretation a judge didn't love, it could
00:26:04 --> 00:26:06 still potentially survive Chevron deference and
00:26:06 --> 00:26:09 be protected by the statute of limitations. Now
00:26:09 --> 00:26:12 there's no Chevron safety net and no time -based
00:26:12 --> 00:26:15 safety net. These doctrines compound. More substantive
00:26:15 --> 00:26:19 vulnerability times less judicial deference times
00:26:19 --> 00:26:22 perpetual exposure to challenge equals chaos.
00:26:22 --> 00:26:25 What corner posts then represent is that any
00:26:25 --> 00:26:27 new entity can challenge any regulation, no matter
00:26:27 --> 00:26:30 how old it is or how long, as long as they can
00:26:30 --> 00:26:33 show that they themselves suffered an injury.
00:26:33 --> 00:26:36 Yes, the clock resets for each new plaintiff.
00:26:36 --> 00:26:39 And regulations are never final. Never. The coming
00:26:39 --> 00:26:41 to the regulatory nuisance doctrine, except this
00:26:41 --> 00:26:43 time the newcomer gets to pick a judge specialized
00:26:43 --> 00:26:46 to help them bulldoze the airport. And combined
00:26:46 --> 00:26:49 with Loper Bright and the major questions doctrine,
00:26:49 --> 00:26:51 agencies are dramatically weaker. Courts are
00:26:51 --> 00:26:53 more powerful. Regulations are more vulnerable.
00:26:54 --> 00:26:56 Finality is gone. Whether that's good or bad
00:26:56 --> 00:26:58 depends on how you feel about regulation. You
00:26:58 --> 00:27:01 can probably guess how I feel about it. But this
00:27:01 --> 00:27:04 is undeniably a massive shift. And it feels like
00:27:04 --> 00:27:07 it would be apropos to, quote, Ghostbusters at
00:27:07 --> 00:27:11 this time. Dogs and cats living together, mass
00:27:11 --> 00:27:14 hysteria. Yes. This brings us to the end of season
00:27:14 --> 00:27:17 one of Administrative Remedies. It's been quite
00:27:17 --> 00:27:20 the journey. We've learned a lot. When we started,
00:27:20 --> 00:27:22 I'm not sure I fully appreciated how much administrative
00:27:22 --> 00:27:25 law actually shapes my life. That's the whole
00:27:25 --> 00:27:27 point. We wanted to give people the foundation
00:27:27 --> 00:27:29 they need to actually understand what's happening
00:27:29 --> 00:27:32 when they hear about these agencies, the regulations,
00:27:32 --> 00:27:34 and all the Supreme Court cases in the news related
00:27:34 --> 00:27:37 to them. OK, let's recap. When we started, we
00:27:37 --> 00:27:38 started with why agencies exist in the first
00:27:38 --> 00:27:41 place. Congress can't regulate airline safety
00:27:41 --> 00:27:44 and drug approvals and workplace conditions all
00:27:44 --> 00:27:47 by itself. We talked about delegation, how Congress
00:27:47 --> 00:27:49 gives agencies authority and the constitutional
00:27:49 --> 00:27:52 limits on that authority. using the babysitter
00:27:52 --> 00:27:54 analogy over and over and over. We covered rulemaking,
00:27:54 --> 00:27:57 how agencies actually create the regulations
00:27:57 --> 00:27:59 that affect everything from nutrition levels
00:27:59 --> 00:28:01 on your food to the emissions of your car. We
00:28:01 --> 00:28:04 explored independent agencies, why some regulators...
00:28:05 --> 00:28:07 have historically been insulated from presidential
00:28:07 --> 00:28:09 control and why that matters for things like
00:28:09 --> 00:28:11 interest rates and market stability. And then
00:28:11 --> 00:28:14 the big recent cases, the major questions doctrine,
00:28:14 --> 00:28:16 Chevron and its death in Loper Bright, and now
00:28:16 --> 00:28:19 Corner Post. Yes. And together, these cases represent
00:28:19 --> 00:28:22 the biggest shift in administrative law in, I
00:28:22 --> 00:28:26 would really say, ever. Potentially, we could
00:28:26 --> 00:28:28 accept the rise of the agencies in the 30s and
00:28:28 --> 00:28:31 40s, but... In that situation, agencies were
00:28:31 --> 00:28:33 expanding, but the law was quite stable, as we
00:28:33 --> 00:28:36 talked about previously. What changed was just
00:28:36 --> 00:28:38 the role agencies played in regulating what was
00:28:38 --> 00:28:41 going on in the country. Now, courts are more
00:28:41 --> 00:28:44 powerful, agencies are more constrained, and
00:28:44 --> 00:28:46 the rules that govern all of these parts of your
00:28:46 --> 00:28:49 daily life that we could list yet again ad nauseum
00:28:49 --> 00:28:51 are more vulnerable to challenge than they've
00:28:51 --> 00:28:53 been in generations. Whether you think that's
00:28:53 --> 00:28:56 a good thing or a bad thing. You need to understand
00:28:56 --> 00:28:58 it to actually have an informed opinion. And
00:28:58 --> 00:29:00 that's what this season was about, giving you
00:29:00 --> 00:29:02 the vocabulary, the concepts, and the framework
00:29:02 --> 00:29:04 to follow what's happening and form your own
00:29:04 --> 00:29:06 views. Okay, so what happens next? We're going
00:29:06 --> 00:29:09 to take a few weeks off, catch our breath, let
00:29:09 --> 00:29:11 you catch up on any episodes you might have missed.
00:29:11 --> 00:29:14 And when we come back... In season two, we're
00:29:14 --> 00:29:17 going to dive deep into adjudication. This is
00:29:17 --> 00:29:19 how agencies act like courts. When you appeal
00:29:19 --> 00:29:21 a Social Security denial or challenge an immigration
00:29:21 --> 00:29:24 decision or fight an SEC enforcement action,
00:29:24 --> 00:29:27 you're in an administrative adjudication. It's
00:29:27 --> 00:29:29 a whole different world from rulemaking with
00:29:29 --> 00:29:31 its own procedures, its own judges, and its own
00:29:31 --> 00:29:34 controversies. Administrative law judges do process
00:29:34 --> 00:29:37 the right to a hearing. All of it. And there
00:29:37 --> 00:29:38 are some major Supreme Court cases in there,
00:29:38 --> 00:29:41 too. But that's for next season. For now, we
00:29:41 --> 00:29:42 want to thank everyone who's been listening.
00:29:42 --> 00:29:45 We started this podcast because we believe you
00:29:45 --> 00:29:48 can't fix what you don't understand. And we hope
00:29:48 --> 00:29:50 that now you understand a lot more about how
00:29:50 --> 00:29:52 the administrative state actually works and why
00:29:52 --> 00:29:55 it matters. If you found this podcast helpful,
00:29:55 --> 00:29:56 please share it with someone who's trying to
00:29:56 --> 00:29:59 make sense of this all. Leave us a review and
00:29:59 --> 00:30:00 we'll see you in a few weeks for season two.
00:30:01 --> 00:30:03 I'm Gwen Savitz. And I'm Mark Rourke. Thank you
00:30:03 --> 00:30:06 for listening to Administrative Remedies. See
00:30:06 --> 00:30:10 you next season. So that does it for today's
00:30:10 --> 00:30:12 episode on administrative remedies. Thank you
00:30:12 --> 00:30:15 for joining us today. Please, if you enjoy this
00:30:15 --> 00:30:17 podcast and enjoy this episode, give us a like
00:30:17 --> 00:30:21 on Spotify, iTunes, or whatever platform you're
00:30:21 --> 00:30:23 listening on. And be sure to tune in next time
00:30:23 --> 00:30:25 where we'll continue to dive into the contours
00:30:25 --> 00:30:28 of administrative law, because remember, you
00:30:28 --> 00:30:29 can't fix what you don't understand.