This episode introduces one of the most important structural distinctions in administrative law: the difference between rulemaking and adjudication. Agencies donβt just enforce law β they also create policy. Sometimes they do it prospectively through general rules. Other times they do it case-by-case while deciding what happens to a specific party. That choice affects procedure, fairness expectations, and how quickly entire industries can change.
The Core Distinction
Rulemaking
- Forward-looking
- General applicability
- Sets standards before conduct happens
- Typically uses notice-and-comment procedures
Adjudication
- Backward-looking (or present-focused)
- Applies to specific parties and facts
- Determines liability, rights, or obligations in individual cases
- Procedural protections vary widely
Why This Distinction Exists
Government canβt realistically give individualized hearings before adopting rules that affect millions of people. But when the government is deciding what happens to a specific person or company, due process concerns become much stronger.
Constitutional Foundation
Londoner v. Denver (1908)
- Individualized determinations β hearing required
Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization (1915)
- General rules affecting many people β no individual hearing required
These cases still structure how courts think about procedural rights today.
The Gray Area: Agencies Can Make Policy Through Adjudication
Under Supreme Court precedent (Chenery), agencies can choose whether to announce policy through rulemaking or through individual cases.
That means agencies can:
- Announce a new standard
- Apply it in the same case
- Effectively change national policy overnight
Real-World Example: Browning-Ferris (NLRB, 2015)
The NLRB expanded the definition of βjoint employerβ through a single adjudication.
Why it mattered:
- Affected staffing agencies, franchises, contractors, and supply chains
- Triggered years of litigation, rulemaking reversals, and political conflict
- Shows how one case can reshape an entire sector
Why This Matters Outside Law School
This structure affects:
- Labor rights
- Environmental regulation
- Data security expectations
- Financial regulation
- Healthcare compliance
- Licensing and professional discipline
Often, regulated parties donβt get a clean rulebook. They piece together standards from enforcement actions.
Key Takeaway
Agencies exercise two fundamentally different kinds of power:
- Setting general rules for the future
- Deciding what happens to specific parties
Which path they choose determines procedure, fairness expectations, and how predictable regulation feels.
Coming Next
Next episode: The spectrum of adjudication procedures β from trial-like hearings to simple denial letters β and why the same statute can produce radically different levels of process.
00:00:14 --> 00:00:17 Hello, and welcome to Administrative Remedies,
00:00:17 --> 00:00:19 because you can't fix what you don't understand.
00:00:19 --> 00:00:21 Brought to you in part by the University of Tulsa
00:00:21 --> 00:00:24 College of Law. I'm Gwendolyn Savitz, an associate
00:00:24 --> 00:00:26 professor here at TU and the associate dean of
00:00:26 --> 00:00:28 research and intellectual life. And I'm Mark
00:00:28 --> 00:00:31 Rourke. I'm the dean of the College of Law. We'll
00:00:31 --> 00:00:33 be breaking down complex doctrines with real
00:00:33 --> 00:00:35 -life analogies and examples to demystify the
00:00:35 --> 00:00:37 world of administrative law for everyone trying
00:00:37 --> 00:00:39 to understand how government actually works.
00:00:40 --> 00:00:41 Agencies are the main way the federal government
00:00:41 --> 00:00:44 gets things done. It's not through Congress for
00:00:44 --> 00:00:46 reasons we'll be addressing over the course of
00:00:46 --> 00:00:50 this series. Welcome back to season two of Administrative
00:00:50 --> 00:00:53 Remedies. This season, we are looking in -depth
00:00:53 --> 00:00:56 at adjudication. But first, Mark, have you ever
00:00:56 --> 00:00:59 gotten a speeding ticket? That is not something
00:00:59 --> 00:01:02 I wish to discuss on the air. All right, fair
00:01:02 --> 00:01:05 enough. But think about the limits on the streets
00:01:05 --> 00:01:08 near your house. The 25 or 35, whatever it's
00:01:08 --> 00:01:11 set at, that isn't decided in the moment by each
00:01:11 --> 00:01:14 individual police officer. Right. It's set in
00:01:14 --> 00:01:16 advance. There's one number, one speed limit
00:01:16 --> 00:01:19 for every single person. Exactly. Somebody went
00:01:19 --> 00:01:22 through, looked at the type of street it is,
00:01:22 --> 00:01:24 at how much pedestrian traffic there is, whether
00:01:24 --> 00:01:26 there's a school nearby, the accident history,
00:01:26 --> 00:01:29 and set some sort of general standard. Yeah,
00:01:29 --> 00:01:31 in theory, or they just picked a number around
00:01:31 --> 00:01:35 the blue. Yeah, it could feel that way too. But
00:01:35 --> 00:01:38 the idea here is they made one sort of forward
00:01:38 --> 00:01:40 -looking rule that applies to everyone, even
00:01:40 --> 00:01:42 though it won't fit every situation perfectly.
00:01:43 --> 00:01:45 That's rulemaking. We covered that last season.
00:01:46 --> 00:01:49 Right. So now imagine you're driving on one of
00:01:49 --> 00:01:52 the roads near your house at 50 miles an hour
00:01:52 --> 00:01:55 and a cop pulls you over. And now I'm in trouble.
00:01:56 --> 00:01:58 The cop is applying that rule to me specifically,
00:01:58 --> 00:02:02 deciding whether I violated it. So that specific
00:02:02 --> 00:02:04 application of the rule to you in that moment,
00:02:04 --> 00:02:07 that's adjudication. Okay, but hold on. Isn't
00:02:07 --> 00:02:10 the cop also making rules in a sense? I mean,
00:02:10 --> 00:02:13 the cop decides whether 50 in a 35 is really
00:02:13 --> 00:02:16 speeding or just barely over, whether I get a
00:02:16 --> 00:02:19 ticket or a warning or a motorcycle helmet violation
00:02:19 --> 00:02:23 because he wants to give something. That can
00:02:23 --> 00:02:26 be a really common area of confusion. The cop
00:02:26 --> 00:02:29 definitely has discretion, but discretion isn't
00:02:29 --> 00:02:32 the same thing as making a rule. Why not? If
00:02:32 --> 00:02:34 the cop always lets people go for five over,
00:02:34 --> 00:02:38 isn't that basically a rule? So here's the difference.
00:02:38 --> 00:02:41 The speed limit applies to everybody on the road
00:02:41 --> 00:02:44 all the time until it's changed. That's a general
00:02:44 --> 00:02:47 applicability. The cop's decision... that applies
00:02:47 --> 00:02:49 to you right now is based on your particular
00:02:49 --> 00:02:53 facts. So particular applicability. Yes, and
00:02:53 --> 00:02:55 that distinction matters because you have different
00:02:55 --> 00:02:57 rights depending on which one the agency is doing.
00:02:58 --> 00:03:01 Okay, so this season is about what happens when
00:03:01 --> 00:03:04 they come after you personally. Yes. And we're
00:03:04 --> 00:03:06 talking about it because there's a whole world
00:03:06 --> 00:03:09 of complexity in how agencies make these individual
00:03:09 --> 00:03:12 determinations. Who hears them? What kind of
00:03:12 --> 00:03:14 procedures apply? Whether you get a real hearing
00:03:14 --> 00:03:17 or a letter that just says denied, that's what
00:03:17 --> 00:03:20 we're talking about. Okay, so let's get technical.
00:03:20 --> 00:03:23 What do the statutes actually say about adjudication?
00:03:24 --> 00:03:25 All right, so we're going to start with the Administrative
00:03:25 --> 00:03:27 Procedure Act. That's that basic governing law
00:03:27 --> 00:03:31 for all agencies. It defines both rulemaking
00:03:31 --> 00:03:33 and adjudication in this definition section.
00:03:34 --> 00:03:35 Do you want to read the definition of a rule?
00:03:36 --> 00:03:39 Sure. A rule means the whole or a part of an
00:03:39 --> 00:03:43 agency statement of general or particular applicability
00:03:43 --> 00:03:46 and future effect designed to implement, interpret,
00:03:46 --> 00:03:50 or prescribe law or policy. So the key phrases
00:03:50 --> 00:03:53 there are general applicability and future effect.
00:03:53 --> 00:03:57 It says general or particular, so a rule can
00:03:57 --> 00:04:01 apply to specific people. Yes, it does say that.
00:04:01 --> 00:04:04 A rule can be super narrow. Like it could say
00:04:04 --> 00:04:07 nuclear power plants within 50 miles of an earthquake
00:04:07 --> 00:04:10 fault line. That's only a handful of plants,
00:04:10 --> 00:04:13 though. Yes, but it's still prospective. It's
00:04:13 --> 00:04:15 setting the standard for the future. The key
00:04:15 --> 00:04:17 to rulemaking is this forward -looking quality.
00:04:17 --> 00:04:21 Okay, so now what about adjudication? The APA
00:04:21 --> 00:04:23 doesn't itself define adjudication. It just calls
00:04:23 --> 00:04:27 the results of adjudication an order. So can
00:04:27 --> 00:04:29 you read the definition of an order? Sure. Order
00:04:29 --> 00:04:33 means the whole or a part of a final disposition,
00:04:33 --> 00:04:36 whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or
00:04:36 --> 00:04:39 declaratory in form of an agency in a matter
00:04:39 --> 00:04:43 other than rulemaking, but including licensing.
00:04:43 --> 00:04:48 So other than rulemaking, that is a pretty circular
00:04:48 --> 00:04:51 definition. If it's not a rule, it's an order.
00:04:52 --> 00:04:55 Yes, that's right. So the APA basically says
00:04:55 --> 00:04:58 all agency action falls into two buckets. They're
00:04:58 --> 00:05:01 either making general rules for the future or
00:05:01 --> 00:05:03 they're deciding current specific cases about
00:05:03 --> 00:05:06 past or present conduct. And the distinction
00:05:06 --> 00:05:09 determines what procedures the agency has to
00:05:09 --> 00:05:12 follow? And what rights you have. Why not just
00:05:12 --> 00:05:15 give everyone the same protections regardless?
00:05:16 --> 00:05:19 Totally fair question. So why shouldn't everyone
00:05:19 --> 00:05:21 get a hearing before the government does something
00:05:21 --> 00:05:23 that affects them? Seems more fair. It could,
00:05:23 --> 00:05:27 yes. So if the EPA wants to set air quality standards,
00:05:27 --> 00:05:29 but before they can do that, they need to give
00:05:29 --> 00:05:32 a personal hearing to every single person or
00:05:32 --> 00:05:35 entity in the U .S. who would be affected by
00:05:35 --> 00:05:39 air quality. That's basically everyone. Yeah.
00:05:39 --> 00:05:41 If we're just talking about the people, we're
00:05:41 --> 00:05:45 already at 340 million hearings. Okay. That's
00:05:45 --> 00:05:47 impractical. But there has to be a line somewhere.
00:05:48 --> 00:05:52 There does. And there is. So the Supreme Court
00:05:52 --> 00:05:54 drew this line over a century ago in two cases.
00:05:54 --> 00:05:56 They're both from Colorado. This is one of those
00:05:56 --> 00:05:58 really nice sets of cases where the facts line
00:05:58 --> 00:06:01 up really. Well, so you can really see the difference.
00:06:01 --> 00:06:04 These were decided just seven years apart. The
00:06:04 --> 00:06:07 first one is Londoner v. Denver from 1908, before
00:06:07 --> 00:06:10 the Administrative Procedure Act existed. Way
00:06:10 --> 00:06:13 before. Denver wants to pay the street. They
00:06:13 --> 00:06:15 decide to charge the cost to the property owners
00:06:15 --> 00:06:18 along the street. They're making a special assessment
00:06:18 --> 00:06:21 for these property owners. And each owner would
00:06:21 --> 00:06:23 pay based on how much their property benefited.
00:06:24 --> 00:06:26 So they're dividing up the bill among specific
00:06:26 --> 00:06:29 people. Yes. And some of these owners objected
00:06:29 --> 00:06:31 and they wanted a hearing before they got hit
00:06:31 --> 00:06:34 with the bill. Well, I mean, of course they did.
00:06:34 --> 00:06:36 I mean, the city is taking their money. Yes.
00:06:36 --> 00:06:39 and the Supreme Court decree. So here, read what
00:06:39 --> 00:06:42 the court said about why individual determinations
00:06:42 --> 00:06:44 require different procedures. A hearing in its
00:06:44 --> 00:06:47 very essence demands that he who is entitled
00:06:47 --> 00:06:50 to it shall have the right to support his allegations
00:06:50 --> 00:06:53 by argument, however brief, and if need be by
00:06:53 --> 00:06:57 proof, however informal. So the property owners
00:06:57 --> 00:06:59 weren't challenging whether to pave the street.
00:07:00 --> 00:07:02 Right. They weren't challenging the action of
00:07:02 --> 00:07:03 paving the street. They were just challenging
00:07:03 --> 00:07:05 how much each of them personally should have
00:07:05 --> 00:07:09 to pay to do it. So that was an individual determination
00:07:09 --> 00:07:12 about these identified people, the people on
00:07:12 --> 00:07:15 that street. Due process required giving them
00:07:15 --> 00:07:18 an opportunity to be heard. Okay. So that makes
00:07:18 --> 00:07:20 sense. You said that there was a second case,
00:07:21 --> 00:07:24 though. Yeah. So the next one is Bimetallic Investment
00:07:24 --> 00:07:26 Company v. State Board of Equalization. This
00:07:26 --> 00:07:30 is from 1915. Also Colorado. Again, these are
00:07:30 --> 00:07:33 really nice facts. This time, the State Board
00:07:33 --> 00:07:36 of Equalization decided to increase the valuation
00:07:36 --> 00:07:39 of all taxable property in Denver by 40%. All
00:07:39 --> 00:07:42 property, not just specific parcels? Right. They
00:07:42 --> 00:07:45 said that everything in the city was being strategically
00:07:45 --> 00:07:47 undervalued, so Denver wouldn't be paying as
00:07:47 --> 00:07:50 much in taxes. They fixed that by just raising...
00:07:50 --> 00:07:53 the value of everything across the board. Okay,
00:07:53 --> 00:07:56 so Biometallic Investment Company owns property
00:07:56 --> 00:07:59 in Denver, their taxes are going up, and they
00:07:59 --> 00:08:01 say, wait, we won a hearing too, just like those
00:08:01 --> 00:08:04 property owners in London are. Exactly, and they
00:08:04 --> 00:08:07 lost. Why? Their taxes went up as well. So the
00:08:07 --> 00:08:09 nature of this kind of decision was different.
00:08:10 --> 00:08:28 Here's what Justice Holmes wrote about it. All
00:08:28 --> 00:08:32 right. Yes. Then he says, general statutes within
00:08:32 --> 00:08:35 the state power are passed that affect the person
00:08:35 --> 00:08:39 or property of individuals, sometimes to the
00:08:39 --> 00:08:41 point of ruin, without giving them a chance to
00:08:41 --> 00:08:44 be heard. Their rights are protected in the only
00:08:44 --> 00:08:46 way that they can be in a complex society, by
00:08:46 --> 00:08:49 their power, immediate or remote, over those
00:08:49 --> 00:08:53 who make it the rule. So, wait, I mean, sometimes
00:08:53 --> 00:08:55 to the point of ruin without giving them a chance
00:08:55 --> 00:08:58 to be heard? Holmes, is he really okay with that?
00:08:59 --> 00:09:02 He's not saying it's ideal or that it's pleasant.
00:09:02 --> 00:09:04 He's saying it's necessary. If the government
00:09:04 --> 00:09:07 is about to make a rule affecting lots of different
00:09:07 --> 00:09:10 people, each person can't get an individual hearing.
00:09:11 --> 00:09:13 So then your remedy is political. Vote out the
00:09:13 --> 00:09:16 people who made the decisions. Right. What he
00:09:16 --> 00:09:20 says, if people buy their power immediate or
00:09:20 --> 00:09:23 remote over those who make the rules, that immediate
00:09:23 --> 00:09:25 power would be if this is some sort of act passed
00:09:25 --> 00:09:28 by. legislation, the more remote version would
00:09:28 --> 00:09:32 be an agency. Okay, so back to our speed limit
00:09:32 --> 00:09:35 example. Setting the limit at 35 miles per hour
00:09:35 --> 00:09:39 is, by Metallic, a general rule where no hearing
00:09:39 --> 00:09:42 was required. Yes. But deciding whether I was
00:09:42 --> 00:09:46 speeding and what fine I should be, that's Londoner.
00:09:46 --> 00:09:48 That's about me specifically, so I should get
00:09:48 --> 00:09:51 to tell my side. Yes, this is the constitutional
00:09:51 --> 00:09:55 foundation. Londoner and bimetallic decided over
00:09:55 --> 00:09:59 a century ago still define this line today. Okay,
00:09:59 --> 00:10:01 this is where we bring the babysitter in, right?
00:10:01 --> 00:10:05 We sure can. So, we have the babysitter. Yay,
00:10:05 --> 00:10:08 she's back. And now she's announced new house
00:10:08 --> 00:10:11 rule, no jumping on the furniture ever. This
00:10:11 --> 00:10:14 applies to everyone. Okay, that's rulemaking,
00:10:14 --> 00:10:17 general applicability, future effect, bimetallic.
00:10:17 --> 00:10:20 Yes. Now the babysitter catches Riley jumping
00:10:20 --> 00:10:23 on the couch later that night and says, Riley,
00:10:23 --> 00:10:25 you violated the rule. You're losing TV time
00:10:25 --> 00:10:27 tomorrow. That's adjudication. Specific person,
00:10:28 --> 00:10:31 backward looking, specific consequence, Londoner.
00:10:31 --> 00:10:34 Yeah. So here's what gets interesting. Riley
00:10:34 --> 00:10:37 could protest and say, I wasn't jumping. I was
00:10:37 --> 00:10:39 barely bouncing. I was just moving my body. That's
00:10:39 --> 00:10:42 different. He wants to be heard before he loses
00:10:42 --> 00:10:45 his TV time. Right, but did he get to vote when
00:10:45 --> 00:10:47 the babysitter was making the rules? Did he get
00:10:47 --> 00:10:49 a hearing about whether jumping should be banned
00:10:49 --> 00:10:52 before it was banned? I don't think so. So that
00:10:52 --> 00:10:55 seems unfair, huh? A little bit. I mean, I guess
00:10:55 --> 00:10:57 it would be impracticable for the babysitter
00:10:57 --> 00:10:59 to hold a referendum every time she wants to
00:10:59 --> 00:11:02 set a household rule. Right, the kids would be
00:11:02 --> 00:11:04 voting for unlimited candy and no bedtimes. The
00:11:04 --> 00:11:07 ballot box of the household doesn't work so well
00:11:07 --> 00:11:09 when the electorate is seven years old. Yes,
00:11:09 --> 00:11:12 that's bimetallic. General rules don't require
00:11:12 --> 00:11:15 hearings. Riley's remedy is to complain to his
00:11:15 --> 00:11:17 parents when they get home. But when the babysitter
00:11:17 --> 00:11:20 is deciding whether Riley specifically violated
00:11:20 --> 00:11:23 that rule and what should happen to him specifically...
00:11:23 --> 00:11:25 Now we're back in Lenderner territory. Now he
00:11:25 --> 00:11:28 has a much stronger claim to be heard. He should
00:11:28 --> 00:11:30 get to explain himself before he's punished.
00:11:30 --> 00:11:33 Okay, but what if the babysitter says Riley and
00:11:33 --> 00:11:36 only Riley is no longer allowed to climb trees
00:11:36 --> 00:11:39 because of what happened last week? Is that a
00:11:39 --> 00:11:42 rule or is that... All right, that's a really
00:11:42 --> 00:11:45 hard case. It's targeted at one person, so it
00:11:45 --> 00:11:47 feels like an adjudication, but it's also prospective,
00:11:47 --> 00:11:51 so it feels like a rule -making. And in the definition
00:11:51 --> 00:11:56 of a rule, it can be specific, but courts often
00:11:56 --> 00:11:59 wrestle with this kind of hybrid situation. The
00:11:59 --> 00:12:03 categories aren't really all that clean. There
00:12:03 --> 00:12:06 is a fuzzy middle area, but the paradigmatic...
00:12:06 --> 00:12:09 Cases are absolutely clear. Making general rules
00:12:09 --> 00:12:12 for everyone going forward, biometallic, that's
00:12:12 --> 00:12:14 rulemaking. Deciding what happens to a specific
00:12:14 --> 00:12:17 person for what they already did, that's Londoner,
00:12:18 --> 00:12:20 that's adjudication. So we've established when
00:12:20 --> 00:12:22 somebody gets a hearing, but there's another
00:12:22 --> 00:12:25 question that's just as important. Okay, what
00:12:25 --> 00:12:28 question? What law applies when the agency is
00:12:28 --> 00:12:31 deciding your case? Up to this point, we've been
00:12:31 --> 00:12:33 assuming that there's already a rule on the books,
00:12:33 --> 00:12:36 like a speed limit exists. And the question is
00:12:36 --> 00:12:38 whether you violated it. Right. The rule is 35
00:12:38 --> 00:12:42 miles per hour. Did I go faster than that? Yes.
00:12:42 --> 00:12:44 But what if there isn't a rule? What if the agency
00:12:44 --> 00:12:47 announces the standard for the first time in
00:12:47 --> 00:12:49 the very case that's deciding your fate? Wait,
00:12:49 --> 00:12:53 so they could do that? They can. And that raises
00:12:53 --> 00:12:56 a whole different set of fairness concerns. Agencies
00:12:56 --> 00:12:59 can actually announce new rules while deciding
00:12:59 --> 00:13:03 someone's case. Yes. An agency can choose to
00:13:03 --> 00:13:05 announce a new standard through notice and comment
00:13:05 --> 00:13:08 rulemaking, or they can announce the same standard
00:13:08 --> 00:13:10 for the first time when deciding a specific case.
00:13:11 --> 00:13:15 So an agency could be adjudicating my case, and
00:13:15 --> 00:13:17 in the middle of deciding whether I violated
00:13:17 --> 00:13:19 the rules, they announce a new rule. Yes, and
00:13:19 --> 00:13:22 then find you liable for violating it. That seems
00:13:22 --> 00:13:25 deeply unfair. I mean, I'm being judged by a
00:13:25 --> 00:13:28 standard that didn't exist when I acted. So a
00:13:28 --> 00:13:31 couple of points here. One, this is how negligence
00:13:31 --> 00:13:34 law works in general. You don't know for sure
00:13:34 --> 00:13:36 that you weren't supposed to do that exact thing
00:13:36 --> 00:13:38 until you've gone and been told you weren't supposed
00:13:38 --> 00:13:41 to do that exact thing. This is also one of the
00:13:41 --> 00:13:42 most persistent criticisms in administrative
00:13:42 --> 00:13:47 law. But this is from a Supreme Court case. This
00:13:47 --> 00:13:50 is SEC v. Chenery from 1947. Here's what the
00:13:50 --> 00:13:53 court said there. The choice made between the
00:13:53 --> 00:13:56 proceeding by general rule or by individual ad
00:13:56 --> 00:13:59 hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in
00:13:59 --> 00:14:01 the informed discretion of the administrative
00:14:01 --> 00:14:04 agency. The informed discretion. The agency gets
00:14:04 --> 00:14:07 to choose which approach it wants to use. The
00:14:07 --> 00:14:10 SEC in that case, they could have done the rulemaking,
00:14:10 --> 00:14:13 but decided to announce a new standard in a specific
00:14:13 --> 00:14:15 enforcement action. Yes, and the court said that's
00:14:15 --> 00:14:19 fine. Agencies need flexibility. They can't always
00:14:19 --> 00:14:21 predict in advance what situations they'll face.
00:14:21 --> 00:14:25 But hold on. When an agency makes policy through
00:14:25 --> 00:14:28 rulemaking, the rule applies prospectively. Going
00:14:28 --> 00:14:31 forward from now, here's the standard. Everyone
00:14:31 --> 00:14:34 knows the rules before they act. Right. But when
00:14:34 --> 00:14:36 an agency makes a policy through adjudication,
00:14:36 --> 00:14:38 the parties in that case are being judged by
00:14:38 --> 00:14:40 a standard that didn't exist when they acted.
00:14:40 --> 00:14:43 The new rule applies retroactively to conduct
00:14:43 --> 00:14:45 that happened before the rule was announced.
00:14:46 --> 00:14:48 Yeah. In this case, the parties are functionally
00:14:48 --> 00:14:51 guinea pigs. They're being punished under a rule
00:14:51 --> 00:14:53 that is announced for the first time in the very
00:14:53 --> 00:14:56 decision, finding them liable for violating the
00:14:56 --> 00:14:59 rule. It's like the babysitter deciding tonight
00:14:59 --> 00:15:01 that jumping on the couch is against the rules
00:15:01 --> 00:15:03 and then punishing Riley because he did it last
00:15:03 --> 00:15:06 week before anyone told him it was a problem.
00:15:06 --> 00:15:09 Yes. And under Chenery, that's allowed. How exactly
00:15:09 --> 00:15:12 do courts justify this? When the court decided
00:15:12 --> 00:15:15 it, they acknowledged that it might seem unfair,
00:15:15 --> 00:15:18 but said agencies need a lot of flexibility to
00:15:18 --> 00:15:21 be able to develop policy. This was a period
00:15:21 --> 00:15:24 of time when the general public viewed agencies
00:15:24 --> 00:15:28 in a much more favorable light. An agency can't
00:15:28 --> 00:15:30 always anticipate every situation in advance.
00:15:30 --> 00:15:33 And the same way that common law courts had been
00:15:33 --> 00:15:36 developing doctrine for centuries, how common
00:15:36 --> 00:15:38 law courts had announced legal principles when
00:15:38 --> 00:15:40 deciding specific disputes, agencies could do
00:15:40 --> 00:15:43 the same thing. But common law courts aren't
00:15:43 --> 00:15:46 also the prosecutor. They're neutral. The agency
00:15:46 --> 00:15:48 is both making the rule and enforcing it against
00:15:48 --> 00:15:51 you. That is a massive tension in the system.
00:15:51 --> 00:15:54 And different agencies handle this very differently.
00:15:54 --> 00:15:57 The NLRB, the National Labor Relations Board,
00:15:57 --> 00:15:59 makes almost all its policy through adjudication.
00:15:59 --> 00:16:01 They rarely do notice and comment rulemaking.
00:16:02 --> 00:16:04 So if you want to know labor law, you have to
00:16:04 --> 00:16:07 read a bunch of NLRB decisions and then piece
00:16:07 --> 00:16:09 together what the standards are. Pretty much.
00:16:09 --> 00:16:12 And that's what you're paying for when you hire
00:16:12 --> 00:16:15 labor law experts. Meanwhile, the EPA tends to
00:16:15 --> 00:16:17 prefer rulemaking, detailed regulations that
00:16:17 --> 00:16:20 go through the notice and comment period. Same
00:16:20 --> 00:16:22 government, same APA, completely different approaches.
00:16:23 --> 00:16:26 Sometimes, though, Congress makes this choice
00:16:26 --> 00:16:29 for them, right? Yes. Congress can. and often
00:16:29 --> 00:16:32 does, mandate that agencies undertake a rulemaking
00:16:32 --> 00:16:35 when deciding something in a new law. Chenery
00:16:35 --> 00:16:38 only applies when Congress hasn't specified what
00:16:38 --> 00:16:40 the agency has to do. If Congress leaves the
00:16:40 --> 00:16:42 door open, the agency can choose to walk through
00:16:42 --> 00:16:45 it however it wants. I'm going to need to see
00:16:45 --> 00:16:48 how this actually works, because in the abstract,
00:16:49 --> 00:16:51 this sounds like it could be abused pretty badly.
00:16:51 --> 00:16:55 Here's a good example. You probably have already
00:16:55 --> 00:16:58 had experience with. Have you ever had your credit
00:16:58 --> 00:17:00 card number stolen in a data breach? Yeah, for
00:17:00 --> 00:17:05 sure. So what law required that company to protect
00:17:05 --> 00:17:07 your credit card information in the first place?
00:17:07 --> 00:17:11 I don't know specifically. Maybe some data security
00:17:11 --> 00:17:14 regulation. Except that there isn't one. Not
00:17:14 --> 00:17:16 in the way you're thinking. Not in the way we
00:17:16 --> 00:17:19 were talking about rules last time. Here, the
00:17:19 --> 00:17:22 FTC has authority under Section 5 of the FTC
00:17:22 --> 00:17:25 Act to go after unfair or deceptive business
00:17:25 --> 00:17:28 practices. That's it. Just those words. Nothing
00:17:28 --> 00:17:31 in the statute about encryption or firewalls
00:17:31 --> 00:17:33 or how to store credit card numbers or when to
00:17:33 --> 00:17:37 notify customers after a breach. So how did unfair
00:17:37 --> 00:17:41 or deceptive turn into actual cybersecurity requirements?
00:17:41 --> 00:17:45 Through enforcement and adjudication. The FTC
00:17:45 --> 00:17:47 sues companies with terrible security practices,
00:17:47 --> 00:17:50 like a hotel chain that was storing credit card
00:17:50 --> 00:17:53 numbers in plain text, businesses without any
00:17:53 --> 00:17:55 sort of firewalls, companies that were ignoring
00:17:55 --> 00:17:58 obvious vulnerabilities in the system. Each case
00:17:58 --> 00:18:00 adds another piece to what these requirements
00:18:00 --> 00:18:03 are. And now if your company doesn't encrypt
00:18:03 --> 00:18:06 customer data and there's a breach, the FTC will
00:18:06 --> 00:18:08 say the failure was an unfair practice based
00:18:08 --> 00:18:10 on standards they built through this case -by
00:18:10 --> 00:18:13 -case approach. Okay, so there's no rulebook
00:18:13 --> 00:18:16 I can read. I have to piece together what reasonable
00:18:16 --> 00:18:18 data security means from 20 years of enforcement
00:18:18 --> 00:18:22 actions. Yes, that is Chenery in action. Agencies
00:18:22 --> 00:18:24 building policies through adjudication instead
00:18:24 --> 00:18:27 of rulemaking. And the companies in those early
00:18:27 --> 00:18:29 cases were the guinea pigs. They were judged
00:18:29 --> 00:18:32 by standards that didn't exist until the decision
00:18:32 --> 00:18:35 that found them liable. So this isn't just some
00:18:35 --> 00:18:37 abstract legal doctrine. It's shaping things
00:18:37 --> 00:18:41 that actually affect people. Yes. I do want to
00:18:41 --> 00:18:45 point out that they're at the very highest level
00:18:45 --> 00:18:46 being judged by the statute that's in place.
00:18:47 --> 00:18:49 It's just how you're going to interpret the statute.
00:18:49 --> 00:18:52 That's what the agency is doing. So this happens
00:18:52 --> 00:18:56 every day in different situations. But to really
00:18:56 --> 00:18:58 see how it works, to see the political stakes,
00:18:58 --> 00:19:02 the reversals. Let's look at the idea of joint
00:19:02 --> 00:19:04 employment because this has been fought over
00:19:04 --> 00:19:06 for decades. We're going to do that by talking
00:19:06 --> 00:19:10 about Browning Ferris Industries. This is a 2015
00:19:10 --> 00:19:14 NLRB case that shows how powerful this adjudication
00:19:14 --> 00:19:17 as rulemaking can be. Okay, so what happened?
00:19:17 --> 00:19:19 Browning Ferris ran a recycling facility in California.
00:19:20 --> 00:19:23 The workers on the sorting lines, the ones physically
00:19:23 --> 00:19:26 doing the sorting work, they weren't hired or
00:19:26 --> 00:19:29 paid directly by Browning Ferris. They were employed
00:19:29 --> 00:19:32 by a staffing agency. So on paper, the staffing
00:19:32 --> 00:19:36 agency was the employer. Yes, on paper. But Browning
00:19:36 --> 00:19:38 Ferris controlled the workplace in some pretty
00:19:38 --> 00:19:40 significant ways. They set the speed of the conveyor
00:19:40 --> 00:19:43 belt. They set the productivity quotas. They
00:19:43 --> 00:19:45 determined the hours of operation. They determined
00:19:45 --> 00:19:48 when the break times were. And under the contract,
00:19:48 --> 00:19:50 they could also require the staffing agency to
00:19:50 --> 00:19:53 remove any worker from the facility. Okay, so
00:19:53 --> 00:19:56 even though they didn't sign the paychecks...
00:19:56 --> 00:19:59 Yeah, even though they weren't signing the paychecks,
00:19:59 --> 00:20:01 they were controlling a lot of what was going
00:20:01 --> 00:20:04 on. So here was the issue. When the workers are
00:20:04 --> 00:20:06 trying to unionize, who accounts as their employer?
00:20:06 --> 00:20:09 Is it just the staffing agency, which has very
00:20:09 --> 00:20:11 little control over their actual day -to -day
00:20:11 --> 00:20:14 working conditions? Or is it also Browning Ferris?
00:20:14 --> 00:20:17 Okay, so why does that matter for unionizing?
00:20:17 --> 00:20:20 You can only bargain with your employer. If Brian
00:20:20 --> 00:20:23 Ferris isn't your employer, you can't demand
00:20:23 --> 00:20:25 they come to the table and bargain. You're stuck
00:20:25 --> 00:20:28 negotiating with a staffing agency, even though
00:20:28 --> 00:20:30 it doesn't actually control any of your working
00:20:30 --> 00:20:33 conditions. All right. That seems like a problem
00:20:33 --> 00:20:37 for workers. Yeah, it was a huge problem. And
00:20:37 --> 00:20:40 under the NLRB's... Then existing test, Brian
00:20:40 --> 00:20:42 Ferris probably wasn't the employer. The old
00:20:42 --> 00:20:45 test required direct and immediate control over
00:20:45 --> 00:20:48 the essential terms of employment. Hiring, firing,
00:20:48 --> 00:20:50 discipline, actual day -to -day supervision.
00:20:51 --> 00:20:54 Brian Ferris wasn't doing that stuff directly.
00:20:54 --> 00:20:57 So what did the NORB do? They didn't read rule
00:20:57 --> 00:20:59 changing the standard. They didn't go through
00:20:59 --> 00:21:02 notice and comment. They decided this one case.
00:21:02 --> 00:21:05 And in deciding it, they announced the indirect
00:21:05 --> 00:21:08 control and reserved authority, that contractual
00:21:08 --> 00:21:10 right that Brown and Ferris had to control the
00:21:10 --> 00:21:13 workers, even if they chose not to exercise it.
00:21:13 --> 00:21:15 That was now enough to make them somebody's joint
00:21:15 --> 00:21:19 employer. So a single adjudication then changed
00:21:19 --> 00:21:22 the legal standard nationwide. Yes, overnight.
00:21:22 --> 00:21:25 And Browning Ferris itself was being judged by
00:21:25 --> 00:21:27 this new standard, the one the board announced
00:21:27 --> 00:21:29 in the same decision that found them liable.
00:21:29 --> 00:21:32 Yes. I do want to point out that what's at stake
00:21:32 --> 00:21:33 here is just whether they have to bargain with
00:21:33 --> 00:21:36 the workers. So we're not saying that anybody
00:21:36 --> 00:21:40 is going to jail. We're saying. You weren't sure
00:21:40 --> 00:21:41 if you had to bargain with the workers. You didn't
00:21:41 --> 00:21:43 think you had to bargain with the workers. But
00:21:43 --> 00:21:46 actually, it turns out you do. This is Chenery
00:21:46 --> 00:21:49 in action. The board has the discretion to announce
00:21:49 --> 00:21:51 a new standard through adjudication rather than
00:21:51 --> 00:21:54 rulemaking. So Browning Ferris was the guinea
00:21:54 --> 00:21:57 pig. Yes. And so this means that every other
00:21:57 --> 00:22:00 company that's using staffing agencies or contractors
00:22:00 --> 00:22:02 needs to be on alert. Because once this board
00:22:02 --> 00:22:04 announces the standard in Browning Ferris, it
00:22:04 --> 00:22:07 applies to everyone. How did the business community
00:22:07 --> 00:22:09 react? How do you think the business community
00:22:09 --> 00:22:13 reacted? Well, I can imagine that they freaked
00:22:13 --> 00:22:15 out. They absolutely did. Think about what this
00:22:15 --> 00:22:18 means for all the franchise models. McDonald's
00:22:18 --> 00:22:21 doesn't employ most of the workers at a local
00:22:21 --> 00:22:24 McDonald's. The franchisee does. But McDonald's
00:22:24 --> 00:22:27 controls a ton of the actual work environment.
00:22:27 --> 00:22:30 They have operations manuals. They have required
00:22:30 --> 00:22:32 equipment. They're the people supplying the food.
00:22:33 --> 00:22:35 They have branding standards. So the franchises
00:22:35 --> 00:22:37 were even required to use McDonald's scheduling
00:22:37 --> 00:22:39 software. That's partly what you're paying for
00:22:39 --> 00:22:42 when you become a franchisee is all of that control
00:22:42 --> 00:22:45 exerted by McDonald's. So under the new Browning
00:22:45 --> 00:22:47 -Ferris standard. Yeah. So now there's suddenly
00:22:47 --> 00:22:49 a real question about whether McDonald's could
00:22:49 --> 00:22:52 be the joint employer of every franchisee worker
00:22:52 --> 00:22:55 in America. Same with Subway, same with hotel
00:22:55 --> 00:22:58 chains, same with any company using staffing
00:22:58 --> 00:23:01 agencies or subcontractors. So that's millions
00:23:01 --> 00:23:05 of workers potentially affected by one adjudication.
00:23:05 --> 00:23:09 It is. So unsurprisingly, after this, the business
00:23:09 --> 00:23:12 community went to war. Trade associations filed
00:23:12 --> 00:23:16 lawsuits, lobbyists descended on Congress, and
00:23:16 --> 00:23:18 later NLRB boards, under different presidents,
00:23:19 --> 00:23:23 tried to undo or modify the standards. Also through
00:23:23 --> 00:23:26 adjudication? So initially through adjudication,
00:23:26 --> 00:23:29 eventually through rulemaking. The Joint Employer
00:23:29 --> 00:23:32 Standard has ping -ponged back and forth multiple
00:23:32 --> 00:23:35 times since this case was decided. Each administration
00:23:35 --> 00:23:37 has tried to lock in its preferred approach.
00:23:37 --> 00:23:41 This one case launched years of legal and political
00:23:41 --> 00:23:44 warfare. That's the... power and the problem
00:23:44 --> 00:23:47 of making policy through adjudication. There's
00:23:47 --> 00:23:49 no notice period when industry could organize
00:23:49 --> 00:23:51 opposition. There's no requirement to respond
00:23:51 --> 00:23:53 to public comments. They just need to decide
00:23:53 --> 00:23:57 the case. And by doing that, suddenly you've
00:23:57 --> 00:23:59 reshaped a huge sector of the economy. Which
00:23:59 --> 00:24:02 explains why this choice, rulemaking versus adjudication,
00:24:03 --> 00:24:07 is so strategic. Yes, and why a lot of critics
00:24:07 --> 00:24:10 of the administrative state hate Chenery. They
00:24:10 --> 00:24:13 say it lets agencies avoid accountability and
00:24:13 --> 00:24:15 surprise regulated parties with these retroactive
00:24:15 --> 00:24:19 rule changes. Are there any limits at all on
00:24:19 --> 00:24:22 when agencies can choose adjudication over rulemaking?
00:24:23 --> 00:24:25 The Supreme Court has said there are theoretical
00:24:25 --> 00:24:27 limits. At some point, this would be so inconsistent
00:24:27 --> 00:24:30 that it could be an abuse of discretion. But
00:24:30 --> 00:24:32 they've never said that line was crossed. So
00:24:32 --> 00:24:35 as a practical matter, agencies have a huge degree
00:24:35 --> 00:24:40 of discretion under January. Okay, so let me
00:24:40 --> 00:24:43 make sure I've got all this. Agencies do two
00:24:43 --> 00:24:45 fundamentally different things. They make general
00:24:45 --> 00:24:48 rules like legislatures, and they decide individual
00:24:48 --> 00:24:51 cases like courts. Yes, and these two functions
00:24:51 --> 00:24:54 get very different procedures, going back to
00:24:54 --> 00:24:58 Londoner and bimetallic over a century ago. And
00:24:58 --> 00:25:02 general rules affecting everyone. No individual
00:25:02 --> 00:25:05 hearing is required. Your remedy is political.
00:25:05 --> 00:25:07 Yes, but if we're talking about... An individual
00:25:07 --> 00:25:10 determination about specific people based on
00:25:10 --> 00:25:13 their specific facts. Now due process kicks in
00:25:13 --> 00:25:15 and you have a right to be heard. Except agencies
00:25:15 --> 00:25:18 can also wear the line under Chinnery. They can
00:25:18 --> 00:25:20 announce new policy in the course of deciding
00:25:20 --> 00:25:24 individual cases. And that means that when that
00:25:24 --> 00:25:26 happens, the first parties that face the new
00:25:26 --> 00:25:29 standard get judged retroactively by a rule that's
00:25:29 --> 00:25:31 announced in the decision, finding them liable
00:25:31 --> 00:25:34 for violating it. And we saw with Browning Ferris
00:25:34 --> 00:25:37 how a single adjudication can reshape entire
00:25:37 --> 00:25:40 industries overnight. Yes, without notice, without
00:25:40 --> 00:25:43 a comment period, without the procedural protections
00:25:43 --> 00:25:46 of rulemaking. Okay, so what procedural protections
00:25:46 --> 00:25:49 do you get in adjudications? So that's where
00:25:49 --> 00:25:52 we're going next. There's a huge range. Some
00:25:52 --> 00:25:54 adjudications give you something like a full
00:25:54 --> 00:25:56 trial with witnesses, with cross -examination,
00:25:57 --> 00:26:00 a neutral decision maker, the works. That sounds
00:26:00 --> 00:26:03 reasonable. Others will just give you a letter
00:26:03 --> 00:26:04 that says denied with almost no explanation.
00:26:05 --> 00:26:08 Same government, same APA, completely different
00:26:08 --> 00:26:12 processes. That sounds less reasonable. Yes,
00:26:12 --> 00:26:15 it can. Next episode, we'll be talking about
00:26:15 --> 00:26:20 all the different kinds of adjudications. So
00:26:20 --> 00:26:21 that does it for today's episode on administrative
00:26:21 --> 00:26:24 remedies. Thank you for joining us today. Please,
00:26:24 --> 00:26:27 if you enjoy this podcast and enjoy this episode,
00:26:27 --> 00:26:31 give us a like on Spotify. iTunes, or whatever
00:26:31 --> 00:26:33 platform you're listening on. And be sure to
00:26:33 --> 00:26:35 tune in next time where we'll continue to dive
00:26:35 --> 00:26:37 into the contours of administrative law, because
00:26:37 --> 00:26:40 remember, you can't fix what you don't understand.

