Property Interests Explained: What Counts as "Property" for Due Process

Property Interests Explained: What Counts as "Property" for Due Process

A due process claim starts with a threshold question: does the government's action deprive you of life, liberty, or property? If what the government is taking away doesn't count as a protected interest, due process doesn't apply — and you may have no right to a hearing at all.

Most people think of property as physical things — your house, your car, your bank account. But in administrative law, "property" means something broader and stranger. A professional license is property. A tenured teaching position is property. Government benefits you're currently receiving can be property. But a benefit you've applied for and haven't received yet? That might not be. A government job you hold at will? Probably not. The line between what counts and what doesn't has been drawn by the Supreme Court through cases that can feel deeply counterintuitive.

The two landmark cases are Board of Regents v. Roth and Perry v. Sindermann. Roth was a professor whose one-year contract wasn't renewed. The Court said he had no property interest in continued employment because nothing in his contract or in university policy gave him a legitimate expectation of renewal. Sindermann was also a professor who wasn't renewed — but he had worked in the system for a decade under an informal understanding that he'd keep his job. The Court said that could be enough to create a property interest, even without a formal contract.

The distinction matters enormously because it's the gateway to due process. If you have a property interest, the government owes you notice and a hearing before taking it away. If you don't, the government can act without any process at all. In this episode, we explain what counts as property, where the line is, and why the Court's framework means that the most vulnerable people — those without formal entitlements — are often the ones with the least protection.

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What We Cover

  • What counts as "property" for due process purposes — and what doesn't
  • Board of Regents v. Roth: why a professor with a one-year contract had no property interest in renewal
  • Perry v. Sindermann: why informal expectations of continued employment can create a property interest even without a written contract
  • The difference between the license you have and the license you want — why current holders of benefits or licenses have more protection than applicants
  • How courts determine whether a "legitimate claim of entitlement" exists
  • Why the threshold question matters: if you don't have a protected interest, due process never applies and the government owes you nothing
  • Real-world applications: government employment, professional licenses, welfare benefits, disability benefits, and other contexts where the property question determines whether you get a hearing

Full Transcript

Gwen: Hello, and welcome to Administrative Remedies, because you can't fix what you don't understand. Brought to you in part by the University of Tulsa College of Law. I'm Gwendolyn Savitz, an associate professor here at TU and the associate dean of research and intellectual life.

Marc: And I'm Marc Roark. I'm the dean of the College of Law. We'll be breaking down complex doctrines with real-life analogies and examples to demystify the world of administrative law for everyone trying to understand how government actually works.

Gwen: Agencies are the main way the federal government gets things done. It's not through Congress for reasons we'll be addressing over the course of this series. All right, Mark, today we are going to start by contrasting two situations. The first is a nurse named Linda. She's been an RN for 22 years. She works the overnight shift at a hospital in Ohio. And one morning she gets a letter from the state nursing board saying her license is being suspended pending investigation. There are allegations of medication errors.

Marc: That's serious, but investigations happen all the time.

Gwen: The letter says the suspension is effective immediately. She can't work as a nurse starting tomorrow. No hearing. No chance to explain. Just you're done until we say otherwise. Well,

Marc: that's her entire livelihood, 22 years of her career, that could be gone with just one letter. So

Gwen: here's what makes this a due process question. Linda has a nursing license. The state gave it to her. She met every requirement. She passed every exam. She maintained every continuing education credit. Can the state just take that away with a letter?

Marc: It feels like they shouldn't be able to. All right, so let's

Gwen: change the facts slightly. So same state, same nursing board, but now instead of Linda, it's Kevin. Kevin has just graduated from nursing school. He applied for his license. He met all the qualifications, and the board denied his application. No explanation, no hearing. Okay, that also feels wrong. It might be wrong as a policy matter, but constitutionally, Linda and Kevin are in completely different positions. Linda has a property interest in her license. The state gave it to her. She relied on it. She built her life around it. Kevin is applying for something he doesn't have yet.

Marc: So Linda gets constitutional protection while Kevin doesn't. Yes. That is a

Gwen: threshold question for due process. Not whether the government's actions seem unfair, but whether you have a legally protected interest that the government is taking away. And today we're going to walk through how courts figured out where that line is, because it's not intuitive and it has enormous consequences for how every government program operates.

Marc: The same agency making the same kind of decision, but the Constitution only shows up for one of them. Yes.

Gwen: And the reason why goes back to a pair of cases in 1972 about two college professors, one who had protection and one who didn't. And that distinction between them still controls everything.

Marc: Let's start with the text. We read the due process clause last episode, but it's worth hearing again because every case to date turns on it.

Gwen: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 16

Marc: words, but they do very specific work.

Gwen: Notice what it doesn't say. It doesn't say the government must always provide a hearing.

Marc: It conditions procedure on deprivation. No deprivation, no constitutional requirement.

Gwen: So defining those terms, life, liberty, or property is everything. Yeah,

Marc: especially property. Most administrative disputes aren't about cars and houses. Right.

Gwen: They're about jobs, licenses, benefits, permits. Those aren't things you own in the traditional sense. And they're probably not things you covered in your first year property course. Things like Linda's nursing license.

Marc: And there's a threshold before we even get to property or liberty, state action. Yeah. So a

Gwen: private employer fires you. You might have a claim under contract law, but there's no constitutional claim there. But a

Marc: government employee that fires you, that's when the analysis now starts. Right. That's

Gwen: if and only if there's a protected interest to begin with. So let's talk about those cases. And these are another one of those really nicely matched sets of cases where the facts are so similar. First one, Board of Regents v. Roth. This is the case that defines property for due process purposes.

Marc: David Roth, an assistant professor at Wisconsin State University Oshkosh, had one-year contract, no tenure, and the university decided not to renew. It gave no reason and offered no hearings. So here,

Gwen: Roth argued that he had a property interest in continued employment.

Marc: Which the court rejected. I'll read the key passage, and this is the language that controls everything. To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must instead have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. A

Gwen: legitimate claim of entitlement. That phrase becomes the hinge for everything that follows.

Marc: Not need, not expectation, entitlement. And his contract was explicitly for one year. No promise of renewal. Yeah, so this

Gwen: brings us to the doctrinal move that matters most for administrative law. Read this part. Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.

Marc: So the Constitution doesn't create property interests. State law does. statutes do, regulations do, and contracts do. Right.

Gwen: The Constitution just says if you have a property interest from one of those sources, then due process applies.

Marc: Which means agencies are often the ones deciding whether constitutional protections attach at all. Yes,

Gwen: exactly. Roth isn't just about defining property. It's a structural rule about program design. Think about Linda and Kevin. Linda's nursing license was issued under a state statute. She met the requirements. The state granted it. That's a property interest, a legitimate claim of entitlement. Kevin applied, but he hasn't received anything yet. So under Roth, he has a unilateral expectation, not an entitlement.

Marc: Agencies can design around constitutional requirements. If you don't want constitutional procedure, don't create an entitlement. Right. You can do that through

Gwen: fixed-term contracts with discretionary renewals. You can condition benefits on things. Those aren't just HR choices. They're constitutional architecture. Okay,

Marc: but Sindermann limits how far that design around strategy can go. Yeah, so this was decided the

Gwen: same day as Roth. Here we have Robert Sindermann. He's been in the Texas state college system for 10 years under a series of one-year contracts. But here, the college's faculty guide said something interesting.

Marc: It suggested that teachers with seven or more years of satisfactory service had permanent tenure. There's

Gwen: no formal tenure policy, but there's a faculty guide making promises. And the college tried to have it both ways. That's not a contract. It's just a guide.

Marc: Which is essentially the government saying, yes, we told you this was permanent, but we didn't really mean it. Right. And

Gwen: the court says you don't get to do that. Read this part. A person's interest in a benefit is a property interest for due process purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of entitlement. Mutually explicit understandings. So this is substance over form, and this matters enormously for how the administrative state operates. Because agencies don't just communicate through statutes and regulations. They have guidance documents and manuals and training materials and standard operating procedures. If those documents create expectations that look like entitlements, Sindermann says the Constitution might hold the agencies to them. The government has to align its actual practices with its legal posture. You can't make promises with one hand and disclaim them with the other.

Marc: Does that mean every agency has to be careful about what it puts in its training materials, internal guidance, even informal policy memos?

Gwen: Yes. And this is one reason you can see agencies working so hard on the language in their manuals and making these determinations so carefully. So the agency may provide instead of the applicant will receive or is subject to available funding instead of guaranteed upon eligibility. Those aren't just bureaucratic hedging. After Sindermann, they're constitutional risk management.

Marc: Roth and Sindermann together, formal structure matters. But you can't hide behind informality either. The question is whether there's a real entitlement. However, it's created. Right. That's the framework. All right. Once you have a property interest, the next question is procedure. And Loudermill draws a critical line. All right. So this is

Gwen: Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill. This one was decided in 1985. We have James Loudermill. He's a civil servant under Ohio law, which means he can only be terminated for cause. A very

Marc: clear property interest under Roth, Ohio law created that entitlement. So it turned out that he

Gwen: lied on his job application about a felony conviction, and the board fired him without a hearing.

Marc: And the board's argument was elegant. Ohio law creates the property interest. Ohio law also defines what procedures come with it. Ohio didn't require a pre-termination hearing. Their argument was

Gwen: take the bitter with the sweet, but the court rejected it. Read what the court had to say. Justice White wrote, the categories of substance and procedure are distinct. Were the rule otherwise, the clause would be reduced to a mere tautology. Property cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its deprivation any more than can life or liberty. So they're saying that state law creates the entitlement. But once that entitlement exists, the Constitution sets the procedural floor. The state can't keep an entitlement on the books and strip away the protections that come with it. It can eliminate the entitlement entirely, and Congress did exactly that with welfare in 1996. But as long as the program says you're entitled to this if you qualify, Loudermill says the state owes you process before it takes it away.

Marc: So agencies face a real choice. Create entitlements and accept the procedural costs that follow, or avoid creating entitlements and retain flexibility.

Gwen: Either way, they're making a policy decision with constitutional consequences. And it explains why so many benefit programs are designed the way they are. Think about it. Some programs say you shall receive benefits if you meet these criteria. Others say the agency may, in its discretion, provide benefits. That word choice isn't just a drafting preference. After Loudermill, it's the difference between a program that triggers constitutional procedures and one that doesn't. A

Marc: program design isn't neutral. It's constitutional architecture.

Gwen: Exactly. So in Loudermill, Ohio created for-cause protection for civil servants. That created the property interest. After Loudermill, the state had to provide process before taking it away, regardless of what that state's own procedures said. The Constitution trumps the state's attempts to limit process. OK.

Marc: Liberty interests operate differently, though, from property interests. Let's talk about that. So here,

Gwen: physical freedom is the core. The government can't imprison you without due process. But reputation matters, too, sometimes.

Marc: Roth actually raised both claims. He argued his reputation was damaged by the non-renewal. The

Gwen: court said no on the liberty interest because the university hadn't actually said anything bad about him. But they did talk about the framework. Read this part. Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential. But reputation alone isn't enough. Courts have developed the stigma plus requirement.

Marc: Stigma plus tangible harm. So here's

Gwen: a concrete example. Say, a state agency fires a building inspector. That's not great, but if he's at will, no property interest, so no due process required. But now, if we instead say that the state also issued a press release saying that the inspector was terminated for accepting bribes from contractors. Now his name is in the local paper. Every potential employer who Googles him sees corruption next to his name.

Marc: Now his reputation is damaged and he can't get work. That's the plus.

Gwen: Exactly. So the firing alone doesn't trigger due process. At will employee, no property interest. But the firing combined with the public accusations of dishonesty does because the government has effectively branded him in a way that forecloses future employment. He's entitled to some kind of hearing to clear his name.

Marc: But if the agency just fires him quietly, no press release, no public accusations,

Gwen: no liberty interest, right? Even if everyone in the office knows why he was fired. The stigma has to be public and officially imposed by the government, and it has to be coupled with tangible harm beyond hurt feelings.

Marc: So the reputational damage has to come from the government itself, be publicly communicated, and be tied to something concrete like job loss or professional exclusion. Yes, that

Gwen: plus is essential. And this is a narrow gate. This matters for agencies. It means government employers can fire at-will employees without constitutional consequence, unless they publicly defame the person in the process. Which is why Smart agency counsel tells their clients, if you're going to fire someone, keep the stated reason generic.

Marc: And then there's Castle Rock. which shows how narrow the gate can get. So this is

Gwen: town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, which was decided in 2005, and this case is difficult.

Marc: Jessica Gonzales had a restraining order against her estranged husband. Her husband then kidnapped their three daughters, and she called the police repeatedly, 7.30, 8.30, 10.10 at night, begging them to enforce the restraining order. And their response was just to tell her to wait. He

Gwen: murdered their children. She sued for failure to enforce the restraining order, and Colorado law said officers shall arrest violators. This was mandatory language.

Marc: Shall usually does mean mandatory, and she did have a court order. But

Gwen: the Supreme Court said she had no property interest in police enforcement. A well-established tradition of police discretion has long coexisted with apparently mandatory arrest statutes. Against that backdrop, a true mandate of police action would require some stronger indication from the Colorado legislature than shall use every reasonable means to enforce a restraining order, or even shall arrest or shall seek a warrant. So a well-established tradition of police discretion. Even shall doesn't overcome that. She had a restraining order. What she didn't have constitutionally was an entitlement to police enforcement of it.

Marc: Mandatory statutory language isn't really mandatory for due process purposes, at least not for enforcement decisions.

Gwen: The court was worried about constitutionalizing every enforcement decision. If she has a property interest in enforcement, does everybody who calls 911 have a property interest?

Marc: The institutional concern is real, but so is the cost. Three children are dead, and the Constitution has nothing to say about the government's failure to act.

Gwen: Castle Rock is tragic. But it's also structurally consistent with everything we've been discussing. The court is limiting entitlements where recognizing them would overwhelm the system with procedural obligations. That's a choice about how far due process extends into discretionary government action. You can certainly disagree with where they drew the line, and no one's arguing that the facts here aren't horrendous. But the line does follow the logic of Roth. It is

Marc: a hard case to sit with, if we're honest.

Gwen: It is. And it forces you to see the boundary clearly. Due process protects you when the government takes something you already have. It doesn't require the government to act for you, and it doesn't constitutionalize enforcement discretion. That line between taking and not acting runs through all of administrative law. And once you see it, you start seeing it everywhere, not just in policing, in licenses, in benefits, in jobs. Let me show you how far this logic travels in a less emotionally devastating context. So, in many states, you need a government license to braid hair. Okay,

Marc: you're right. That is a much more significantly lighter context. A license to braid hair. Yeah,

Gwen: natural hair braiding. Some states have required hundreds of hours of cosmetology training, which often doesn't even cover braiding, plus exams, fees, ongoing continuing education, all before you can legally charge someone to braid their hair.

Marc: That seems like a lot of regulatory overhead for something people have been doing for thousands of years.

Gwen: It is, and there's been a lot of litigation and legislative reform around it. But here's why it's a perfect due process illustration. Say you're Maya. You've jumped through all these hoops. You have your braiding license. You've been operating a braiding shop for eight years. One day, the state board sends you a letter saying your license is being revoked because you didn't complete some new continuing education requirement you didn't know about. So

Marc: she has a property interest. The state issued the license. She relied on it under Roth. That's a legitimate claim of entitlement. All right. And we can contrast that with

Gwen: her neighbor, Alicia, who has been braiding hair out of her kitchen for years without a license. And for Alicia, the state tells her to stop or face fines.

Marc: Alicia has no property interest in a license that she never received. Right.

Gwen: The state can change its licensing requirements. It can make them harder. It can make them easier. And regardless, Alicia has no constitutional claim to process because there's nothing to take away. Whereas with Maya, the state owes her process before it takes the license away. Notice of why and opportunity to respond. Under Loudermill, the state can't just define away those protections. So we have the

Marc: same skill, same neighborhood, same government agency, but completely different constitutional treatment.

Gwen: And it also gets even more interesting because some states have deregulated hair braiding entirely. There's no license needed. Others have created exemptions. When a state eliminates a licensing requirement. All the mayas in the state lose their property interest. There's nothing left for due process to protect.

Marc: So the state can create the entitlement and the state can eliminate it entirely. Right.

Gwen: What it can't do, after Loudermill, is keep the entitlement on the books and then take it away from individuals without due process. That's the constitutional line. And every occupational licensing board in the country operates within it, whether they're licensing nurses or hair braiders or plumbers or mortgage brokers.

Marc: People see a bureaucratic letter from a licensing board and think, government red tape. They don't realize there's a constitutional framework underneath all of it. Right.

Gwen: Roth, Sindermann, Loudermill, these are all operating in the background every time a state issues, denies, or revokes a professional license. That's not red tape. That's the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment. Okay,

Marc: so the threshold question, property or liberty, is technical, but it determines whether the Constitution shows up at all.

Gwen: And the government has significant control over whether entitlements exist in the first place.

Marc: That's very much the architecture of what we've been talking about. Roth gives agencies power to structure around due process. Sindermann limits the power when informal practices create expectations. Loudermill says once the entitlement exists, procedures follow, and Castle Rock preserves enforcement discretion.

Gwen: Administrative law may not generate a ton of splashy Supreme Court moments, but so much of it is constitutional law embedded in everyday governance. Okay. So what's next then? All right. Assuming you've cleared the threshold, we decided you do have a property interest or potentially a liberty interest. How much process do you actually get? That's Mathews v. Eldridge. This is the balancing test that determines whether Linda the nurse gets a hearing before her suspension or after her suspension. Okay.

Marc: From do I have a right to what is a right? So that does it for today's episode on administrative remedies. Thank you for joining us today. Please, if you enjoy this podcast, enjoy this episode, give us a like on Spotify, iTunes, or whatever platform you're listening on. And be sure to tune in next time where we'll continue to dive into the contours of administrative law, because

Gwen: remember, you can't fix what you don't understand.

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