The Answer Depends on What You Call the Question: Review of Questions of Law, Fact, and Mixed Questions
Administrative RemediesNovember 17, 2026x
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00:32:0429.4 MB

The Answer Depends on What You Call the Question: Review of Questions of Law, Fact, and Mixed Questions

The house closes Friday. The buyer gets the keys Saturday, walks into the dining room, and the chandelier is gone. The seller unscrewed it Thursday night, patched the hole, and took it to her new house. It was her grandmother’s, it had been wired into the ceiling for five years, and she’d mentioned at the showing that she planned to take it. The buyer said nothing, and the contract never mentions it.

Suppose nobody disputes any of that. Everyone agrees on the facts. Everyone agrees on the legal test for what counts as a fixture. The trial court says the seller could take it, and the buyer appeals. What exactly is the appellate court being asked to do?

That question sits underneath every case in this episode. Before a reviewing court can decide whether an agency got something wrong, it has to decide what kind of question it’s answering: what the law means, what happened, or what happens when you put the two together. Gwen and Marc work through why that classification can matter more than the answer.

In this episode:

  • APA section 706, and why Congress gave courts one instruction about questions of law and a different one about agency fact-finding
  • Section 405(g) and the word “conclusive,” plus Universal Camera’s reminder that substantial evidence review still means reading the whole record
  • U.S. Bank v. Village at Lakeridge, where the test for a mixed question turns on whether answering it is primarily legal or factual work, which describes the problem more than it solves it
  • Why that framing is still useful: who is better positioned, the court that can clarify a rule for future cases or the one that watched the witnesses
  • Pullman-Standard v. Swint, and the limit on characterization: a finding doesn’t become a question of law just because it decides the case
  • Wilkinson v. Garland: a seven-year-old with severe asthma, a father facing removal, and a hardship determination legal enough to get into court but factual enough to receive deference
  • Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, decided this March, where the immigration judge believed every word and the applicant still lost, because the record has to compel the contrary conclusion
  • Justice Jackson’s point that whether an issue escapes a jurisdiction-stripping provision says nothing about how closely a court then reviews it
  • NLRB v. Hearst, the men the Court said were misnamed boys, and the Court interpreting “employee” itself while leaving the Board room to apply it
  • Taft-Hartley narrowing the rule, and United Insurance showing that a narrower test still didn’t let a court substitute its own conclusion
  • Why deference there wasn’t a reward for technical expertise

The real question after Loper Bright may not be whether courts defer to agencies on what a statute means. It may be what courts are willing to call statutory interpretation in the first place.


00:00:13 --> 00:00:15 Welcome to Administrative Remedies, because you
00:00:15 --> 00:00:17 can't fix what you don't understand. Brought
00:00:17 --> 00:00:19 to you in part by the University of Tulsa College
00:00:19 --> 00:00:22 of Law's Mabee Legal Information Center. I'm
00:00:22 --> 00:00:24 Gwendolyn Savitz, an associate professor here
00:00:24 --> 00:00:26 at TU. And I'm Mark Roark, a professor at the
00:00:26 --> 00:00:29 College of Law. We'll be breaking down complex
00:00:29 --> 00:00:31 doctrines with real -life analogies and examples
00:00:31 --> 00:00:33 to demystify the world of administrative law
00:00:33 --> 00:00:35 for everyone trying to understand how government
00:00:35 --> 00:00:38 actually works. Agencies are the main way the
00:00:38 --> 00:00:40 federal government gets things done. It's not
00:00:40 --> 00:00:42 through Congress for reasons we'll be addressing
00:00:42 --> 00:00:46 over the course of the series. All right, Mark,
00:00:46 --> 00:00:49 let's say that house closes on Friday and the
00:00:49 --> 00:00:51 buyer gets the keys on Saturday, walks into the
00:00:51 --> 00:00:53 dining room and discovers that the chandelier
00:00:53 --> 00:00:57 is gone. So the seller took it with them. Yes.
00:00:57 --> 00:00:59 Like Thursday night, she unscrews it from the
00:00:59 --> 00:01:01 ceiling. She patches the hole and she takes it
00:01:01 --> 00:01:04 to her new house. Yeah, that that's not going
00:01:04 --> 00:01:07 to go over well. Whenever the buyer comes into
00:01:07 --> 00:01:09 the house and finds that there is no chandelier
00:01:09 --> 00:01:11 in the dining room, they're probably going to
00:01:11 --> 00:01:15 raise a dispute breach of contract. So is that
00:01:15 --> 00:01:17 because the chandelier came with the house? It's
00:01:17 --> 00:01:20 not that simple. The question is whether it was
00:01:20 --> 00:01:23 a fixture or not. And personal property can become
00:01:23 --> 00:01:25 part of the real property and generally fixtures
00:01:25 --> 00:01:29 transfer with the land. So whether there's something
00:01:29 --> 00:01:31 that qualifies depends on the applicable law
00:01:31 --> 00:01:33 and circumstances and also the contract that
00:01:33 --> 00:01:36 was executed. OK, so here's a little more information.
00:01:36 --> 00:01:39 The chandelier was an antique and it belonged
00:01:39 --> 00:01:41 to the seller's grandmother. She had installed
00:01:41 --> 00:01:43 in the dining room five years earlier. It was
00:01:43 --> 00:01:45 wired into the ceiling, but she'd always intended
00:01:45 --> 00:01:48 to take it when she moved. OK, I mean, so she
00:01:48 --> 00:01:52 had private expectations about how what the longevity
00:01:52 --> 00:01:56 of that chandelier was, but those aren't necessarily
00:01:56 --> 00:02:00 known. And so the question is, did she communicate
00:02:00 --> 00:02:03 that to the buyer when they signed the contract?
00:02:03 --> 00:02:06 What if during the showing, she told the buyer,
00:02:06 --> 00:02:08 well, the person showing the house, told the
00:02:08 --> 00:02:10 buyer that the chandelier had been in her family
00:02:10 --> 00:02:11 for generations and she planned to take it with
00:02:11 --> 00:02:14 her? The buyer doesn't say anything, but then
00:02:14 --> 00:02:17 when they sign the actual contract, neither side
00:02:17 --> 00:02:20 mentions the chandelier. Okay, that does make
00:02:20 --> 00:02:22 the problem more interesting. That kind of creates
00:02:22 --> 00:02:25 a parole evidence issue. The chandelier was physically
00:02:25 --> 00:02:28 attached to the house, but the seller had told
00:02:28 --> 00:02:31 the buyer she intended to take it. Whether that
00:02:31 --> 00:02:33 matters and whether this buyer's science matters
00:02:33 --> 00:02:35 depends on the governing. governing contract
00:02:35 --> 00:02:38 and fixtures. And what I'll also say is when
00:02:38 --> 00:02:40 you look at the standard real estate contract,
00:02:40 --> 00:02:43 it makes it really easy to opt out of certain
00:02:43 --> 00:02:47 things that don't come with the house. That might
00:02:47 --> 00:02:50 actually not be a great set of facts for the
00:02:50 --> 00:02:53 seller who takes the antique chandelier with
00:02:53 --> 00:02:56 her. Suppose at this point that neither party
00:02:56 --> 00:02:58 is disputing any of these facts and assume the
00:02:58 --> 00:03:01 dispute is covered by a fixture test that looks
00:03:01 --> 00:03:03 at the manner of attachment and the adaptation
00:03:03 --> 00:03:05 to the property and objective evidence of intent.
00:03:05 --> 00:03:07 The trial court applies that test and decides
00:03:07 --> 00:03:10 that the seller could take the chandelier and
00:03:10 --> 00:03:13 then the buyer appeals. OK, what is the basis
00:03:13 --> 00:03:15 for the buyer's appeal now? The buyer is saying
00:03:15 --> 00:03:18 that the trial court got the answer wrong. Let's
00:03:18 --> 00:03:20 say in this case that everybody agrees on the
00:03:20 --> 00:03:23 legal test. Everybody agrees what happened. And
00:03:23 --> 00:03:26 the buyer just argues that those facts mean the
00:03:26 --> 00:03:30 chandelier is a fixture. OK, so that's an interesting
00:03:30 --> 00:03:32 problem. The appellate court might be deciding
00:03:32 --> 00:03:36 what the legal test for fixtures means, whether
00:03:36 --> 00:03:40 the test itself creates a certain meaning of
00:03:40 --> 00:03:43 those things. It might be reviewing how the trial
00:03:43 --> 00:03:45 judge evaluated the circumstance of the particular
00:03:45 --> 00:03:48 chandelier. If the facts are established and
00:03:48 --> 00:03:50 the law is established, why shouldn't the appellate
00:03:50 --> 00:03:52 court independently decide whether the chandelier
00:03:52 --> 00:03:56 meets the legal test? Sometimes it can and maybe
00:03:56 --> 00:03:59 it should, but that's not automatic. You have
00:03:59 --> 00:04:03 only certain kinds of. cases where the appellate
00:04:03 --> 00:04:07 court gets to weigh in and apply facts to the
00:04:07 --> 00:04:09 law. Depending on the jurisdiction and the issue,
00:04:10 --> 00:04:12 appellate courts may give different degrees of
00:04:12 --> 00:04:14 deference to a trial court's application of the
00:04:14 --> 00:04:16 law to the facts. Which can sound a little odd
00:04:16 --> 00:04:19 if everybody agrees on both of them. Right, because
00:04:19 --> 00:04:22 the application can require judgment. I mean,
00:04:22 --> 00:04:24 how important is the fact that the chandelier
00:04:24 --> 00:04:26 was wired in the ceiling? What weight should
00:04:26 --> 00:04:28 we give the seller's statement about taking the
00:04:28 --> 00:04:30 chandelier? Does that statement affect the legal
00:04:30 --> 00:04:35 characterization of the property? And also, did
00:04:35 --> 00:04:37 you see the way they testified? And were you
00:04:37 --> 00:04:40 able to give weight to whether their body language
00:04:40 --> 00:04:43 gave any sort of credibility to their statements?
00:04:44 --> 00:04:46 So the appellate court has to decide what kind
00:04:46 --> 00:04:48 of a question it's answering before it decides
00:04:48 --> 00:04:50 whether the trial court got it wrong. Yeah, and
00:04:50 --> 00:04:52 that characterization can affect how much freedom
00:04:52 --> 00:04:54 the appellate court has to reach a different
00:04:54 --> 00:04:58 answer. It isn't an arbitrary choice, but it
00:04:58 --> 00:05:02 does matter. Okay, so let's circle back to Kathleen.
00:05:02 --> 00:05:05 Okay, our warehouse supervisor whose disability
00:05:05 --> 00:05:08 claim finally reaches federal court. Last week,
00:05:08 --> 00:05:10 we talked about what the federal judge gets to
00:05:10 --> 00:05:13 see, her administrative record. Now the judge
00:05:13 --> 00:05:16 has that record and is reviewing the administrative
00:05:16 --> 00:05:19 law judge's decision to deny benefits. OK. And
00:05:19 --> 00:05:22 the question is what the judge is permitted to
00:05:22 --> 00:05:25 do with it now. Yes. Consider two possible findings.
00:05:25 --> 00:05:28 In one, the ALJ might have written. The claimant's
00:05:28 --> 00:05:30 statements concerning the intensity, persistence,
00:05:30 --> 00:05:32 and limiting effects of her symptoms are not
00:05:32 --> 00:05:34 entirely consistent with the medical evidence
00:05:34 --> 00:05:37 and other evidence in the record, or if we try
00:05:37 --> 00:05:39 and translate that. Looking at all the evidence,
00:05:39 --> 00:05:41 I don't think her symptoms limit what she can
00:05:41 --> 00:05:44 do as much as she says. Okay, and the ALJ is
00:05:44 --> 00:05:46 deciding how much weight to give Kathleen's account
00:05:46 --> 00:05:49 of her symptoms compared with the other evidence
00:05:49 --> 00:05:53 that's available to it. Then the ALJ concludes
00:05:53 --> 00:05:55 that she has the residual functional capacity
00:05:55 --> 00:05:57 to perform sedentary work. She still has the
00:05:57 --> 00:06:00 ability to do sedentary work. Which matters because
00:06:00 --> 00:06:03 the agency uses her remaining capacities, everything
00:06:03 --> 00:06:06 she's still capable of doing, together with her
00:06:06 --> 00:06:09 age, her education, and her work history to determine
00:06:09 --> 00:06:11 whether there are jobs that she still can do.
00:06:11 --> 00:06:14 So at this point, say she's making two arguments.
00:06:14 --> 00:06:17 Argument number one, the ALJ misunderstood what
00:06:17 --> 00:06:20 sedentary work meant. Argument number two. The
00:06:20 --> 00:06:22 medical evidence doesn't support his finding
00:06:22 --> 00:06:25 about how long she can sit. Okay, these are different
00:06:25 --> 00:06:27 objections. The first concerns the legal requirement,
00:06:28 --> 00:06:30 and the second concerns the evidence supporting
00:06:30 --> 00:06:33 the factual finding. Let's add another variation,
00:06:33 --> 00:06:35 too. Suppose the LJ correctly states the standard
00:06:35 --> 00:06:38 and identifies her limitations, but the dispute
00:06:38 --> 00:06:41 is whether those limitations satisfy the standard.
00:06:41 --> 00:06:43 Okay, then it's not really a dispute about what
00:06:43 --> 00:06:46 the law says or what the facts are. It's about
00:06:46 --> 00:06:48 what happens when you put those two things together.
00:06:49 --> 00:06:51 Yes. These are different kinds of decisions,
00:06:51 --> 00:06:53 and Congress has given courts different instructions
00:06:53 --> 00:06:56 about questions of law versus questions of fact.
00:06:56 --> 00:07:00 Let's start with 706 of the APA. Okay. The APA
00:07:00 --> 00:07:03 says here, to the extent necessary to decision
00:07:03 --> 00:07:05 and when presented, the reviewing court shall
00:07:05 --> 00:07:09 decide all relevant questions of law. So this
00:07:09 --> 00:07:11 gives courts the responsibility for determining
00:07:11 --> 00:07:13 the legal meaning. The same section separately
00:07:13 --> 00:07:17 addresses review of agency factual findings and
00:07:17 --> 00:07:19 includes substantial evidence review in certain
00:07:19 --> 00:07:21 proceedings. Okay, so the statute distinguishes
00:07:21 --> 00:07:24 the court's responsibility to decide what the
00:07:24 --> 00:07:26 law means from its responsibility to review what
00:07:26 --> 00:07:29 the agency found. And particular statutes can
00:07:29 --> 00:07:31 supply their own instructions. Additionally,
00:07:31 --> 00:07:33 for Kathleen's Social Security case, Section
00:07:33 --> 00:07:36 405G governs. Here's what that says. The findings
00:07:36 --> 00:07:39 of the Commissioner of Social Security as to
00:07:39 --> 00:07:41 any fact if supported by substantial evidence
00:07:41 --> 00:07:45 shall be conclusive. Conclusive is a strong word.
00:07:45 --> 00:07:47 Congress didn't tell the district judge to consider
00:07:47 --> 00:07:50 every fact and decide which account she prefers.
00:07:50 --> 00:07:53 Right. Although substantial evidence review isn't
00:07:53 --> 00:07:55 a rubber stamp. In Universal Camera, which we've
00:07:55 --> 00:07:57 talked about before, the Supreme Court emphasized
00:07:57 --> 00:08:00 that reviewing courts must consider the record
00:08:00 --> 00:08:02 as a whole, including evidence that detracts
00:08:02 --> 00:08:05 from the agency's conclusion. OK, but the judge
00:08:05 --> 00:08:07 still can't simply replace a supported factual
00:08:07 --> 00:08:10 determination with the conclusion she would have
00:08:10 --> 00:08:13 reached herself. Yes, and that's an important
00:08:13 --> 00:08:15 division of responsibility. Congress gave the
00:08:15 --> 00:08:17 agency the initial responsibility to find facts,
00:08:18 --> 00:08:19 while the federal courts review those findings
00:08:19 --> 00:08:21 within the limits that Congress established.
00:08:21 --> 00:08:23 Which makes the distinction between law and fact
00:08:23 --> 00:08:26 consequential. If something is a legal question,
00:08:26 --> 00:08:28 the court may have a different responsibility
00:08:28 --> 00:08:31 than if it's reviewing an agency's factual determination.
00:08:32 --> 00:08:34 And we can also hit hard questions that don't
00:08:34 --> 00:08:37 neatly fall into either category. This became
00:08:37 --> 00:08:40 even more important after Loperbright. That was
00:08:40 --> 00:08:42 the Supreme Court case that said, Courts must
00:08:42 --> 00:08:44 exercise independent judgment about the meaning
00:08:44 --> 00:08:47 of a statute. But that doesn't mean that courts
00:08:47 --> 00:08:49 independently reconsider every agency decision
00:08:49 --> 00:08:52 that involves a statute. Because interpreting
00:08:52 --> 00:08:54 a legal standard and applying it to particular
00:08:54 --> 00:08:57 facts aren't necessarily the same thing. And
00:08:57 --> 00:08:59 deciding where that matters can be surprisingly
00:08:59 --> 00:09:02 difficult. The lower right majority itself distinguished
00:09:02 --> 00:09:05 statutory interpretation from fact -bound applications
00:09:05 --> 00:09:08 of broad statutory terms. And the dissent questioned
00:09:08 --> 00:09:11 how cleanly those tasks could be separated. So
00:09:11 --> 00:09:14 even after Chevron was overruled, we still have
00:09:14 --> 00:09:16 to decide whether a dispute is actually about
00:09:16 --> 00:09:19 legal interpretation or about applying law to
00:09:19 --> 00:09:21 facts. Yes. That brings us to mixed questions
00:09:21 --> 00:09:24 of law and fact. Agencies encounter them constantly.
00:09:24 --> 00:09:26 Is someone an employee under a labor statute?
00:09:26 --> 00:09:29 Does an immigrant's family face a legally sufficient
00:09:29 --> 00:09:31 level of hardship? Does particular conduct satisfy
00:09:31 --> 00:09:35 regulatory prohibition? And in each case, the
00:09:35 --> 00:09:37 decision maker has to apply a general legal standard
00:09:37 --> 00:09:41 to very specific facts. Yeah. And the Supreme
00:09:41 --> 00:09:44 Court addressed this general problem in U .S.
00:09:44 --> 00:09:46 Bank v. Village at Lake Ridge. This was a bankruptcy
00:09:46 --> 00:09:49 case from 2018. Okay. Bankruptcy is kind of close
00:09:49 --> 00:09:52 to property. I'm intrigued. All right. Here we
00:09:52 --> 00:09:54 have a corporation. It's in bankruptcy and has
00:09:54 --> 00:09:56 a creditor whose claim was purchased by someone
00:09:56 --> 00:09:58 with a romantic relationship with one of the
00:09:58 --> 00:10:00 corporation's insiders. The question is whether
00:10:00 --> 00:10:03 that purchaser should be treated as a non -statutory
00:10:03 --> 00:10:05 insider. Which matters because bankruptcy law
00:10:05 --> 00:10:08 treats insiders very differently from outsiders.
00:10:08 --> 00:10:10 Yeah. The Ninth Circuit here used a two -part
00:10:10 --> 00:10:13 test. They looked at the creditor's relationship
00:10:13 --> 00:10:15 with the debtor and said it had to be comparable
00:10:15 --> 00:10:17 to relationships covered by the bankruptcy code's
00:10:17 --> 00:10:20 enumerated insider exceptions. And they said
00:10:20 --> 00:10:22 that the transaction had to be negotiated at
00:10:22 --> 00:10:25 less than arm's length. So the relationship mattered,
00:10:25 --> 00:10:28 but so did how the transaction actually occurred.
00:10:28 --> 00:10:30 Yes. And the bankruptcy court found that the
00:10:30 --> 00:10:32 purchase had been conducted at arm's length.
00:10:32 --> 00:10:34 Then the Supreme Court faced a standard of review
00:10:34 --> 00:10:36 question. Should the appellate court independently
00:10:36 --> 00:10:39 reconsider that application of the test or should
00:10:39 --> 00:10:41 I review it only for clear error? And the Supreme
00:10:41 --> 00:10:43 Court took the Ninth Circuit's legal test as
00:10:43 --> 00:10:46 a given. It didn't decide whether that was the
00:10:46 --> 00:10:49 correct substantive definition of a non -statutory
00:10:49 --> 00:10:52 insider. Yes. So the court addressed the standard
00:10:52 --> 00:10:54 of review for the application, not the correctness
00:10:54 --> 00:10:57 of the underlying legal test. And because this
00:10:57 --> 00:10:59 was appellate review of a bankruptcy court. It's
00:10:59 --> 00:11:01 holding doesn't automatically determine the standard
00:11:01 --> 00:11:03 for reviewing administrative agencies. But the
00:11:03 --> 00:11:06 court's explanation of mixed questions is more
00:11:06 --> 00:11:09 broadly useful. Yes. Here's what Kagan wrote
00:11:09 --> 00:11:11 for a unanimous court. In short, the standard
00:11:11 --> 00:11:14 of review for a mixed question all depends on
00:11:14 --> 00:11:17 whether answering it entails primarily legal
00:11:17 --> 00:11:20 or factual work. That's not really much of a
00:11:20 --> 00:11:24 test, if I'm being fair. Yeah, I know. It theoretically
00:11:24 --> 00:11:28 provides at least questions you can ask to analyze
00:11:28 --> 00:11:31 it. Okay, and it tells the court to determine
00:11:31 --> 00:11:34 whether something is primarily legal or factual
00:11:34 --> 00:11:37 by deciding whether answering it requires primary
00:11:37 --> 00:11:40 legal or factual work. That describes the problem
00:11:40 --> 00:11:43 rather than solving it. It's sort of like a self
00:11:43 --> 00:11:46 -fulfilling prophecy. Okay, but consider the
00:11:46 --> 00:11:48 institutional difference. If resolving the dispute
00:11:48 --> 00:11:51 requires clarifying what a legal standard means
00:11:51 --> 00:11:53 for future cases, an appellate court could be
00:11:53 --> 00:11:56 well -positioned to do that. If it requires examining
00:11:56 --> 00:11:58 one complicated transaction and the people involved
00:11:58 --> 00:12:00 in it, the court that heard the evidence probably
00:12:00 --> 00:12:03 has an advantage there. Lake Ridge, the legal
00:12:03 --> 00:12:06 test was taken as a given. The remaining work
00:12:06 --> 00:12:08 was evaluating whether these particular parties
00:12:08 --> 00:12:11 had actually dealt with each other at arm's length.
00:12:11 --> 00:12:14 Yes. And so the Supreme Court held a clear error
00:12:14 --> 00:12:17 review was appropriate. OK, that rationale is
00:12:17 --> 00:12:20 defensible. I mean, but. The difficult part is
00:12:20 --> 00:12:23 deciding whether a dispute requires elaborating
00:12:23 --> 00:12:26 a legal rule or evaluating the facts. Describe
00:12:26 --> 00:12:29 the question as, what does arm's length require?
00:12:29 --> 00:12:33 And it sounds legal. Describe it as, did these
00:12:33 --> 00:12:35 two people behave like strangers? And it sounds
00:12:35 --> 00:12:38 factual. Yes. Although, theoretically, parties
00:12:38 --> 00:12:40 can't change the governing standard by changing
00:12:40 --> 00:12:43 the wording. Of course, but that question generally
00:12:43 --> 00:12:46 has both dimensions. That characterization can
00:12:46 --> 00:12:49 still affect how closely the appellate court
00:12:49 --> 00:12:51 examines the decision. And Lakeridge isn't an
00:12:51 --> 00:12:54 exceptionless formula. Constitutional mixed questions,
00:12:54 --> 00:12:56 for example, can still call for independent review
00:12:56 --> 00:12:59 for other reasons. Or a specific statute could
00:12:59 --> 00:13:01 also govern the standard for reviewing a particular
00:13:01 --> 00:13:04 issue. So the framework is useful, but it doesn't
00:13:04 --> 00:13:07 give courts unlimited freedom to decide how deferential
00:13:07 --> 00:13:09 they want to be. All right, let's circle back
00:13:09 --> 00:13:11 to the chandelier. If the appellate court is
00:13:11 --> 00:13:14 deciding what the fixture test means, that sounds
00:13:14 --> 00:13:16 like legal work. But what if everyone agrees
00:13:16 --> 00:13:18 on the test and the dispute is about the particular
00:13:18 --> 00:13:21 circumstances? Okay, then the court might be
00:13:21 --> 00:13:23 doing something closer to what the bankruptcy
00:13:23 --> 00:13:27 court did in Lake Ridge. It's evaluating how
00:13:27 --> 00:13:29 an established test applies to a particular transaction.
00:13:30 --> 00:13:33 But I'd still want to know what the governing
00:13:33 --> 00:13:35 jurisdiction says about reviewing fixture determinations.
00:13:36 --> 00:13:39 Lakeridge doesn't decide that for us. So you
00:13:39 --> 00:13:40 wouldn't necessarily get the same standard of
00:13:40 --> 00:13:43 review just because the two cases involve applying
00:13:43 --> 00:13:46 law to facts? No, but there's a more basic point
00:13:46 --> 00:13:48 about our chandelier. The seller's statement
00:13:48 --> 00:13:51 about taking it might be evidence of intent,
00:13:51 --> 00:13:53 but if the dispute were instead about whether
00:13:53 --> 00:13:56 that conversation changed the written agreement,
00:13:56 --> 00:13:59 we'd have a different legal issue and the physical
00:13:59 --> 00:14:02 object hasn't changed. The question before the
00:14:02 --> 00:14:05 court, though, has very much changed. Otherwise...
00:14:05 --> 00:14:08 If we don't have these kinds of standards, every
00:14:08 --> 00:14:11 losing party would describe the decisive factual
00:14:11 --> 00:14:14 finding as the legal conclusion and demand independent
00:14:14 --> 00:14:17 review. Yes, that was tried. And the Supreme
00:14:17 --> 00:14:20 Court rejected that move in 1982 in a case called
00:14:20 --> 00:14:23 Pullman Standard v. Swint. This was a Title VII
00:14:23 --> 00:14:26 case. Black employees challenged the seniority
00:14:26 --> 00:14:28 system of the company. And the district court
00:14:28 --> 00:14:31 found no discriminatory intent behind its adoption.
00:14:31 --> 00:14:33 And the Court of Appeals treated discriminatory
00:14:33 --> 00:14:37 intent as an ultimate fact it could reconsider
00:14:37 --> 00:14:39 independently. Yes, but the Supreme Court said
00:14:39 --> 00:14:42 that Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
00:14:42 --> 00:14:45 didn't permit that kind of distinction. Here's
00:14:45 --> 00:14:48 how it said it. It does not divide facts into
00:14:48 --> 00:14:50 categories. In particular, it does not divide
00:14:50 --> 00:14:53 findings of fact into those that deal with ultimate
00:14:53 --> 00:14:56 and those that deal with subsidiary facts. So
00:14:56 --> 00:14:58 the fact that a finding determines the outcome
00:14:58 --> 00:15:01 doesn't transform it into a question of law.
00:15:01 --> 00:15:04 Intent was factual and the appellate court had
00:15:04 --> 00:15:06 to respect the trial court's fact -finding rule.
00:15:07 --> 00:15:09 Even when the legal error distorted the fact
00:15:09 --> 00:15:11 -finding, the ordinary solution should be to
00:15:11 --> 00:15:14 send the case back for proper findings, not to
00:15:14 --> 00:15:16 have the appellate court make them itself. Which
00:15:16 --> 00:15:19 is a meaningful limit on characterization. The
00:15:19 --> 00:15:21 importance of an answer doesn't change what sort
00:15:21 --> 00:15:24 of question it is. But when law and fact genuinely
00:15:24 --> 00:15:26 overlap, the reviewing court still has to work
00:15:26 --> 00:15:28 out what kind of review is appropriate. In 2024,
00:15:29 --> 00:15:31 the Supreme Court confronted such a mixed question
00:15:31 --> 00:15:33 in a setting where the classification determined
00:15:33 --> 00:15:36 whether the court could review it at all. OK,
00:15:36 --> 00:15:38 you're talking about Wilkinson v. Garland. I
00:15:38 --> 00:15:41 am. Good guess. Here we had Cedar Cama Wilkinson,
00:15:41 --> 00:15:43 who'd come to the United States from Trinidad
00:15:43 --> 00:15:45 and Tobago on a tourist visa and remained after
00:15:45 --> 00:15:48 it expired. Years later, he faced removal. And
00:15:48 --> 00:15:51 he had a U .S. citizen son. Yes. His son was
00:15:51 --> 00:15:54 seven when he was detained, and the child suffered
00:15:54 --> 00:15:56 from severe asthma, severe enough that it required
00:15:56 --> 00:15:59 hospitalization several times a year. He helped
00:15:59 --> 00:16:01 manage his son's medications, and he provided
00:16:01 --> 00:16:03 substantial financial and emotional support.
00:16:04 --> 00:16:06 He sought cancellation of removal based in part
00:16:06 --> 00:16:09 on the hardship his son would suffer if he were
00:16:09 --> 00:16:12 deported. One of the statutory eligibility requirements
00:16:12 --> 00:16:15 was that removal would cause exceptional and
00:16:15 --> 00:16:17 extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying family
00:16:17 --> 00:16:20 member. OK, that's a pretty demanding standard.
00:16:20 --> 00:16:23 Many children suffer when a parent is removed.
00:16:23 --> 00:16:26 But Congress required something beyond the ordinary
00:16:26 --> 00:16:29 hardship associated with that kind of separation.
00:16:29 --> 00:16:32 Yes. The immigrant judge credited Wilkinson's
00:16:32 --> 00:16:34 testimony, but concluded that the combined hardship
00:16:34 --> 00:16:37 still didn't meet that statutory threshold. And
00:16:37 --> 00:16:39 the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. And
00:16:39 --> 00:16:41 the Third Circuit said it lacked jurisdiction
00:16:41 --> 00:16:45 to review the hardship determination. Yes. So
00:16:45 --> 00:16:47 the immigration statute generally restricts review
00:16:47 --> 00:16:49 of certain decisions concerning cancellation
00:16:49 --> 00:16:51 of removal, even though it preserves review of
00:16:51 --> 00:16:54 constitutional claims and questions of law. The
00:16:54 --> 00:16:56 Third Circuit treated the hardship determination
00:16:56 --> 00:16:59 as an unreviewable discretionary judgment. But
00:16:59 --> 00:17:02 there are two different decisions here. Does
00:17:02 --> 00:17:05 Wilkinson satisfy the statutory eligibility requirements?
00:17:05 --> 00:17:07 And if he does, should the government actually
00:17:07 --> 00:17:10 grant cancellation as a matter of discretion?
00:17:10 --> 00:17:12 That's the distinction the Supreme Court drew.
00:17:12 --> 00:17:15 Applying the statutory hardship standard to established
00:17:15 --> 00:17:17 facts, it said, is a mixed question of law and
00:17:17 --> 00:17:20 fact. And under this particular immigration provision,
00:17:20 --> 00:17:23 mixed questions fell within the exception that
00:17:23 --> 00:17:26 preserved review of questions of law. Even though
00:17:26 --> 00:17:29 deciding whether this child faces exceptional
00:17:29 --> 00:17:31 hardship requires examining all the particular
00:17:31 --> 00:17:34 circumstances of his life. Yes. The Supreme Court
00:17:34 --> 00:17:36 distinguished applying the hardship standard
00:17:36 --> 00:17:38 from revisiting the factual findings themselves.
00:17:39 --> 00:17:42 Here's how. Only the question whether those established
00:17:42 --> 00:17:45 facts satisfy the statutory eligibility standard
00:17:45 --> 00:17:48 is subject to judicial review. So the federal
00:17:48 --> 00:17:51 court can't simply reconsider the findings about
00:17:51 --> 00:17:53 the child's medical condition or Wilkinson's
00:17:53 --> 00:17:55 support. It reviews whether those established
00:17:55 --> 00:17:58 facts satisfy statutory hardship standard. Yes.
00:17:59 --> 00:18:04 OK, that sounds as though Wilkinson won the right
00:18:04 --> 00:18:06 to an independent legal review, though. He won
00:18:06 --> 00:18:08 the right to judicial review. But the Supreme
00:18:08 --> 00:18:11 Court also said that. because this hardship inquiry
00:18:11 --> 00:18:13 requires primarily factual work, that that review
00:18:13 --> 00:18:16 would be really deferential. So the question
00:18:16 --> 00:18:18 is legal enough to get into court, but factual
00:18:18 --> 00:18:22 enough to receive deference. Exactly. Okay. That
00:18:22 --> 00:18:24 separates two things that we had been treating
00:18:24 --> 00:18:27 as one, whether a court has the authority to
00:18:27 --> 00:18:29 review an issue and how independently it can
00:18:29 --> 00:18:32 decide that issue once it gets there. Yes. And
00:18:32 --> 00:18:34 Wilkinson didn't win his underlying immigration
00:18:34 --> 00:18:36 claim. The Supreme Court reversed the jurisdictional
00:18:36 --> 00:18:38 determination, that determination that it couldn't
00:18:38 --> 00:18:40 be reviewed, vacated the judgment and remanded.
00:18:40 --> 00:18:43 It didn't decide whether his son would experience
00:18:43 --> 00:18:46 the required hardship. Nor would establishing
00:18:46 --> 00:18:48 hardship necessarily guarantee cancellation.
00:18:48 --> 00:18:51 The ultimate decision whether to grant it remained
00:18:51 --> 00:18:54 discretionary. Yes. And Justice Alito, joined
00:18:54 --> 00:18:57 by Roberts and Thomas, dissented. Because they
00:18:57 --> 00:18:59 said that the majority had extended this questions
00:18:59 --> 00:19:01 of law exception too far into what was essentially
00:19:01 --> 00:19:05 just a factual determination. OK, what strikes
00:19:05 --> 00:19:07 me is that the immigration judge credited the
00:19:07 --> 00:19:10 evidence about Wilkinson's son, including his
00:19:10 --> 00:19:12 severe asthma and the support his father provided.
00:19:12 --> 00:19:15 The dispute was over whether all those circumstances
00:19:15 --> 00:19:18 met the statutory threshold. And the classification
00:19:18 --> 00:19:21 determines whether a federal court can even consider
00:19:21 --> 00:19:24 that argument. Yes. And even when review is available,
00:19:24 --> 00:19:26 that degree of deference still matters. Two years
00:19:26 --> 00:19:28 later, the Supreme Court confronted another immigration
00:19:28 --> 00:19:31 case that made this distinction even clearer.
00:19:31 --> 00:19:33 This was March of this year when the Supreme
00:19:33 --> 00:19:36 Court decided Arias Oriana v. Bondi. OK, what
00:19:36 --> 00:19:39 was the dispute? Douglas and his family had come
00:19:39 --> 00:19:41 to the United States from El Salvador in 2021
00:19:41 --> 00:19:44 and they had applied for asylum. And he testified
00:19:44 --> 00:19:46 that a hitman had targeted him and that his family
00:19:46 --> 00:19:49 had repeatedly moved to escape threats. So the
00:19:49 --> 00:19:52 immigration judge believed him. Yeah. The immigration
00:19:52 --> 00:19:54 judge explicitly found his testimony credible,
00:19:54 --> 00:19:56 but the judge concluded that his experiences
00:19:56 --> 00:19:59 didn't establish past persecution or a well -founded
00:19:59 --> 00:20:01 fear of future persecution under the immigration
00:20:01 --> 00:20:04 statute. And then the Board of Immigration Appeals
00:20:04 --> 00:20:06 affirmed and the First Circuit upheld the determination
00:20:06 --> 00:20:09 under substantial evidence review. That strikes
00:20:09 --> 00:20:12 me as a harder case than the one where the judge
00:20:12 --> 00:20:15 simply doesn't believe the applicant. Everyone
00:20:15 --> 00:20:18 accepts his account of the threats. The disagreement
00:20:18 --> 00:20:20 is about whether the legal standard covers what
00:20:20 --> 00:20:23 happened. Right. Which is why he argued that
00:20:23 --> 00:20:25 the federal court should independently decide
00:20:25 --> 00:20:27 whether the established facts amounted to persecution.
00:20:27 --> 00:20:30 I can see the argument. If nobody disputes what
00:20:30 --> 00:20:33 happened, why should the agency get the benefit
00:20:33 --> 00:20:35 of deference on whether those events satisfy
00:20:35 --> 00:20:38 the legal test? The answer was because the governing
00:20:38 --> 00:20:40 immigration statute required substantial evidence
00:20:40 --> 00:20:43 review of this kind of determination. The Supreme
00:20:43 --> 00:20:46 Court explicitly examined it, including its earlier
00:20:46 --> 00:20:50 decision to ISV Elias Zacharias. And unanimously
00:20:50 --> 00:20:52 concluded that substantial evidence review applied
00:20:52 --> 00:20:55 to the agency's persecution determination, including
00:20:55 --> 00:20:57 its application of the statutory standard to
00:20:57 --> 00:21:00 establish facts. Yes, this was an opinion that
00:21:00 --> 00:21:02 Jackson wrote, but there is an important limit.
00:21:02 --> 00:21:04 The applicants weren't challenging the governing
00:21:04 --> 00:21:06 legal definition of persecution. They accepted
00:21:06 --> 00:21:08 the standard. They were just disputing its application.
00:21:09 --> 00:21:12 So the court wasn't deciding that an agency received
00:21:12 --> 00:21:15 substantial evidence deference on what the legal
00:21:15 --> 00:21:17 definition itself means. Right. It was deciding
00:21:17 --> 00:21:19 how closely a court reviews the agency's conclusion
00:21:19 --> 00:21:22 that particular circumstances meet or, in this
00:21:22 --> 00:21:25 case, fail to meet that standard. Justice Jackson
00:21:25 --> 00:21:27 distinguished that issue from that jurisdictional
00:21:27 --> 00:21:29 question that they'd been dealing with previously.
00:21:30 --> 00:21:32 Here's what she said. As a result, whether a
00:21:32 --> 00:21:35 given issue is treated as a question of law exempt
00:21:35 --> 00:21:37 from the INA's jurisdiction stripping provisions
00:21:37 --> 00:21:40 tells us nothing about the type of review the
00:21:40 --> 00:21:43 court must afford to that issue under other provisions
00:21:43 --> 00:21:46 of the statute. I want to push a little bit on
00:21:46 --> 00:21:49 that because if the immigration judge believed
00:21:49 --> 00:21:53 Arias and the court still has to defer to the
00:21:53 --> 00:21:56 conclusion that what happened wasn't persecution.
00:21:57 --> 00:22:00 How meaningful is the review? I mean, where does
00:22:00 --> 00:22:03 the court have room to disagree? Substantial
00:22:03 --> 00:22:05 evidence review still allows reversal, but the
00:22:05 --> 00:22:08 question is whether the record compels a conclusion
00:22:08 --> 00:22:11 contrary to the agency's. If every reasonable
00:22:11 --> 00:22:13 adjudicator would have to conclude that the established
00:22:13 --> 00:22:16 events amounted to persecution under the standard,
00:22:16 --> 00:22:19 the court would not be required to uphold the
00:22:19 --> 00:22:21 agency's contrary determination. But it isn't
00:22:21 --> 00:22:23 enough for the federal court to think that persecution
00:22:23 --> 00:22:27 is the better conclusion. the record has to compel
00:22:27 --> 00:22:30 it. Right. This is a demanding standard. The
00:22:30 --> 00:22:32 court cannot replace the agency's supported determination
00:22:32 --> 00:22:34 merely because it might have reached a different
00:22:34 --> 00:22:37 conclusion independently. And that means even
00:22:37 --> 00:22:39 a person whose account has been accepted may
00:22:39 --> 00:22:42 fail to obtain reversal because the court can't
00:22:42 --> 00:22:44 say the statute's demanding standard has been
00:22:44 --> 00:22:47 met. So Wilkinson held that this hardship determination
00:22:47 --> 00:22:49 could be reviewed at all and that the review
00:22:49 --> 00:22:51 had to be deferential, but it didn't specify
00:22:51 --> 00:22:54 exactly which deferential standard applied. Urias
00:22:54 --> 00:22:57 Uriana addressed the more specific question for
00:22:57 --> 00:22:59 persecution determinations and held that substantial
00:22:59 --> 00:23:03 evidence review governs. But doesn't this give
00:23:03 --> 00:23:06 courts a way around Loper -Bright? In what sense?
00:23:06 --> 00:23:09 Loper -Bright says courts must independently
00:23:09 --> 00:23:12 interpret statutes. But if courts characterize
00:23:12 --> 00:23:14 a dispute as applying a legal standard to facts
00:23:14 --> 00:23:17 rather than interpreting the statute, they can
00:23:17 --> 00:23:19 still defer to the agency. Yes, and this means
00:23:19 --> 00:23:22 that courts can still preserve substantial deference
00:23:22 --> 00:23:25 to agencies. by characterizing disputed issues
00:23:25 --> 00:23:28 as fact -intensive applications rather than questions
00:23:28 --> 00:23:30 of legal interpretation. And I think there is
00:23:30 --> 00:23:32 a real argument that after Loper -Wright, this
00:23:32 --> 00:23:35 is a likely response. This is the Alito -Roberts
00:23:35 --> 00:23:38 -Thomas approach in Urias, right? They're saying
00:23:38 --> 00:23:41 that what the court is trying to do is dig into
00:23:41 --> 00:23:44 the factual determination. Even when the agency
00:23:44 --> 00:23:46 is effectively determining where the boundaries
00:23:46 --> 00:23:50 of a legal category fall, Whether certain threats
00:23:50 --> 00:23:54 amount to persecution, for example. Yes. Formally,
00:23:54 --> 00:23:56 the court might say it independently determines
00:23:56 --> 00:23:58 what persecution means. But if it defers to the
00:23:58 --> 00:24:01 agency on whether particular conduct qualifies,
00:24:01 --> 00:24:03 the agency is still retaining considerable practical
00:24:03 --> 00:24:06 authority over how that legal standard operates.
00:24:06 --> 00:24:09 So courts can continue deferring to agency judgments
00:24:09 --> 00:24:13 with substantial legal content, even though Chevron
00:24:13 --> 00:24:17 deference is gone. Yes. Now, Arias -Ariano itself
00:24:17 --> 00:24:19 rested on a specific statutory provision governing
00:24:19 --> 00:24:22 substantial evidence review. So the court wasn't
00:24:22 --> 00:24:25 free to simply choose deference because it preferred
00:24:25 --> 00:24:27 the agency's judgment. But in cases where the
00:24:27 --> 00:24:29 boundary between interpretation and application
00:24:29 --> 00:24:32 is less clearly determined, how a court characterizes
00:24:32 --> 00:24:34 the issue itself can make a major difference.
00:24:35 --> 00:24:37 Which means Loperbright may have shifted the
00:24:37 --> 00:24:39 battle from whether courts defer to agencies
00:24:39 --> 00:24:42 on statutory interpretation to what courts are
00:24:42 --> 00:24:44 willing to characterize as statutory interpretation
00:24:44 --> 00:24:47 in the first place. Yes, and that struggle over
00:24:47 --> 00:24:49 the boundary between interpretation and application
00:24:49 --> 00:24:51 isn't new. It was still important long before
00:24:51 --> 00:24:55 Chevron. Okay, so Congress can determine how
00:24:55 --> 00:24:57 courts review an agency's application of a standard,
00:24:58 --> 00:25:00 but what happens when Congress changes the standard
00:25:00 --> 00:25:04 itself? Does that change who gets to decide how
00:25:04 --> 00:25:06 it applies? That's what makes NLRB v. Hearst's
00:25:06 --> 00:25:09 publication so interesting. It's worth noting
00:25:09 --> 00:25:12 that this case is from 1944, which predates the
00:25:12 --> 00:25:15 APA. Newspaper sellers? Are we talking newsies?
00:25:15 --> 00:25:18 Sort of. The court said these people were called
00:25:18 --> 00:25:21 newsboys, but the court said that that was an
00:25:21 --> 00:25:23 improper term. They were misnamed boys. They
00:25:23 --> 00:25:25 were generally grown men. Many of them were supporting
00:25:25 --> 00:25:28 families. So not quite the dancing children from
00:25:28 --> 00:25:31 newsies. Yes. These were men who worked at established
00:25:31 --> 00:25:34 street corners, sometimes for years. But they
00:25:34 --> 00:25:36 weren't simply receiving a salary from a newspaper
00:25:36 --> 00:25:38 publisher. They bought papers and resold them
00:25:38 --> 00:25:41 and kept the difference. Okay, that sounds like
00:25:41 --> 00:25:43 running a small business. You buy a product at
00:25:43 --> 00:25:45 one price, you sell it at another. Why wouldn't
00:25:45 --> 00:25:47 they just be independent contractors? That was
00:25:47 --> 00:25:50 the publisher's position. But look at the actual
00:25:50 --> 00:25:52 arrangement. The publisher controlled the selling
00:25:52 --> 00:25:54 prices and the price the newsboys paid for the
00:25:54 --> 00:25:57 papers as well. So the publisher largely determined
00:25:57 --> 00:25:59 how much each worker could earn on the sale.
00:26:00 --> 00:26:02 Okay, what about the unsold papers? The workers
00:26:02 --> 00:26:04 could return unsold copies for credit, but they
00:26:04 --> 00:26:06 had to pay for papers that were lost or otherwise
00:26:06 --> 00:26:09 unreturnable. The publisher also controlled distribution
00:26:09 --> 00:26:12 areas and had substantial influence over how
00:26:12 --> 00:26:14 many papers each worker received. So these men
00:26:14 --> 00:26:17 had some entrepreneurial features, but they couldn't
00:26:17 --> 00:26:19 choose their own prices, and they didn't have
00:26:19 --> 00:26:21 the kind of control over supply that an independent
00:26:21 --> 00:26:24 shopkeeper would. Yeah. The district manager
00:26:24 --> 00:26:26 supervised the operation and had authority over
00:26:26 --> 00:26:29 who could occupy different selling spots. And
00:26:29 --> 00:26:30 the board considered all of those circumstances
00:26:30 --> 00:26:33 when it concluded that the regular full -time
00:26:33 --> 00:26:37 newsboys, again, grown men, were employees. Which
00:26:37 --> 00:26:39 makes it easier to see why the classification
00:26:39 --> 00:26:42 was disputed. There were real facts pointing
00:26:42 --> 00:26:44 in different directions. Yes. First, the Supreme
00:26:44 --> 00:26:47 Court had to decide what the statutory term employee
00:26:47 --> 00:26:49 meant. The publishers argued... It should be
00:26:49 --> 00:26:51 confined to traditional common law categories.
00:26:51 --> 00:26:55 And the court rejected that interpretation. It
00:26:55 --> 00:26:57 did. The court itself interpreted the statute
00:26:57 --> 00:26:59 in light of its context and purposes. Then it
00:26:59 --> 00:27:01 considered the board's application of that understanding
00:27:01 --> 00:27:04 to these particular working relationships. And
00:27:04 --> 00:27:06 that second step required evaluating the competing
00:27:06 --> 00:27:09 characteristics of the newsboys' arrangements.
00:27:09 --> 00:27:11 Yes. The court distinguished judicial responsibility
00:27:11 --> 00:27:14 for statutory interpretation. from the board's
00:27:14 --> 00:27:17 role in applying a broad term to particular facts.
00:27:17 --> 00:27:19 Here's what it said. The board's determination
00:27:19 --> 00:27:22 that specified persons are employees under this
00:27:22 --> 00:27:24 act is to be accepted if it has warrant in the
00:27:24 --> 00:27:27 record and a reasonable basis in law. So the
00:27:27 --> 00:27:29 court supplied the governing understanding of
00:27:29 --> 00:27:31 the statute and the board had room to apply it
00:27:31 --> 00:27:34 to particular employment relationships. Yes,
00:27:34 --> 00:27:36 that's how the Loper -Bright majority later characterized
00:27:36 --> 00:27:39 this. The dissent questioned how cleanly statutory
00:27:39 --> 00:27:41 interpretation and application could really be
00:27:41 --> 00:27:44 separated in cases like this. But Congress didn't
00:27:44 --> 00:27:46 leave the broad understanding adopted in Hearst
00:27:46 --> 00:27:50 alone. No, it didn't. In 1947, in the Taft -Hartley
00:27:50 --> 00:27:52 amendments, it expressly excluded independent
00:27:52 --> 00:27:54 contractors from the definition of employee.
00:27:54 --> 00:27:56 And the governing legal framework shifted to
00:27:56 --> 00:27:59 common law agency principles. So Congress narrowed
00:27:59 --> 00:28:02 the legal rule, but that still left someone to
00:28:02 --> 00:28:04 decide whether particular workers were employees
00:28:04 --> 00:28:06 or independent contractors under the new test.
00:28:06 --> 00:28:09 Yes. So then in 1968, the court considered that
00:28:09 --> 00:28:12 problem in NLRB v. United Insurance Company of
00:28:12 --> 00:28:14 America. So dealing with insurance agents. Yes.
00:28:14 --> 00:28:16 The company used what it called debit agents.
00:28:17 --> 00:28:19 They collected premiums for policyholders and
00:28:19 --> 00:28:22 tried to prevent existing policies from lapsing
00:28:22 --> 00:28:25 and sold new insurance. So the question was whether
00:28:25 --> 00:28:26 they were working as independent salespeople
00:28:26 --> 00:28:29 or as employees of the insurance company. Yes.
00:28:29 --> 00:28:31 And the board found that the agents were trained
00:28:31 --> 00:28:33 by company supervisors, that they ordinarily
00:28:33 --> 00:28:36 sold only the company's policies, they were subject
00:28:36 --> 00:28:38 to company procedures, and they also received
00:28:38 --> 00:28:40 benefits under the company's vacation insurance
00:28:40 --> 00:28:44 and pension arrangements. That sounds considerably
00:28:44 --> 00:28:46 more like an employment relationship than the
00:28:46 --> 00:28:48 label independent contractor suggests. The board
00:28:48 --> 00:28:50 certainly thought so. It concluded that the agents
00:28:50 --> 00:28:53 were employees and ordered the company to bargain
00:28:53 --> 00:28:55 with their union. But the Seventh Circuit disagreed.
00:28:55 --> 00:28:57 It found that the agents were independent contractors
00:28:57 --> 00:29:00 and refused to enforce the board's order. So
00:29:00 --> 00:29:02 the Court of Appeals substituted its conclusion
00:29:02 --> 00:29:04 about the employment relationship for the boards.
00:29:04 --> 00:29:07 Yes, and the Supreme Court reversed. The broader
00:29:07 --> 00:29:09 statutory approach approved in Hearst no longer
00:29:09 --> 00:29:12 governed. But applying the common law test still
00:29:12 --> 00:29:14 involved evaluating the actual relationship,
00:29:15 --> 00:29:17 and the board had to choose between fairly conflicting
00:29:17 --> 00:29:20 views supported by the record. And the Supreme
00:29:20 --> 00:29:22 Court acknowledged that applying common law agency
00:29:22 --> 00:29:24 principles didn't require specialized administrative
00:29:24 --> 00:29:28 expertise judges lacked. Yeah, deference here
00:29:28 --> 00:29:30 wasn't just some sort of reward for technical
00:29:30 --> 00:29:32 expertise. It reflected the board's assigned
00:29:32 --> 00:29:34 responsibilities and the governing limits on
00:29:34 --> 00:29:37 judicial review. So Congress could change the
00:29:37 --> 00:29:40 legal test, but that didn't mean a court could
00:29:40 --> 00:29:42 disregard the board's supported application of
00:29:42 --> 00:29:46 that test. And who counts as an employee determines
00:29:46 --> 00:29:50 who receives statutory protections. So this brings
00:29:50 --> 00:29:53 us back to Kathleen. Her ALJ concluded that she
00:29:53 --> 00:29:56 could perform sedentary work. Yes, and if he
00:29:56 --> 00:29:58 misunderstood the governing legal requirements,
00:29:58 --> 00:30:01 she could challenge that as legal error. If the
00:30:01 --> 00:30:03 medical evidence, though, doesn't support this
00:30:03 --> 00:30:06 finding about Kathleen's limitations, she seems
00:30:06 --> 00:30:09 to have a factual challenge. And if the dispute
00:30:09 --> 00:30:11 concerns whether the established limitations
00:30:11 --> 00:30:14 satisfied the legal standard, the issue involves
00:30:14 --> 00:30:18 applying law to facts. But those are not necessarily
00:30:18 --> 00:30:21 three separate boxes. An ALJ who misunderstands
00:30:21 --> 00:30:24 the legal standard might also make factual determinations
00:30:24 --> 00:30:27 affected by that mistake. Yes, good point. A
00:30:27 --> 00:30:29 single decision itself could contain multiple
00:30:29 --> 00:30:32 kinds of error. And the reviewing court has to
00:30:32 --> 00:30:34 identify the actual dispute and determine what
00:30:34 --> 00:30:36 the Social Security Act and the governing precedent
00:30:36 --> 00:30:38 would require. Which is where we started with
00:30:38 --> 00:30:40 the chandeliers. Sometimes the problem is what
00:30:40 --> 00:30:43 the law means. Sometimes it's what happened.
00:30:43 --> 00:30:45 And sometimes it's what happens when you put
00:30:45 --> 00:30:47 the two things together. Yes. And that distinction
00:30:47 --> 00:30:49 can determine how much authority the reviewing
00:30:49 --> 00:30:52 court has to reconsider the agency's judgment.
00:30:52 --> 00:30:54 But before a court decides whether an agency
00:30:54 --> 00:30:56 got something wrong, it has to figure out what
00:30:56 --> 00:31:00 kind of question it's reviewing. And that classification
00:31:00 --> 00:31:03 matters. Even after Loper Bright, courts may
00:31:03 --> 00:31:05 continue to defer to agencies by treating disputes
00:31:05 --> 00:31:08 as applications of law to facts rather than questions
00:31:08 --> 00:31:12 of legal interpretation. So this means the decision
00:31:12 --> 00:31:14 about how to characterize the question can be
00:31:14 --> 00:31:17 essentially as important as the answer itself.
00:31:17 --> 00:31:21 And the decision is the decision before the decision.
00:31:22 --> 00:31:24 Yes. Next week, we will look more closely at
00:31:24 --> 00:31:26 questions of law and what independent judicial
00:31:26 --> 00:31:28 judgment actually means after Loeb or Bright.
00:31:29 --> 00:31:31 So that does it for today's episode on administrative
00:31:31 --> 00:31:35 remedies. Thank you for joining us today. Please,
00:31:35 --> 00:31:37 if you enjoy this podcast and enjoy this episode,
00:31:37 --> 00:31:41 give us a like on Spotify, iTunes, or whatever
00:31:41 --> 00:31:43 platform you're listening on. And be sure to
00:31:43 --> 00:31:45 tune in next time where we'll continue to dive
00:31:45 --> 00:31:47 into the contours of administrative law. Because
00:31:47 --> 00:31:50 remember, you can't fix what you don't understand.