The Interpretive Toolkit: How Courts Answer Questions of Law After Loper Bright

In 2015, the Supreme Court decided whether a fish was a tangible object. John Yates was the captain of a commercial fishing boat in the Gulf of Mexico. A federal officer boarded his boat, found undersized fish, and told Yates to keep them for examination back at port. Yates instead ordered a crew member to throw the fish overboard. He was prosecuted under a federal statute that made it a crime to destroy, conceal, or falsify a “record, document, or tangible object” with the intent to obstruct a federal investigation. A fish is a physical thing you can touch, pick up, and throw overboard. Four Supreme Court justices agreed that a fish was a tangible object. Five did not. The statute, the majority concluded, didn’t cover fish. The disagreement wasn’t about what happened. It wasn’t about the statutory text. The justices even invoked many of the same principles of statutory interpretation. They disagreed about what those principles established. That’s the subject of this episode — the toolkit courts use to decide what a statute means, and why having tools doesn’t tell you which one to reach for.

This is the second merits-side episode in Season 3’s judicial review arc. The previous episode established the law/fact/mixed questions framework — once a court decides it’s answering a question of law under independent judgment, it still has to actually answer the question. That’s where the interpretive canons come in. They’re principles courts use to work out the meaning of statutory language. They have Latin names and ancient pedigrees, but the underlying ideas are familiar. They constrain interpretation. They don’t always produce a single uncontested answer. And after Loper Bright required courts to exercise independent judgment about statutory meaning — rather than deferring to reasonable agency interpretations under Chevron — the toolkit matters more than it did when agencies carried much of the interpretive load.

The semantic canons are rules about how language works. Noscitur a sociis — “a word is known by the company it keeps” — tells interpreters that the meaning of a word depends partly on the words around it. The Yates phrase “record, document, or tangible object” reads differently when you consider the three terms together than when you read “tangible object” in isolation. Justice Ginsburg, writing for four justices, argued that records and documents are used to preserve information, so “tangible object” referred to other objects performing the same function — a hard drive or a flash drive, not a fish. Justice Alito supplied the fifth vote on narrower reasoning emphasizing the statute’s list of nouns, verbs, and title. Justice Kagan, writing in dissent, didn’t reject the canon itself — she challenged the conclusion. Records and documents, she argued, don’t just preserve information; they also serve as evidence in investigations. And so can a physical object like a fish. Under her approach, all three categories fit together because they can contain or provide evidence someone might try to destroy. The canon required attention to context. It didn’t settle what the relevant context was.

Ejusdem generis — “of the same kind” — tells interpreters that when a statute lists specific items followed by a general category, the general language can be read in light of the examples. The question in Yates was what kind of objects the specific examples (record, document) suggested Congress had in mind. But a legislature might use broad phrasing precisely because it wanted to reach beyond its examples. The canon gives a reason to limit the general phrase. It doesn’t require that the legislature always did. The rule against surplusage adds another layer: courts generally prefer interpretations that give meaning to every part of a statute rather than treating words as unnecessary. If “tangible object” means anything physical, then records and documents — assuming they’re physical — are already included, and specifically mentioning them was redundant. That’s an argument for the narrow reading. But ordinary language is often redundant too. People list examples and then add a broader category; so do statutes, sometimes for emphasis or to make particular applications unmistakable. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius — expressing one thing may imply exclusion of another — can cut similarly. If Congress authorized an agency to impose civil penalties for three identified violations, that specific list might suggest Congress deliberately limited the penalty authority. Or Congress might have been giving examples. The canon provides a reason for an interpretation; it doesn’t automatically settle the question.

This is where Karl Llewellyn’s 1950 critique landed. He assembled a table of interpretive canons alongside canons that went in the opposite direction. Whatever interpretation a lawyer wanted, there was probably a canon supporting it — and the other side could counter with the opposing canon. If every canon has a counter-canon, perhaps these rules don’t actually constrain judges much. There’s a response to the critique that doesn’t require abandoning the canons entirely. Property lawyers routinely apply competing interpretive principles to deeds — preferring specific descriptions over general ones, giving effect to the entire instrument, reading language in context. Sometimes those principles point in different directions. That doesn’t make them useless. It means judges have to exercise judgment about how they fit together. Some interpretations fit language much better than others. Some principles are particularly appropriate to certain statutory structures. What Llewellyn established wasn’t that the canons have no constraining force — it’s that there’s no universally controlling formula for deciding which canon prevails when accepted interpretive principles point in different directions. After Loper Bright, this matters more. If courts are required to exercise independent judgment about statutory meaning, they need to figure out which interpretive principles should prevail in difficult cases. The canons don’t tell them.

The semantic canons describe how language works. A different set of principles — the substantive canons — protect background legal and constitutional values. This isn’t a distinction between neutral rules and rules involving judicial choice; both kinds require judgment. The difference is that the substantive canons more explicitly incorporate legal values and institutional presumptions into statutory interpretation. The rule of lenity is one example. It resolves ambiguity in criminal statutes in favor of the defendant — but only after ordinary interpretive tools have been exhausted and genuine ambiguity remains. It reflects concern about fair notice and the proper allocation of responsibility for defining crimes. If Congress wants to impose criminal punishment, the law should give sufficiently clear notice of what conduct is prohibited. In Yates, Ginsburg suggested that if doubt remained after the ordinary interpretive analysis, lenity would favor Yates. Kagan rejected that move because she didn’t think the statute remained ambiguous. Even before applying lenity, the justices disagreed about whether there was enough uncertainty for it to matter — a broader feature of substantive canons, which often require courts to decide whether some threshold has been satisfied before the canon even applies.

Constitutional avoidance works the same way. If a statute is reasonably susceptible to two interpretations and one raises serious constitutional doubts while the other avoids them, courts generally prefer the interpretation that avoids the doubts — even without deciding that the other interpretation would actually be unconstitutional. The administrative law example is Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. A labor union handed out leaflets at a shopping mall urging customers not to shop there because of a dispute over construction workers’ wages. The NLRB interpreted federal labor law to prohibit that activity as unlawful coercion. The Supreme Court was concerned — reading the statute that way raised serious First Amendment questions. Peaceful hand-billing with no picketing or intimidation looks like ordinary speech. The Court concluded the statutory prohibition didn’t have to be read to reach that activity, adopting a permissible interpretation that avoided the constitutional question. Constitutional avoidance doesn’t merely ask what a word ordinarily means. It gives the court a reason to prefer one permissible interpretation because of problems another interpretation would create. The presumption against retroactivity operates similarly: courts generally require a clear indication from Congress before interpreting legislation to have certain retroactive effects. These rules reflect legal values beyond the ordinary meaning of individual words.

The most consequential substantive canon in modern administrative law is the major questions doctrine, and the justices don’t agree on what kind of interpretive rule it is. There’s a weak version and a strong version. In West Virginia v. EPA, the EPA relied on Clean Air Act authority to determine the “best system of emissions reductions” — and read that to authorize an approach involving a shift from coal to solar. Under the weak version of the doctrine, the extraordinary significance of the claimed authority is part of the context you’d consider when interpreting the statute. We might not ordinarily understand Congress to have authorized a major restructuring of an industry through general language. That’s Justice Barrett’s approach. The goal is still to identify the best interpretation of what Congress enacted. The doctrine is a way of understanding the text, not a reason to depart from its best reading. The strong version is Justice Gorsuch’s. It’s grounded in constitutional principles about delegated power. Extraordinary claims of authority require especially clear congressional authorization. The requirement operates as an additional constraint — not simply another consideration in determining the statute’s ordinary meaning. A court might conclude the statutory language would ordinarily authorize the agency’s action but still find Congress hadn’t spoken clearly enough. Justice Kagan has gone further than either: ordinary statutory interpretation is sufficient, and courts should enforce the delegations Congress actually enacted — broad or narrow — without imposing a special major questions requirement.

The three-way disagreement broke into the open in Learning Resources v. Trump in 2026. The justices agreed the tariffs exceeded the statutory authority at issue. They disagreed sharply about the role of the major questions doctrine. Barrett defended the contextual approach. Gorsuch defended the stronger rule. Kagan concluded ordinary statutory analysis was enough without invoking the doctrine at all. The argument isn’t really about how broadly to interpret one statutory phrase. It’s about what courts are doing when they invoke the major questions doctrine. Are they using context to determine what Congress meant? Or are they applying a substantive principle that demands some special degree of clarity before recognizing certain types of delegations? The answer changes depending on how much authority the doctrine gives judges. Under the contextual approach, the court is trying to identify the statute’s best reading. Under the stronger approach, the court can impose a separate requirement for recognizing extraordinary delegated authority. Both approaches require judgment about what counts as extraordinary in the first place. That’s what makes the major questions doctrine such a useful example of the interpretive toolkit — the disagreement isn’t just over the answer, it’s over the nature of the tool itself.

The practical concern this raises is institutional. Judges developing interpretive rules isn’t new; property lawyers have been dealing with judicially-developed rules of construction for centuries. What’s different is what some rules can do. There’s a difference between a convention that helps identify how words ordinarily operate and a presumption that requires a legislature to speak with unusual clarity before a court recognizes a particular consequence. Clear statement rules can be legitimate — they’re part of how courts interpret statutes against background constitutional and legal principles. The major questions doctrine has substantial antecedents in MCI v. AT&T and FDA v. Brown & Williamson (the FDA cigarettes case), both of which reflected concerns about finding extraordinary agency authority in broadly worded provisions. Supporters see the doctrine as expressing longstanding principles about Congress’s responsibility for major policy decisions. But a case can be made that the present formulation imposes a sharpened requirement on statutes enacted before the doctrine existed in its current form. And while private parties can draft around unwanted interpretive rules, Congress can only respond by amending a statute — which requires both houses to pass another law and go through the constitutional process involving presidential approval or a veto override. A judicial interpretation over federal delegation can define an agency’s authority over an entire regulatory program. When courts apply substantive canons, they’re not merely resolving a dispute about language. Their interpretive choices can affect the allocation of authority between Congress and agencies. A later court could require a degree of clarity that the enacting Congress had no reason to anticipate. The court may understand itself as applying an established background principle. The effect can still be to limit the scope of a statutory delegation without Congress changing the text. That concern is strongest with the strong version of major questions — the version that imposes a separate clarity requirement rather than treating the significance of the claimed authority as part of the statutory context.

The agency’s role in this analysis changed with Loper Bright but didn’t disappear. Skidmore is still available: the Supreme Court has long recognized that an agency’s interpretation can be persuasive without being binding, based on the quality of the agency’s reasoning, its consistency, and its expertise. Even though the court decides what the statute means, the agency can contribute to that decision. Courts exercise independent judgment. That doesn’t mean they have to disregard the agency’s expertise. The interpretive rules do most of the work of evaluating statutory meaning — and an agency’s well-reasoned interpretation can contribute to the analysis. It just doesn’t control the result. That’s where this episode sits in the larger arc: once we’ve established that a question is a question of law, and once Loper Bright has settled that the court exercises independent judgment on it, the actual interpretive work still has to happen. The canons are how courts do it. They don’t produce single answers. They don’t eliminate judicial choice. They narrow the field, and they require judges to explain which rule prevails when accepted principles point in different directions. The next episode returns to Kathleen’s case to examine a different problem — what happens when the dispute isn’t about what the law means but about whether the agency’s findings about the facts have sufficient support.

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What We Cover

  • Yates v. United States (2015) and the five-justice conclusion that a fish isn’t a “tangible object” under the federal obstruction statute
  • Why the justices agreed on what happened, agreed on the statutory text, agreed on the applicable interpretive principles — and still split on the answer
  • The two basic categories of canons: semantic canons (how language works) and substantive canons (which protect background legal and constitutional values)
  • Noscitur a sociis (“a word is known by the company it keeps”) and how Ginsburg and Kagan used the same principle to reach opposite conclusions in Yates
  • Ejusdem generis (“of the same kind”) and when a statutory catch-all after specific examples should be read narrowly
  • The rule against surplusage and why giving meaning to every word in a statute cuts in favor of narrower readings — sometimes
  • Expressio unius est exclusio alterius and why lists might be exhaustive or might be examples
  • Karl Llewellyn’s 1950 critique of dueling canons — and the response that canons constrain judges even when they don’t automatically settle hard cases
  • Why Loper Bright’s independent-judgment requirement makes the canons more important than they were in the Chevron era
  • The rule of lenity as a substantive canon operating only after ordinary interpretive tools have been exhausted — and the Yates disagreement about whether that threshold had been reached
  • Constitutional avoidance and how it operates differently from the semantic canons
  • Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. and the Supreme Court’s narrowing of the NLRA to avoid First Amendment questions about peaceful labor leafleting
  • The presumption against retroactivity and other clear-statement rules that incorporate legal values into interpretation
  • The major questions doctrine and the three-way split over what kind of interpretive rule it actually is
  • Barrett’s contextual approach: the significance of a claimed authority is part of the context for interpreting the statute
  • Gorsuch’s clear-statement approach: extraordinary delegations require especially clear congressional authorization as a separate requirement
  • Kagan’s rejection of both: ordinary statutory analysis is sufficient without a special major-questions requirement
  • How the Barrett/Gorsuch/Kagan disagreement played out in Learning Resources v. Trump (2026)
  • Why the major questions dispute is really a disagreement about the nature of the interpretive tool, not just the answer in any particular case
  • The institutional stakes: the practical difficulty of Congress amending statutes compared to private parties drafting around judicially-developed rules
  • Why MCI v. AT&T and FDA v. Brown & Williamson are the antecedents the doctrine’s supporters point to — and why a sharpened current formulation raises concerns about reshaping statutes enacted before the doctrine existed
  • Skidmore’s continuing role after Loper Bright: the agency’s interpretation can still be persuasive without being binding
  • Why the canons don’t eliminate judicial choice — they narrow the field and require judges to explain which rule prevails when accepted principles point in different directions

Full Transcript

Gwen: Welcome to Administrative Remedies, because you can't fix what you don't understand. Brought to you in part by the University of Tulsa College of Law's Mabee Legal Information Center. I'm Gwendolyn Savitz, an associate professor here at TU.

Marc: And I'm Marc Roark, a professor at the College of Law. We'll be breaking down complex doctrines with real-life analogies and examples to demystify the world of administrative law for everyone trying to understand how government actually works.

Gwen: Agencies are the main way the federal government gets things done. It's not through Congress for reasons we'll be addressing over the course of the series. All right, Marc, let's start this one off with a Supreme Court case about fish.

Marc: Oh, fish. Okay.

Gwen: Yes. Yates v. United States. Do you remember it?

Marc: Oh, yeah. I remember that case. It was decided in 2015. John Yates was the captain of a commercial fishing boat in the Gulf of Mexico. And as I remember, a federal officer boarded the boat, discovered that some of the fish were smaller than the legal minimum size that you're allowed to catch. And so the officer told Yates to keep those fish so that they could be examined when the boat returned to port. But instead, Yates ordered a crew member to throw the undersized fish overboard.

Gwen: That sounds like obstruction of an investigation.

Marc: Yeah. And he was prosecuted under a federal statute that made it a crime to destroy, conceal, or falsify a record, document, or tangible object with the intent to obstruct a federal investigation.

Gwen: All right. Here's the question. Is a fish a tangible object?

Marc: Of course it is. You can touch it. You can pick it up. You can throw it overboard. I don't see how a fish could be anything other than a tangible object.

Gwen: And four Supreme Court justices agreed with you.

Marc: Only four?

Gwen: Yeah. So eventually five concluded the statute didn't cover fish.

Marc: Okay. How in the world is that the case?

Gwen: Let's look at the statutory language. It says record, document, or tangible object. What do those first two words have in common?

Marc: Records and documents both contain information.

Gwen: Right. And the justices who ruled for Yates thought that mattered. Justice Ginsburg wrote an opinion for the four justices interpreting tangible object to mean something used to record or preserve information. And Alito supplied the fifth vote. He reached the same result through a narrower analysis, emphasizing the statute's list of nouns, verbs, and its title.

Marc: So a computer hard drive would be a tangible object covered by the statute, but a fish is not.

Gwen: Exactly.

Marc: Okay, and a fish could also be evidence in an investigation, and that's why the officer wanted Yates to keep it, though.

Gwen: That was part of Kagan's dissent. She argued that tangible object has an ordinary meaning that plainly includes fish. She also argued that the statute's surrounding language supported that meaning. Records, documents, and other physical objects can all be evidence relevant to an investigation. And destroying any of them can obstruct law enforcement.

Marc: She wasn't ignoring the surrounding words. She just thought they pointed towards a different answer.

Gwen: Yes, exactly. That's what makes Yates such a useful case for today. Last week, we were talking about how courts distinguish questions of law from questions of fact. Determining that something is a question of law doesn't necessarily say how the court should answer it. So in Yates, the justices agreed on what happened. They agreed on the statutory text, and they even invoked many of the same principles of statutory interpretation. But they disagreed about what those principles established.

Marc: And the difference determined whether throwing fish overboard violated that particular federal statute.

Gwen: Yes. Courts have developed an extensive toolkit for interpreting statutes, and those tools help constrain interpretation, but they don't always produce a single uncontested answer. And courts sometimes disagree about how much weight each deserves. That's what I want to talk about today, because once we've established that a court has a responsibility for answering a legal question, even if we've determined that they're exercising de novo review, we still need to understand how the court will exercise that responsibility.

Marc: Last week, we talked about how courts decide whether a question is one of law or fact, and we spent a lot of time discussing standards of review. Where do these interpretive rules fit?

Gwen: Think about what happens when a court decides to review a question of statutory interpretation independently, doing it without deferring to an agency. That tells us how the court is supposed to approach the agency's interpretation, but it doesn't tell anyone what the statute means. The judge still has to figure that out. That's where the canons we're going to be talking about today come in. They're principles courts use to work out the meaning of statutory language. Let's look at a couple that the justices were using in Yates. They have Latin names, but the underlying ideas are familiar. The first is noscitur a sociis, which roughly means that a word is known by the company it keeps.

Marc: The meaning of a word depends partly on the words around it.

Gwen: Yes. Think about the phrase from Yates, that record, document, or tangible object. If you saw tangible object by yourself, you would naturally think it covered anything physical. But when it's placed after record and document, it becomes possible to read the phrase more narrowly. Records and documents are used to preserve information. So perhaps tangible object refers to other objects that perform the same function.

Marc: Like a hard drive or a flash drive.

Gwen: Yes, that was central to Ginsburg's reasoning. But here's where it gets interesting. Kagan, writing for the dissent, didn't reject the idea that the surrounding words help establish meaning. She just challenged the conclusion.

Marc: Because words might have something else in common.

Gwen: Yes. Here, records and documents don't just preserve information. They also serve as evidence in an investigation. And so can a physical object like fish. Under Kagan's approach, all three categories fit together because they can contain or provide evidence that someone might try to destroy.

Marc: Okay, and so the same principle, you look at the surrounding words, can support different interpretations depending on what common characteristic you identify.

Gwen: Yes, that doesn't mean a canon is meaningless. It requires the interpreter to consider context rather than isolating a phrase from the statute. But identifying the relevant context and deciding what it tells us can require judgment. So, now let's look at a related one, ejusdem generis. That one means of the same kind. When a statute lists specific items followed by a general category, courts may interpret the general language in light of the examples. That's another way of looking at record, document, or tangible object. The question is what kind of objects the specific example suggests that Congress had in mind.

Marc: OK, but the legislature might have used a broad phrase precisely because it wanted to include things beyond those examples.

Gwen: Right. That's the tension here. The canon gives us reason to limit the general phrase, but it's still possible that the legislature intended the broad language to have a broad meaning. Both of these appeared in Yates. In Ginsburg's opinion and Alito's concurrence, it relied on them to support this narrow understanding of tangible object. And Kagan's dissent argued that they didn't justify excluding fish. There's another principle in Yates, the rule against surplusage. The courts generally prefer interpretations that give meaning to every part of a statute rather than treating words as unnecessary.

Marc: Yeah, we use a similar principle in property law when interpreting a deed. We try to give effect to all of the language and read the provisions so as to not eliminate any particular provision that was included.

Gwen: So consider what happens if tangible object means absolutely anything physical.

Marc: Okay, then record and document are already included. They're both tangible objects.

Gwen: At least if we're talking about physical records and physical documents. And that's one of the arguments supporting the narrow interpretation. Why would Congress specifically mention records and documents if the catch-all phrase already covered them?

Marc: But ordinary language can also be redundant. People list examples and then add a broader category all the time.

Gwen: Sure, they do. And statutes sometimes do the same thing. Legislatures can use overlapping terms for emphasis or to make particular important applications unmistakable. The rule against surplusage doesn't automatically defeat every interpretation that creates some overlap. But there's another familiar expression, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Expressing one thing may imply the exclusion of another. Suppose Congress authorizes an agency to impose civil penalties for three specifically identified violations.

Marc: I'd question whether the agency could impose the same penalties for a fourth violation that Congress didn't list then.

Gwen: This specific list could suggest Congress is deliberately limiting the penalty authority, but it also depends on context. Sometimes a list is intended to be exhaustive. Other times Congress is simply identifying examples. So once again, the canon provides a reason for an interpretation, but it doesn't automatically settle the question. This leads to the famous criticisms of canons by Karl Llewellyn. In 1950, he assembled a table of interpretive canons alongside other canons that went the opposite direction.

Marc: So whatever interpretation a lawyer wanted, there might be a canon supporting it.

Gwen: Right. And then the other side could counter with whatever the opposing canon was. That was the criticism. If every canon has its counter canon, perhaps these rules don't actually constrain judges nearly as much as lawyers might suggest.

Marc: But I think that demands too much of them. And in property law, we regularly apply competing interpretive principles. We might prefer a specific description over a general one. We might try to give effect to the entire instrument. We might read the language in the context of other language.

Gwen: Right.

Marc: But sometimes those principles point in different directions. That doesn't mean they're useless and it doesn't mean that judges stop judging when they make choices.

Gwen: You could say that. It doesn't necessarily mean that Llewellyn established that these canons have no constraining force. Some interpretations seem to fit language a lot better than others. Some principles are particularly appropriate to certain statutory structures. But he was making an important point that there isn't a universally controlling formula for deciding which canon should prevail whenever accepted interpretive principles point in different directions. So judges can't merely look up a statutory phrase, find the applicable canon, and get an answer. They have to decide how these interpretive principles fit together.

Marc: Which is true of legal reasoning generally.

Gwen: Yes, it is. But this is especially important after Loper Bright. If courts are required to exercise independent judgment about statutory meaning, they need to figure it out. That doesn't tell them which interpretive principles should prevail in some sort of difficult case. And so far, we've been talking about rules primarily concerned with how language works. The next category is different. So these are substantive canons. They don't reflect conventions about language. They protect background legal and constitutional principles. This isn't a distinction between neutral rules and rules that involve some sort of judicial choice. Both the semantic and substantive canons require judgment. But the difference is that these semantic canons generally draw on conventions of language and drafting, while substantive canons more explicitly incorporate legal values and institutional presumptions.

Marc: Okay, give me an example of what we're talking about here.

Gwen: Yates worked for this one as well. Remember, he was being prosecuted under a criminal statute. Ginsburg's opinion discussed one more interpretive principle, the rule of lenity.

Marc: Which says that ambiguity in a criminal statute can be resolved in favor of the defendant.

Gwen: Yes, it can, although only after ordinary interpretive tools have been exhausted and genuine ambiguity remains. So the rule reflects concern about fair notice and the proper allocation of responsibility for defining crimes. If Congress wants to impose criminal punishment, the law should give sufficiently clear notice of what conduct is prohibited.

Marc: This is different from deciding whether words in a list share a common meaning.

Gwen: Yes. The semantic canons help us understand how the language operates. Lenity can resolve some sort of remaining ambiguity based on substantive principles about criminal punishment. And notice another disagreement in Yates. Ginsburg suggested that if doubt remained after the ordinary interpretive analysis, lenity would favor Yates. Kagan rejected that approach because she didn't think the statute remained ambiguous.

Marc: So even before applying lenity, the justices disagreed about whether there was enough uncertainty for it to matter.

Gwen: Yes, and this illustrates a broader point, that substantive canons may require courts to decide whether some sort of threshold has been satisfied before the canon even applies, like constitutional avoidance. If a statute is reasonably susceptible to two interpretations and one raises serious constitutional doubts while the other avoids them, courts generally prefer the interpretation that avoids those doubts.

Marc: Even if the court hasn't actually decided whether the other interpretation would be unconstitutional.

Gwen: Yes, we have administrative law examples here, too. In DeBartolo, a labor union was handing out leaflets at a shopping mall, urging customers not to shop there because of a dispute over construction workers' wages. The National Labor Relations Board interpreted federal labor law to prohibit that kind of activity as unlawful coercion.

Marc: But handing someone a leaflet asking them not to shop somewhere sounds like ordinary speech.

Gwen: This is why the Supreme Court was concerned. The board's interpretation raised serious First Amendment questions. The court concluded that the statutory prohibition didn't have to be read to reach peaceful hand-billing that involved no picketing or intimidation.

Marc: So the court didn't have to decide whether Congress could constitutionally prohibit those leaflets.

Gwen: Right. It adopted a permissible interpretation that avoided the constitutional question. That's an important difference from the semantic canons. Constitutional avoidance doesn't merely ask what a word ordinarily means. It gives the court a reason to prefer one permissible interpretation because of the constitutional problems another interpretation would create. Or we can think about the presumption against retroactivity. Courts generally require a clear indication from Congress before interpreting legislation to have certain retroactive effects. And those rules reflect legal values beyond the ordinary meaning of individual words. And one of the most consequential interpretive principles in modern administrative law is the major questions doctrine.

Marc: Which we've discussed at length.

Gwen: We have. And we already discussed something important about it, that the justices don't agree on what kind of interpretive rule it really is. Remember, we talked about two versions of the doctrine, the weak version and the strong version.

Marc: Yeah, the weak version is really just a way of interpreting statutes. The stronger version requires something more from Congress.

Gwen: Yes. And so that works particularly well with what we're trying to think about today. If we think about West Virginia v. EPA, the case we were talking about a lot back when we were talking about the major questions doctrine, EPA relied on a provision in the Clean Air Act authorizing it to determine the best system of emissions reductions for certain pollution sources. The dispute concerned whether that language authorized the EPA to adopt an approach that involved a shift in electricity generation from higher emitting sources like coal towards lower emitting ones like solar. Under the weak version of the major questions doctrine, the extraordinary significance of the claimed authority is part of the context you'd consider when interpreting the statute.

Marc: Because we might not ordinarily understand Congress to have authorized a major restructuring of an industry through general language.

Gwen: Right. That's Barrett's approach. She argues that the constitutional structure and ordinary expectations about how Congress delegates authority can help us determine the statute's most natural meaning. But here's the critical point. Under that approach, the objective is still to try and identify the best interpretation of what Congress enacted. The major questions doctrine in this way is a way of understanding the text, not a reason to depart from its best reading.

Marc: And the strong version of that?

Gwen: This is Gorsuch. Gorsuch has defended a much stronger version grounded in constitutional principles about delegated power. Under this approach, extraordinary claims of authority require especially clear congressional authorization. And that requirement operates as an additional constraint rather than simply another consideration in determining the statute's ordinary meaning.

Marc: So a court might conclude that the statutory language would ordinarily authorize the agency's action, but still find that Congress hadn't spoken clearly enough.

Gwen: Right. That's the concern. This is why the distinction matters. Barrett warned that a strong version could require judges to reject the best reading of a statute in favor of a narrow interpretation, merely because Congress didn't express its delegation with sufficient specificity. And Kagan has gone even further. She argues that ordinary statutory interpretation is sufficient, that courts should enforce the delegations Congress actually enacted, whether broad or narrow, without imposing some sort of special major questions requirement.

Marc: We saw that disagreement in the tariff case.

Gwen: We did. In Learning Resources v. Trump, the justices agreed that the tariffs exceeded the statutory authority at issue, but they disagreed sharply about the role of the major questions doctrine. Barrett defended the contextual approach. Gorsuch defended the stronger rule. And Kagan concluded that the ordinary statutory analysis was enough without invoking the doctrine at all. This isn't merely an argument about how broadly to interpret one statutory phrase. It's a disagreement about what courts are doing when they invoke the major questions doctrine. Are they using context to determine what Congress meant? Or are they applying a substantive principle that demands some special degree of clarity before recognizing certain types of delegations?

Marc: The answer changes depending on how much authority the doctrine gives judges.

Gwen: Yes. Under this contextual approach, the court's trying to identify the statute's best reading. Under the stronger approach, the court could impose a separate requirement for recognizing extraordinary delegated authority. Both approaches require judgment about what counts as extraordinary in the first place. And that's why the major questions doctrine is such a useful example of the interpretive toolkit. The disagreement isn't just over the answer, it's over the nature of the tool itself.

Marc: But you keep emphasizing that courts develop these rules, and I'm not sure why that should bother us. Most of the rules for interpreting deeds were developed by judges. That's ordinary common law reasoning.

Gwen: That judges developed a rule isn't what concerns me. What concerns me is what the rule can do. There's a difference between a convention that helps identify how words ordinarily operate and a presumption that requires a legislature to speak with unusual clarity before a court recognizes a particular consequence.

Marc: But clear statement rules can be legitimate, too. They're part of how courts interpret statutes against background constitutional and legal principles.

Gwen: Sure. And the major questions doctrine did have substantial antecedents. MCI v. AT&T and FDA v. Brown & Williamson, that was the FDA regulating cigarettes case, reflected concerns about finding extraordinary agency authority in broadly worded provisions. And supporters of the doctrine see it as expressing longstanding principles about Congress's responsibility for major policy decisions. But there's certainly an argument that the present formulation imposes a sharpened requirement on statutes that were enacted before it even existed.

Marc: OK, and the same problem can arise with deeds. Courts develop rules of construction and they apply them to instruments that were drafted earlier.

Gwen: That's true, but there is a practical difference. If you're representing someone preparing a deed, there's an established interpretive rule that might produce an unwanted result.

Marc: We draft around it. We say more clearly what the grantor intends.

Gwen: Congress can amend a statute, but doing so requires another law. Both houses must pass it and it must go through the constitutional process involving presidential approval or a veto override.

Marc: But you're comparing Congress changing an existing statute with someone drafting a new deed. Once a deed is transferred property rights, the original grantor generally can't unilaterally rewrite it without some form of doctrinal assistance from the court. If the court later applies a new rule of construction to that deed, the parties may be just stuck with that as a result, or the court may decide that this interpretation just hasn't been given the force of authority and so disregard it. But either way, it's not just a clear pass based on a doctrinal reading.

Gwen: Even if an existing deed can't generally be rewritten too easily either. Future private parties can still adjust their drafting more easily than Congress can amend a federal statute. And there's another distinction. A dispute over a deed generally concerns particular property rights. A judicial interpretation over federal delegation can define an agency's authority over an entire regulatory program. When courts apply substantive canons, they're not merely resolving a dispute about language. Their interpretive choices can affect the allocation of authority between Congress and agencies. Let's think about a statute that's been enacted in 1970. A later court could require a degree of clarity that the enacting Congress had no reason to anticipate in precisely that form. The court may understand itself as applying this established background principle, but the effect can still be to limit the scope of a statutory delegation without Congress changing the text. And this matters especially in administrative law, where a statutory interpretation determines the boundaries of agency power. A court's choice of canon can affect whether Congress authorized an agency to act and how broadly it authorized that action. That's a significant exercise of judicial authority.

Marc: Although that concern is strongest with the version of major questions that imposes a separate clarity requirement rather than treating the significance of the claimed authority as part of the statutory context.

Gwen: Yes, that's an important distinction. The strong version raises that concern particularly because the court could require some sort of clear statement to narrow authority that the ordinary interpretive analysis would have otherwise been fine with. Under the contextual approach, the court's claim is that it's simply trying to identify what Congress most naturally meant. But either way, these are judicially developed principles that shape how courts understand statutory delegations.

Marc: And where does the agency fit into all this? Presumably the agency has its own understanding of what Congress authorized it to do.

Gwen: It does. Remember our earlier episode on Skidmore? This was when the Supreme Court recognized that an agency's interpretation could be persuasive without being binding. They were looking at the quality of the agency's reasoning, its consistency, and its expertise, and saying those could all potentially influence how much weight the court would give it.

Marc: Even though the court decides what the statute means, the agency can still contribute to that decision.

Gwen: Sure. Courts exercise independent judgment, but that doesn't mean they have to disregard the agency's expertise. And the interpretive rules we've discussed today help courts evaluate statutory meaning. An agency's well-reasoned interpretation can contribute to that analysis. It just doesn't control the result.

Marc: Okay. Last week, we talked about how courts determine whether something is a question of law or a question of fact. Today, we've been talking about how they actually answer questions of law when they're doing a de novo review. Next week, we're going to move to a related question, which is questions of fact.

Gwen: Yes, and we're moving to a different standard of review. For statutory questions, courts generally exercise independent judgment. That's why we didn't spend a lot of time on it today. The interpretive rules we talked about today help them decide what the law means when they're applying that independent judgment. But when courts review agency factual findings, Congress may, generally does, require them to apply a much more deferential standard.

Marc: Substantial evidence.

Gwen: Yes. And under substantial evidence review, the court examines the administrative record to determine whether the agency's factual findings have sufficient support. It doesn't simply reweigh the evidence and make the findings it would have preferred.

Marc: We're returning to Kathleen's disability case next week.

Gwen: Yes. So we spent today looking at how courts answer questions of statutory interpretation. Next week, we'll return to our case to examine a different problem. What happens when a court disagrees with the agency's findings about the facts? How much authority does the court have to second guess the agency's conclusions about what Kathleen can actually do?

Marc: That's next week. So that does it for today's episode on administrative remedies. Thank you for joining us today. Please, if you enjoy this podcast, enjoy this episode, give us a like on Spotify, iTunes, or whatever platform you're listening on. And be sure to tune in next time where we'll continue to dive into the contours of administrative law, because remember, you can't fix what you don't understand.

Related Guides

Marc: That's next week. So that does it for today's episode on administrative remedies. Thank you for joining us today. Please, if you enjoy this podcast, enjoy this episode, give us a like on Spotify, iTunes, or whatever platform you're listening on. And be sure to tune in next time where we'll continue to dive into the contours of administrative law, because remember, you can't fix what you don't understand.

Related Guides