Pairings for Breyer, Stewart, Sunstein, Vermeule & Herz, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy: Problems, Text, and Cases (9th ed. 2022)

Section B: What Is Administrative Law?
→ Why We Need the Administrative State — covers what administrative law is, why it exists, and why it matters.

Section C: Regulation (Market Failures, Regulatory Tools, Regulatory Performance)
→ Why We Need the Administrative State — covers the market failure rationale and the standard cases for and against regulation. The podcast’s treatment is more introductory than the Sunstein and Viscusi excerpts in Section C.3; it serves as orientation before students encounter the scholarly debate.

Section D: The Historical Development of Administrative Government
→ Why We Need the Administrative State — covers the New Deal era and the shifts through the modern period.
→ Trump v. Slaughter Explained: The Case That Ended Independent Agencies — brings Section D.8 (“The Future”) current through the 2026 ruling that unsettled the Humphrey’s Executor framework.

Section B.1–5: The Nondelegation Doctrine (Schechter, Benzene, American Trucking, Whitman, Gundy)
→ The Nondelegation Doctrine Explained — covers the full doctrinal arc, including the 1935 cases, mid-century decline, and the Gundy revival.
→ The Intelligible Principle Explained — covers the test from J.W. Hampton through Whitman v. American Trucking.
→ Delegation of Power Explained — covers the general principle and why Congress delegates.

Section B.7: Tools of Congressional Control (INS v. Chadha, Legislative Veto)
→ The podcast doesn’t yet have dedicated coverage of the legislative veto. Noted in gaps.

Section C.1: Hiring — Appointment of Officers (Buckley, Lucia, Edmond, Free Enterprise Fund)
→ Independent vs. Executive Agencies — covers the structural setup that the Appointments Clause doctrines police.
→ The Removal Power — covers the appointment/removal relationship directly, including Lucia.

Section C.2: Removal (not explicitly broken out in Ch.2’s TOC but woven through C — covered by Free Enterprise Fund and the removal cases in Ch.3 of other books)
→ The Removal Power — covers the doctrinal arc from Myers through Seila Law.
→ Trump v. Slaughter Explained — brings the Humphrey’s Executor line into 2026.

Section C.3.c: Practical Considerations / Presidential Memoranda
→ Two Executive Orders, Two Very Different Days in Court: Birthright Citizenship and Mail Voting — covers how presidential directives interact with agency authority through two 2025–26 orders that took very different paths through the courts.

Section C.4: Supervisory Authority — Presidential Control (EO 12866, EO 13563, Cost-Benefit Analysis)
→ The podcast doesn’t yet have dedicated OIRA/EO 12866 coverage. Noted in gaps.

Section D: The Agency’s Power to Adjudicate (Crowell, Northern Pipeline, Schor, Stern, Oil States, Seventh Amendment)
→ Can a Federal Agency Fine You Without a Jury Trial? — covers Jarkesy’s doctrinal foundations, which build directly on the Schor / public-rights / private-rights framework from this section.
→ Jarkesy Jumps to the FTC: Intuit v. FTC Explained — current application of the doctrine to the FTC’s adjudication scheme.

Section A: Review of Questions of Fact (Universal Camera, Allentown Mack)
→ Judicial Review of Agency Action — covers substantial evidence review and the standards for reviewing factual findings.
→ Why Two Identical Disability Cases Can Have Opposite Outcomes — covers evidence and credibility determinations in the specific context of substantial evidence review.

Section B: Review of Questions of Law — Pre-Chevron and Skidmore (Hearst, Skidmore)
→ Chevron, Skidmore, and Loper Bright: How Courts Review Agency Decisions — the three-episode arc covers the pre-Chevron framework.

Section C.1–2: Chevron Basics and Step Zero (Chevron, Mead, Barnhart, King v. Burwell, City of Arlington)
→ Chevron, Skidmore, and Loper Bright — core coverage of Chevron’s two-step framework and Mead’s step zero.
→ The Major Questions Doctrine Explained — covers King v. Burwell as an early MQD precursor.

Section C.3: Chevron, Textualism, Literalism — Step One (Brown & Williamson, Massachusetts v. EPA)
→ Chevron, Skidmore, and Loper Bright — covers the mechanics of Step One analysis.
→ The Major Questions Doctrine Explained — covers Brown & Williamson as the paradigmatic pre-West Virginia v. EPA MQD case.

Section C.4: Chevron Step Two (Michigan v. EPA)
→ Chevron, Skidmore, and Loper Bright — covers Step Two analysis.

Section C.5: Chevron and Judicial Precedent (Brand X)
→ Chevron, Skidmore, and Loper Bright — covers the Brand X problem and its implications for Loper Bright.
→ Corner Post and Regulatory Finality — relevant to the stare decisis question once Chevron is gone.

Section D: Agency Interpretations of Agency Regulations (Kisor v. Wilkie)
→ Chevron, Skidmore, and Loper Bright — covers Auer/Kisor deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations.

Section E.1–3: Arbitrary and Capricious / Hard Look (Overton Park, Mass. v. EPA, State Farm, Baltimore Gas, FCC v. Fox)
→ Judicial Review of Agency Action — covers the State Farm test and hard-look review.
→ The Administrative Record Explained — covers the Overton Park record-review framework.

Section E.4: Agency Policy Change Across Administrations — Pretext and Reliance (DHS v. Regents)
→ The Administrative Record Explained — covers the Department of Commerce v. New York census case, the paradigmatic pretext case, and the doctrinal framework the Court applied to DACA.

Section A: Must Agencies Make Rules?
→ Rulemaking vs. Adjudication — covers the general question of when agencies should rule by rulemaking versus adjudication.

Section B: Requiring Consistent Explanation — The Chenery Litigation (Chenery I, Chenery II)
→ Agency Control of Adjudication — covers the Chenery doctrine and the choice between rulemaking and adjudication as policy instruments.

Section C: Consistency in Applying Regulations — “An Agency Must Follow Its Own Rules” (Caceres)
→ When a Judge Is Told to Reverse Her Own Decisions: The Annandale Immigration Court Case — current application of the “agency must follow its own rules” doctrine (Accardi v. Shaughnessy) in immigration court, which is the modern analogue to the doctrinal question Caceres raises.

Section D: Equitable Estoppel (Schweiker v. Hansen, OPM v. Richmond)
→ No direct episode; not covered in the podcast.

Section E.1: Adjudication — Inconsistent Decisions, Retroactivity, Res Judicata
→ Agency Control of Adjudication — covers how agencies manage inconsistency and the mechanisms they use to produce (or avoid producing) consistent outcomes.
→ Why the Same Disability Claim Can Win or Lose Depending on Which Judge You Draw — covers the empirical problem of inconsistency in agency adjudication.

Section E.2: Rulemaking — Retroactivity (Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital)
→ Corner Post and Regulatory Finality — covers the backward-looking question of how long a rule stays exposed to challenge, which is the counterpart to the retroactivity question.

Section A: Rulemaking and Adjudication — The Constitutional Distinction (Londoner, Bi-Metallic)
→ Rulemaking vs. Adjudication — covers the Londoner/Bi-Metallic distinction and its downstream procedural consequences.

Section B.2.a–b: Triggering and Overview of Formal Adjudication (Dominion Energy)
→ The Adjudication Spectrum — covers when a formal hearing is triggered and what “formal” means.

Section B.4–6: Formal vs. Informal Rulemaking, Notice and Comment (Florida East Coast, Nova Scotia, Vermont Yankee, Perez v. Mortgage Bankers, Long Island Care)
→ Rulemaking vs. Adjudication — covers why formal rulemaking died after Florida East Coast.
→ Notice and Comment Rulemaking — covers the full § 553 process, including notice, the “logical outgrowth” test, and the concise general statement requirement.

Section B.7: Exceptions to Notice-and-Comment (US v. Texas, Community Nutrition, American Mining Congress, Hoctor, Air Transport, Little Sisters)
→ Notice and Comment Rulemaking — covers the good cause exception, interpretive rules, policy statements, procedural rules, and the circuit splits around what counts as “legislative” vs. “interpretive.”

Section B.9: Consequences of the Transformation — Ossification, Direct Final Rules, Negotiated Rulemaking
→ Corner Post and Regulatory Finality — covers downstream regulatory stability.
→ Two Executive Orders, Two Very Different Days in Court — covers negotiated rulemaking in context through the student loan plan’s required HEA restart.

Section C.1: Need for Facts in the Record (Union Electric)
→ The Administrative Record Explained — covers what counts as the administrative record and official notice.

Section C.2: Off-the-Record Communications (PATCO, Sierra Club v. Costle)
→ The Administrative Record Explained — covers ex parte contacts and what agencies can lawfully exclude from the record.

Section D.1–2: Traditional Learning and Protected Interests (Right/Privilege, Summary Action, Goldberg, Roth, Sindermann, Arnett, Meachum, Sandin)
→ Due Process Explained — covers the shift from the right/privilege distinction to the modern due process framework.
→ Property Interests and What Counts as “Property” — covers Roth, Sindermann, and the entitlements framework.

Section D.3: The Process Due — Mathews Balancing (Mathews, Goss, Horowitz, Schweiker, Loudermill, Walters)
→ The Mathews Balancing Test Explained — walks through the three-part test and its application.
→ Due Process, Habeas Corpus, and Immigration Right Now — current application of the Mathews framework to immigration enforcement.

Section E: Public Disclosure of Agency Information (FOIA Basics and Exemptions)
→ The podcast doesn’t yet have dedicated FOIA coverage. The Administrative Record Explained page addresses FOIA Exemption 5 and the deliberative process privilege. A full FOIA episode is on the production roadmap.

Section A.1: Separation of Functions in Adjudication (Wong Yang Sung)
→ When the Agency Reviews Itself: How Internal Appeals Actually Work — covers separation of functions in practice.

Section A.3: The Independence of Administrative Law Judges (Nash v. Bowen)
→ Who Decides: ALJs vs. Non-ALJs — covers the institutional distinction between ALJs and other agency adjudicators.
→ Why the Same Disability Claim Can Win or Lose Depending on Which Judge You Draw — covers the empirical question of ALJ independence and variation.

Section A.4: Appointment of Administrative Law Judges / Note on Non-ALJ “Administrative Judges”
→ Who Decides: ALJs vs. Non-ALJs — directly covers the ALJ vs. non-ALJ distinction.
→ When a Judge Is Told to Reverse Her Own Decisions: The Annandale Immigration Court Case — covers how non-ALJ adjudicators (immigration judges) are managed, which is the live field version of the Section A.4 question.

Section B.1–2: Combination of Functions and Bias (Withrow, Cement Institute, Cinderella)
→ When the Agency Reviews Itself: How Internal Appeals Actually Work — covers the institutional separation-of-functions doctrine in practice.
→ Agency Control of Adjudication — covers the mechanisms by which agencies maintain (and limit) decisional independence.

Section C: Who Decides? (Morgan I)
→ Who Decides: ALJs vs. Non-ALJs — covers the “who decides” question across the spectrum of agency adjudicators.

Section A: Statutory Provisions for Judicial Review
→ Judicial Review of Agency Action — covers the architecture of APA review and the statutory framework.

Section C.1–3: Reviewability — Presumption, Preclusion (Block, Michigan Academy, Johnson v. Robison)
→ Scope Limits Explained: When Courts Won’t Review Agency Action at All — covers the presumption of reviewability, statutory preclusion, and the “committed to agency discretion” exception.

Section C.4: Committed to Agency Discretion (Heckler v. Chaney, SUWA, Webster v. Doe)
→ Scope Limits Explained — covers Chaney’s presumption of unreviewability for enforcement decisions and the Adams v. Richardson abdication exception.

Section C.4.c: Judicial Review of Agency Inaction (Massachusetts v. EPA)
→ Scope Limits Explained — covers Massachusetts v. EPA as the exception that proves the Chaney rule.

Section D.1–2: Standing — Introduction and the Data Processing Revolution (ADAPSO)
→ Standing Explained: Why the Crocodile Case Decides Who Can Sue a Federal Agency — covers the modern three-part standing framework.

Section D.4–5: Zone of Interests and Injury in Fact (Clarke, Air Courier, NCUA, Lujan, Massachusetts v. EPA, Allen v. Wright)
→ Standing Explained — covers the zone-of-interests test, Lujan, and the modern standing framework.
→ When “I Want to Look at the White House” Isn’t Enough: The Ballroom Standing Ruling — current 2025 application of the particularized injury requirement.

Section D.7: Nexus, Causation, Redressability (Simon, Duke Power, Allen v. Wright, Clapper)
→ Standing Explained — covers causation and redressability as the second and third prongs.

Section D.8: Information (FEC v. Akins)
→ Standing Explained — covers Akins and informational standing.

Section E.1: Ripeness (Abbott Labs, NLRB Union v. FLRA, National Automatic Laundry, Reno v. Catholic Social Services)
→ Ripeness, Exhaustion, and Mootness Explained — covers ripeness as one of three timing doctrines.
→ Two Executive Orders, Two Very Different Days in Court: Birthright Citizenship and Mail Voting — current 2025–26 application of ripeness, including how the Supreme Court held the mail voting challenge premature.

Section E.2: Finality
→ Finality Explained: When Has the Agency Actually Done Something You Can Sue About? — covers Bennett v. Spear’s two-part test and Sackett.

Section E.3: Exhaustion (Myers v. Bethlehem, FTC v. Standard Oil, McKart, Woodford v. Ngo)
→ Ripeness, Exhaustion, and Mootness Explained — covers exhaustion as one of three timing doctrines, including statutory and issue exhaustion.

Section E.4: Judicial Stay / Interim Relief
→ The Emergency Docket Explained: How the Supreme Court Decides Cases Before It Decides Them — covers the procedural posture through which stays and interim relief now typically reach the Supreme Court.