Pairings for Hickman, Pierce & Walker, Federal Administrative Law: Cases and Materials (4th ed. 2023)
For each chapter of the casebook, the Learn pages and podcast episodes below provide plain-language explanations, current-case applications, and audio treatment that pairs with the material. Pairings can be assigned before class to orient students to the doctrine, after class to reinforce it, or as review.
Chapter 1 — Introduction
Section A: The Study of Administrative Law
→ Why We Need the Administrative State — covers the policy rationale for the administrative state and the basic case for studying administrative law.
Section B: What Is an Agency? (CREW v. Office of Administration, executive/independent distinction)
→ Independent vs. Executive Agencies — covers the structural distinction and why it matters.
→ Delegation of Power Explained — covers how Congress creates agencies and vests them with authority.
Section C: The History of Administrative Law
→ Why We Need the Administrative State — covers the New Deal era and the modern period’s pressures on the administrative state.
→ Trump v. Slaughter Explained: The Case That Ended Independent Agencies — brings “the modern era” (Section C.5) current through the 2026 ruling that unsettled the Humphrey’s Executor framework.
Chapter 2 — Congress and Agencies
Section A.1: The Nondelegation Doctrine (Panama Refining, Schechter, Benzene, Whitman, Michigan v. EPA, Gundy)
→ The Nondelegation Doctrine Explained — covers the full doctrinal arc, including the 1935 cases, the mid-century decline, and the Gundy revival.
→ The Intelligible Principle Explained — covers the test from J.W. Hampton through Whitman v. American Trucking.
→ Delegation of Power Explained — covers the general principle and why Congress delegates.
Section A.1.e: Subdelegation (Nou excerpt, US Telecom Ass’n)
→ Delegation of Power Explained — covers the general principle behind why subdelegation questions arise.
Section B: Delegating Adjudicatory Power (Crowell, Northern Pipeline, Schor, Granfinanciera)
→ Can a Federal Agency Fine You Without a Jury Trial? — covers Jarkesy’s doctrinal foundations, which build directly on the Schor / public-rights / private-rights framework.
→ Jarkesy Jumps to the FTC: Intuit v. FTC Explained — current application of the doctrine to the FTC’s adjudication scheme.
Section D.1: Due Process Limits on Congressional Power (Pillsbury v. FTC)
→ Due Process Explained — covers the baseline due process framework that applies to congressional meddling in pending adjudications.
Chapter 3 — Presidential Control of Agencies
Section A.1–4: Appointments (Buckley, Lucia, Morrison, Edmond, Arthrex, Freytag)
→ Independent vs. Executive Agencies — covers the structural setup that the Appointments Clause doctrines police.
→ The Removal Power — covers the appointment/removal link directly, including Arthrex and Lucia.
Section B: The Power to Remove (Myers through Seila Law)
→ The Removal Power — covers the doctrinal arc from Myers through Seila Law.
→ Trump v. Slaughter Explained — brings the Humphrey’s Executor line into 2026, which the casebook’s coverage anticipates but cannot fully address.
Section C.1: Youngstown and Presidential Authority
→ Two Executive Orders, Two Very Different Days in Court: Birthright Citizenship and Mail Voting — covers how presidential authority is tested through agencies, with current application to two 2025–26 executive orders.
Section C.2: Tools Presidents Use (EO 12866, OMB/OIRA, Strauss excerpt)
→ The podcast doesn’t yet have dedicated OIRA/EO 12866 coverage. Noted in gaps.
Chapter 4 — Adjudication
Section A.1.a: Londoner/Bi-Metallic
→ Rulemaking vs. Adjudication — covers the Londoner/Bi-Metallic distinction and its downstream procedural consequences.
Section A.1.b: Life, Liberty, or Property (Goldberg, Roth, Sindermann, Paul v. Davis, Kerry v. Din)
→ Due Process Explained — covers the shift from the right/privilege distinction to the modern framework.
→ Property Interests and What Counts as “Property” — covers Roth, Sindermann, and the entitlements framework.
Section A.2: Procedures Required by Due Process (Mathews, Loudermill)
→ The Mathews Balancing Test Explained — walks through the three-part test and its application.
Section B.1: Formal Adjudication (Dominion Energy)
→ The Adjudication Spectrum — covers when a formal hearing is triggered and what “formal” means.
Section B.2: Informal Adjudication (Overton Park, LTV)
→ The Lifecycle of an Administrative Case — walks through an administrative adjudication from start to finish.
→ The Administrative Record Explained — covers Overton Park’s record-review framework and what counts as an adequate record.
Section C.1–2: Separation of Functions and the Judicial/Bureaucratic Models (Withrow, Nash v. Bowen)
→ When the Agency Reviews Itself: How Internal Appeals Actually Work — covers separation of functions in practice.
→ Who Decides: ALJs vs. Non-ALJs — covers the institutional distinctions.
→ Why the Same Disability Claim Can Win or Lose Depending on Which Judge You Draw — directly addresses the “Ongoing Issues with ALJs in the Social Security Disability System” subsection.
Section D.1: Judicial Review of Agency Fact Finding (Universal Camera, Richardson v. Perales, Biestek, Data Processing)
→ Judicial Review of Agency Action — covers substantial evidence review and the standards for reviewing factual findings.
→ Why Two Identical Disability Cases Can Have Opposite Outcomes — directly covers the evidence and credibility determinations at stake in Richardson v. Perales and Biestek.
→ How Social Security Disability Hearings Work — provides the procedural context.
Chapter 5 — Rules and Rulemaking
Section A.1: Agency Power to Issue Rules (National Petroleum Refiners)
→ Notice and Comment Rulemaking — covers the core rulemaking authority question.
Section A.2: Functional Relationship Between Rules and Adjudications (Heckler v. Campbell, Yetman)
→ Rulemaking vs. Adjudication — covers how rules and adjudications interact and the structural choice between them.
Section A.3: Making “Rules” Through Adjudication (Chenery II, Bowen v. Georgetown)
→ Agency Control of Adjudication — covers the Chenery doctrine and the choice between rulemaking and adjudication as policy instruments.
Section B.1: Decline of Formal Rulemaking (Florida East Coast)
→ Rulemaking vs. Adjudication — covers why formal rulemaking essentially died after Florida East Coast.
Section B.2: The Evolution of Informal Rulemaking (Vermont Yankee, Shell Oil, Portland Cement, ARRL, Nova Scotia, Sierra Club v. Costle, ANA v. FTC)
→ Notice and Comment Rulemaking — covers the full § 553 process, including notice, the “logical outgrowth” test, and the concise general statement requirement.
→ The Administrative Record Explained — covers the record-review framework that governs challenges to rules.
Section B.3: Exemptions (Mack Trucks, Little Sisters, Mendoza, American Mining Congress, Pacific Gas, Community Nutrition)
→ Notice and Comment Rulemaking — covers the good cause exception, interpretive rules, policy statements, and procedural rules exemptions.
Section C: Arbitrary and Capricious / Hard Look Review (NTDRA, State Farm, FCC v. Fox, Hard Look and Pretextual Reasoning)
→ Judicial Review of Agency Action — covers the State Farm test and arbitrary-and-capricious review.
→ The Administrative Record Explained — covers the Department of Commerce v. New York census case, which is the paradigmatic example for the “Hard Look Review and Pretextual Reasoning” subsection.
Section D: Ossification and Responses (Negotiated Rulemaking, Direct Final, Remand Without Vacatur)
→ Corner Post and Regulatory Finality — covers the downstream consequences of ossification for regulatory stability.
→ Two Executive Orders, Two Very Different Days in Court — covers negotiated rulemaking in context through the student loan plan’s required HEA restart.
Chapter 6 — Statutory Interpretation in Administrative Law
Section A: The Pre-Chevron Approach (Hearst, Skidmore)
→ Chevron, Skidmore, and Loper Bright: How Courts Review Agency Decisions — the three-episode arc covers the pre-Chevron framework, including Skidmore deference.
Section B: The Chevron Revolution (Chevron, Scalia and Bressman excerpts, Walker’s Literature Review)
→ Chevron, Skidmore, and Loper Bright — core coverage of Chevron’s two-step framework, its theoretical basis, and the critique literature. Walker’s own scholarship is cited inside the deference debate; this three-episode treatment is the podcast’s parallel.
Section B.1–3: Step One Tools, Substantive Canons, and Step Two (Rucker, General Dynamics, SWANCC, Babbitt, Carter, AT&T v. Iowa Utilities, Rapanos, Encino Motorcars)
→ Chevron, Skidmore, and Loper Bright — covers the mechanics of Step One and Step Two analysis.
Section C: Chevron’s Scope and the Mead Counter-Revolution (Christensen, Mead, Barnhart)
→ Chevron, Skidmore, and Loper Bright — covers the Mead step-zero framework.
Section D: Chevron and Stare Decisis (Brand X, Home Concrete)
→ Chevron, Skidmore, and Loper Bright — covers the Brand X problem and its implications for Loper Bright.
→ Corner Post and Regulatory Finality — relevant to the broader stare decisis / regulatory stability question.
Section E: Chevron and Jurisdictional Questions (City of Arlington)
→ Chevron, Skidmore, and Loper Bright — covers the jurisdictional question debate.
Section F: Major Questions Doctrine (King v. Burwell, West Virginia v. EPA)
→ The Major Questions Doctrine Explained — covers King v. Burwell and West Virginia v. EPA and the doctrine’s current scope.
→ The Supreme Court’s Tariff Ruling Explained — current application of MQD reasoning to IEEPA tariffs in 2026.
Section G: Agency Interpretations of Agency Regulations (Auer, Talk America, Kisor)
→ Chevron, Skidmore, and Loper Bright — covers Auer/Kisor deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations.
Chapter 7 — Prerequisites to Judicial Review
Section A.1: Preclusion (Johnson v. Robison, Block v. Community Nutrition, Michigan Academy)
→ Scope Limits Explained: When Courts Won’t Review Agency Action at All — covers the presumption of reviewability and statutory preclusion.
Section A.2: Committed to Agency Discretion (Overton Park, Webster, Lincoln v. Vigil)
→ Scope Limits Explained — covers the “no law to apply” test and its modern application.
Section A.3: Agency Inaction (Dunlop v. Bachowski, Heckler v. Chaney, American Horse Protection v. Lyng)
→ Scope Limits Explained — covers Chaney’s presumption of unreviewability and the Adams v. Richardson abdication exception.
Section B.1: Final Agency Action (Franklin, Bennett v. Spear, Hawkes)
→ Finality Explained: When Has the Agency Actually Done Something You Can Sue About? — covers Bennett v. Spear’s two-part test, Sackett, and the current finality framework.
Section B.2: Ripeness (Abbott Labs, NOVA, Reno v. Catholic Social Services)
→ Ripeness, Exhaustion, and Mootness Explained — covers all three timing doctrines together.
Section B.3: Duty to Exhaust (McKart, McCarthy v. Madigan, Carr v. Saul)
→ Ripeness, Exhaustion, and Mootness Explained — covers exhaustion as one of the three timing doctrines, including issue exhaustion.
Section C.1: Constitutional Standing (Allen v. Wright, Akins, TransUnion, Lujan, Steel Co., Friends of the Earth, Massachusetts v. EPA)
→ Standing Explained: Why the Crocodile Case Decides Who Can Sue a Federal Agency — covers Lujan and the modern three-part framework.
→ When “I Want to Look at the White House” Isn’t Enough: The Ballroom Standing Ruling — current 2025 application of the particularized injury requirement.
Section C.2: Statutory Standing / Zone of Interests (NCUA, Patchak)
→ Standing Explained — covers the zone-of-interests test under the APA.
